delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Vanessa Bahr was required to maintain registration as a violent offender. She was charged with failure to provide the notice required by law of her change of address, a charge later amended to failing to provide notice of a change of residence. She was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to five years with the Department of Corrections, all suspended on conditions. Bahr appeals and we affirm.
¶2 Bahr raises the following issues on appeal:
¶3 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge on the ground that the information was based upon conduct that was not a crime under Montana law.
¶4 Issue Two: Whether the District Court erred by allowing the State to amend the information on a matter of substance on the first day of trial.
¶5 Bahr was required to register as a violent offender as a result of a 1995 conviction for robbery, and as of2002 maintained a registration in Glacier County, Montana. See §46-23-504, MCA. She came to the attention of Great Falls Police in Cascade County, Montana, who were investigating a robbery. They determined that Bahr had been living in Cascade County for over a month without changing her registration information. Based upon these facts, in January, 2008 the State obtained leave to file an information charging her with ‘failure of violent offender to provide notice of address change,” citing §§46-23-502(7); -502(9); -505; and -507, MCA.
¶6 In October, 2008, over nine months after being arraigned on the charge and four days before the start of trial, Bahr moved to dismiss the charge ‘for failing to allege an offense recognized by current Montana law.” The basis of Bahr’s motion was that the statutory offense was failing to provide notification of a change in residence, and that at the time of the incident there was no offense of failure to provide notification of a change of address. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, and, over Bahr’s objection, granted a motion by the State to file an amended information. The amended information changed the description of the offense from failure to provide “notice of change of address” to failure to provide “notice of change of residence.” The amendment also changed one of the statutory references from “46-23-502(9)” to “46-23-502(10).”
¶7
Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge on the ground that the information was based upon conduct that was not a crime under Montana law.
Sexual and violent offenders may be required to register their
¶8 Bahr was charged by information.
“An information is a written accusation of criminal conduct prepared by a prosecutor in the name of the State. The information must reasonably appraise the accused of the charges against him, so that he may have the opportunity to prepare and present his defense.” We read the information, and the affidavit in support thereof, as a whole to determine the sufficiency of the charging documents. We apply the “common understanding” rule to determine if the charging language of a document allows a person to understand the charges against him. Under this standard, “the test of the sufficiency of a charging document is whether the defendant is appraised of the charges and whether he will be surprised.”
State v. Wilson,
¶9 An information that contains an erroneous name of the offense
or an erroneous statutory reference is not necessarily invalid as long as the charging language passes the “common understanding” rule.
State v. Brogan,
¶10 The District Court correctly concluded that the initial information properly charged an offense. The actual offense that Bahr was charged with did not change: a violation of § 46-23-507, MCA. That section makes it an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment for an offender to fail to “register, verify registration, or keep registration current ....” Bahr’s offense was failing to keep her registration current, as defined in §46-23-505, MCA, and as made an offense by § 46-23-507, MCA. The original information and the affidavit filed in support of it clearly set out that Bahr was required to register as a violent offender; that her last registration was completed in 2002; that in 2002 she acknowledged the requirement that she must provide notice of any change; that she had been registered in Glacier County; and that she had lived in Great Falls for over a month “without updating her registration information.” The term “residence” as used in the statute specifically requires that it “can be located by a street address ....’’Section 46-23-502(7), MCA.
¶11 This was enough as a matter of law to apprise Bahr of the charges against her and to prevent any surprise. Bahr does not allege any surprise, or any prejudice to her defense that arose from the wording of the original charging documents. The facts that she waited over nine months after arraignment to raise the issue of the sufficiency of the information and then did so on the eve of trial belie any claim of surprise. Even if there were error in the charging documents, there is no ground for reversal unless Bahr demonstrates that she was prejudiced. Section 46-20-701, MCA; State
v. Ferguson,
¶12
¶13 Similarly, the amendment from “change of address” to “change of residence” was not a change of substance. As previously noted, a street address is an essential component of “residence” under §46-23-502(7), MCA, which was specifically cited in both the original information and the amended information. Bahr’s offense was failing to ‘keep registration current” as required by §46-23-507, MCA. The change of “street address” to “residence” was therefore a change of form, not substance. Bahr does not deny on appeal that she had left Glacier County and had been living in a motel in Great Falls, Cascade County, without changing her registration information.
¶14 The District Court correctly allowed the amendment.
¶15 Affirmed.