State v. BakerState v. Baker
We accepted discretionary review of a superior court decision which affirmed Glenn Baker's district court conviction for driving while license suspended. We hold the Department of Licensing suspended Mr. Baker's license without affording him his due process right to reasonable notice. Thus, the suspension is void; Mr. Baker's conviction is reversed.
The record establishes Mr. Baker's Washington driver's license expired in 1981. Mr. Baker testified he did not renew the license because he had moved to another state. On July 17, 1984, he was cited in Yakima County for a traffic infraction, and he gave 1501 Paterson, Prosser, as his address. 1 On March 20, 1985, the Department mailed notice of an order of suspension to Mr. Baker at 712 Court, Prosser. Apparently, the "Court" address was the one given by Mr. Baker when he originally applied for a Washington license.
Mr. Baker stated he first learned his driving privileges were suspended on May 15 or 16, 1985, when he was stopped by a Richland police officer because his vehicle had no front license plate. One week later, on May 22, 1985, he was stopped in Yakima County for speeding and cited for driving while his license was suspended.
At his trial, Mr. Baker attempted to introduce into evidence a copy of the notice of traffic infraction issued on July 17, 1984, in Yakima County, showing 1501 Paterson, Prosser, as his address. The district court took judicial notice of the exhibit, which was part of its own files, but it refused to admit the exhibit for the jury's consideration. The court gave two reasons: (1) Mr. Baker had produced no evidence that the Department had received the notice of
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infraction with the new address; and (2) in any event, the notice of infraction did not comply with the statutory procedures for advising the Department of changes of address.
See
In
Bell v. Burson,
The Department contends it complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements by sending Mr. Baker notice of its intent to suspend his license at the address he gave when he applied for his license. The narrow question here is whether such notice was appropriate to the nature of the case, Bell v. Burson, at 542, if the Department had a later address for Mr. Baker on record.
The district court rejected evidence of the later address on the ground Mr. Baker had not proved the Department received it, but under
*781 (2) Every court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under this chapter, or any other act of this state . . . regulating the operation of motor vehicles on highways, . . . shall forward to the department within ten days of a forfeiture of bail. . . or a finding that any person has committed a traffic infraction an abstract of the court record in the form prescribed by rule of the supreme court, . . .
Here, the 1984 ticket contains an abstract of judgment which has a date written in after the heading "Abstract Mailed to Olympia." The foregoing is sufficient evidence that the Department had the "Paterson" address on record.
In
State v. Thomas,
The notice given before deprivation of a significant right must be notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to inform the affected party of the pending action and afford him an opportunity to present his objections. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,339 U.S. 306 ,94 L. Ed. 865 ,70 S. Ct. 652 (1950).
In determining whether reasonable notice under the circumstances has been provided, the nature of the individual right at stake should be balanced with the relative burden imposed on the party who must give notice. The circumstances of the case provide the answer.
Thomas, at 772-73.
Other jurisdictions have employed the same general analysis as
Thomas
to support holdings that a notice of suspension sent to an old address was insufficient when the
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defendant's new address was available from traffic tickets forwarded to the licensing department by the courts.
People v. Yount,
In determining what is reasonable notice under the circumstances, we balance Mr. Baker's significant interest in his driver's license against the Department's interest in efficient administration. Mr. Baker's interest outweighs the small inconvenience to the Department in reviewing his file and sending notices, at a minimum, to the most recent address listed on any of the papers in its possession, as well as to the original address provided by him. In light of the Department's knowledge of Mr. Baker's most recent address, the notice provided was inadequate to reasonably inform Mr. Baker of the pending suspension. Thus, Mr. Baker was denied due process.
In so holding, we reject the State's contention that Mr. Baker's failure to advise the Department of his address change pursuant to
The State also argues that Mr. Baker should have stopped driving once he learned of the suspension and initiated an administrative challenge to the Department's order. The State suggests a prudent procedure to follow, *783 but the issue before us is whether Mr. Baker's license was validly suspended. Procedural due process is required before a license suspension becomes effective. Bell v. Burson, supra.
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed.
Notes
Appellate counsel for Mr. Baker represented to this court during oral argument that the "Paterson" address was the address of Mr. Baker's parents who would forward mail addressed to him. Mr. Baker acted as his own counsel at trial.