112 Ind. 335 | Ind. | 1887
The affidavit and information herein, filed in the court below on the 2d day of April,'1887, charged, in substance, that appellee, Sarah H. Bain, on the 1st' day of January, 1887, at Huntington county, in this State^ did then and there, and on divers other days and times, as well before as after that date and previous to this presentment, at and in the county and State aforesaid, she, appellee, a single woman, and Frazy E. Low, at the times aforesaid, then and there having a lawful wife living, and at all of said times she, Sarah H. Bain, and Frazy E. Low, not being married to each other, did then and there during said times, unlawfully live and cohabit together as man and wife, as Alzina Low had complained on oath, contrary to the form of the statute, etc.
Appellee answered specially, under oath, by what is called her plea in abatement herein; and to this answer or plea the State demurred, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a legal bar to this prosecution, or, in any way, to abate the same. This demurrer was overruled by the court, and to this ruling the State at the time excepted; and the State refusing to reply or plead further, it was adjudged by the court that appellee go thence without day, upon her plea in abatement.
From this judgment the State appeals to this court and has here assigned as error the overruling of its'demurrer to appellee’s answer or plea in abatement.
In her answer or plea, appellee said that the State ought not to have or maintain this prosecution against her,‘because she is ehai’ged with having committed the offence of adultery and fornication with one Frazy E. Low; and she averred that, at the January term, 1887, of the court below, said Frazy E. Low was presented therein by information and affidavit charging him with adultery and fornication with appellee herein; that the acts and circumstances, and all the evidence whereby the State expected to convict appellee in this cause, were the same as, and no other than, those which
Appellee further averred, that said Low duly filed with the clerk of such court the sum of fifty dollars in money as his bond; that since said time he, Low, had worked wherever the road for which he was employed had called on him, ,and had put in all the time he could; that he, Low, had not been guilty of any acts of adultery or fornication with appellee herein, nor with any one else, of appellee’s knowledge, since said time; and that he, Low, had been acting in good faith with the State in such matter; that appellee herein, since said agreement was so made, had been guilty of no acts of impropriety with him, Low. 'Wherefore appellee said that this prosecution against her ought to abate until he, Low, should violate his agreement with the State.
Are the facts stated in appellee’s answer or plea herein, the substance of which we have given, sufficient to constitute a legal bar to the State’s cause of action, or to abate merely the pending prosecution ? The court below held, as we understand the record now before us, that the facts stated in such answer or plea, admitted to bo true by the State’s demurrer as the case is now presented here, are sufficient merely to abate the pending prosecution. In other words, the court below held, as we understand its decision, that, pending the •agreement between the State and Frazy E. Low, and prior' to
The offence charged against appellee in the affidavit and information herein is a misdemeanor which is defined, and its punishment prescribed, in section 1991, R. S. 1881, in force since September 19th, 1881. The section reads as follows: “ Whoever cohabits with another in a state of adultery or' fornication shall be' fined in any sum not exceeding five-hundred dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six months.” '
The offence for which appellee is prosecuted is denominated in our statute “ an offence against public morals.” It is an offence which can only be committed by two persons of opposite or different sexes, and it is the joint offence of both the persons participating therein — that is, both the parties; cohabiting with each other must be guilty of the adultery or fornication resultinc from such cohabitation, or neither of them can be guilty thereof.
Appellant’s counsel concede, as, indeed, they must concede, that if Frazy E. Low had been tried and acquitted of the charge of cohabiting with appellee herein in a state of adultery or fornication, the State could not have or maintain any
In Baumer v. State, supra, Baumer was prosecuted for incest, which offence, like adultery or fornication, was necessarily the joint offence of two persons, of opposite or different sexes. Upon the point we are now considering, this court there said: “Whether they (the parties to the offence) be prosecuted in the same indictment or not, the crime must be charged as a joint crime. They may be tried separately, and one may be convicted and sentenced before the other is tiled. If one be tried and acquitted, the other must be discharged j and, it is said in the Michigan case (Delany v. People, 10 Mich. 241), that if one be tried, convicted, and sentenced, and the other tried and acquitted, this will, ipso facto, render the first conviction void.”
Is the State bound by the aforesaid agreement, by and between the prosecuting attorney, with the approval of the court.below, and said Frazy E. Low, as the same is stated in appellee's answer or plea herein ? By an express provision of the statute, an indictment • may “ bo non-prossed or information dismissed, * * by order of the court on motion of the prosecuting attorney.” Section 1673, R. S. 1881.
There is no provision of the statute, however, which, in express terms, either authorizes or prohibits the execution of such an agreement, on behalf of the State, by and between the prosecuting attorney, with the approval of the proper court, and the defendant in a pending criminal cause, in relation to the future disposition thereof. But while this is so, we are of opinion that the alleged agreement between the prosecuting attorney and said Frazy E. Low, as stated in appellee's answer or plea herein, whether approved by the court or not, was invalid and void and was not binding on the State. It was, as we have said, wholly unauthorized by any provision of our statutes. But the effect of such agreement was to “discontinue or delay” the prosecution then
Manifestly, the evil to be prevented by the enactment of these statutory provisions was the compounding, the discontinuance, or the unnecessary delay of a pending prosecution for crime or for a statutory offence, while the act or thing to be punished, under such provisions, was the taking of money, property, or a gratuity or reward, or the promise thereof, upon an agreement or understanding, express or implied, to promote or accomplish such evil. We think, therefore, that the alleged agreement between the prosecuting attorney and Frazy E. Low, as stated in appellee’s answer or plea, was within the prohibition of the spirit and'intention of the provisions of section 2013, supra, as the effect of such agreement was to delay, without any apparent necessity, and ultimately to discontinue, the pending prosecution against Low, and was invalid and void. As appellee’s answer or plea was founded solely upon such void agreement, it follows of necessity that such answer or plea was bad, and that the State’s demurrer thereto ought to have been sustained. Gray v. State, 107 Ind. 177.
Of course, if such agreement shall be so far executed or consummated, by the action of the court below, as to have resulted in the legal discharge or acquittal of Frazy E. Low
The judgment is reversed, with costs, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the answer or plea in abatement, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.