¶ 1 Riсardo Avila (defendant) was convicted of two counts of aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (aggravated DUI), class four felonies, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 28-1381(A)(1), (2) (Supp.2006). On aрpeal, he argues for the first time that one of the prior felony convictions used by the trial court to enhance his sentence did not qualify as a “historical prior felony conviction” as defined by A.R.S. § 13-604(W)(2)(c) (Supp.2006). Bеcause defendant is unable to prove his claim based on the appellate record, we affirm defendant’s sentences.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2 On March 26, 2003, defendant was charged by direct complaint with two counts of aggravated DUI. Defendant pled not guilty to both charges. On May 9, 2003, the State filed an allegation of three historical prior felony convictions. On May 16, 2003, defendant failed to appear at the initial pretrial conference and the trial court issued a bench warrant. On December 12, 2005, defendant appeared pursuant to the bench warrant and the matter proceeded to trial.
¶ 3 At trial, defendant testified that he was the pаssenger, not the driver, of the vehicle involved in the collision that precipitated his arrest. On direct and cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he had previously been convicted of two felonies, one committed on April 12, 1994 and the other on March 30,1997.
¶ 4 After a three-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court admitted in evidence certified minute entry copies of defendant’s previous felony convictions and sentences. The first, dated August 17, 1994, reflects defendant pled guilty to forgery, a class four felony, and was sentenced to a two-and-one-half year term of imprisonment to be sеrved concurrently with a five-year term of imprisonment imposed when the probation he received for a 1992 offense was revoked. The second, dated April 27, 2000, reflects defendant pled guilty to one count оf aggravated DUI, a class four felony, and was sentenced to a two-and-one-half year term of imprisonment. Defendant did not admit the third alleged historical prior felony conviction at trial, and the State was not prepared to pursue it at the hearing and declined the trial court’s offer to continue the hearing. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent, ten-year terms of imprisonment, the presumрtive sentences for class four felonies with two historical prior felony convictions.
¶ 5 Defendant appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13—4031, and -4033(A)(1) (2001).
*99 DISCUSSION
¶ 6 As his sole issue on appeal, defendant argues that thе trial court improperly enhanced his sentence by using a prior felony conviction that does not fall within the time limits set forth in § 13-604(W)(2)(c). Specifically, defendant contends that his conviction for forgery, a class four fеlony, on April 12, 1994 is too remote in time to qualify as a historical prior felony conviction under the statute.
¶7 Pursuant to § 13-604(W)(2)(c), a historical prior felony conviction includes “[a]ny class 4, 5 or 6 felony ... that was committed within the fivе years immediately preceding the date of the present offense.” To calculate whether a felony was committed within the preceding five years for purposes of the statute, any time the defendant spent “incarcerated” is excluded. § 13-604(W)(2)(e). The State bears the burden of proving a prior conviction.
See State v. Morales,
¶ 8 At the sentencing hearing, defendant objected to the trial court’s use of the two prior felony conviсtions for enhancement purposes, but only on the basis that his trial testimony did not constitute a sufficient admission that he had been convicted of the felonies, an argument rejected by the trial court.
See State v. Pacheco,
¶ 9 To obtain relief under fundamental errоr review, a defendant must prove: (1) that error occurred; (2) that the error was fundamental; and (3) that the error was prejudicial.
Id.
at 567-68, ¶¶ 19-20,
¶ 10 In this case, defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that he was incarcerated for a sufficient amount of time to bring his forgery conviction .within the five-year requirement of § 13-604(W)(2)(c). If we were to adopt this formulation of the issue as the propеr inquiry on appeal of a claim forfeited at trial, our review would be no different than had defendant contested the sufficiency of the evidence at the sentencing hearing.
Henderson
precludes such an apрroach. Instead, under the circumstances of this case, defendant needs to demonstrate that, excluding the amount of time for which he was incarcerated between the commission of the forgery and the сommission of the current offenses, the forgery was not committed within the five years preceding the current offenses.
1
To obtain relief on direct
*100
appeal, the requisite showing must be based on the trial court record that is transmitted to the aрpellate court.
See State v. Carter,
¶ 11 Based on thе trial court record provided us, defendant has not met his burden of showing the occurrence of error, let alone fundamental error. The length of time between defendant’s commission of the forgery on April 12, 1994 and his сommission of the current offenses on March 23, 2003 is 8.95 years. Applying the five-year requirement of § 13-604(W)(2)(e), defendant’s forgery conviction does not qualify as a historical prior felony conviction unless defendant was incarcerated for at least 3.95 years during that intervening time period. The record reflects that, on August 17, 1994, defendant was sentenced to five years in prison and, on April 27, 2000, he was sentenced to two-and-one-half years in рrison. The seven-and-one-half years reflected in the sentencing minute entries well exceeds the 3.95 years necessary to bring the 1994 forgery within the five years preceding the 2003 DUI for purposes of the statute.
¶ 12 As acknowledged by the State, the record does not include defendant’s actual release dates from any of the prison sentences. But as Henderson made clear, the burden of persuasion borne by a defendant in fundamental error review does not permit him to remain silent at trial and reserve the “hole card” of a later appeal on a matter that was curable at trial, and then seek appellate reversal. 2 Here, the record on appeal contains evidence that reasonably supports a finding that the forgery conviction was a historical prior felony conviction. Under these circumstances, the Stаte is not required to disprove on appeal the possibility that defendant was incarcerated for less than the requisite amount of time. 3
¶ 13 The lack of provable trial court error distinguishes this case from two other recent cases in which the trial court erred by accepting the defendant’s stipulation to a prior conviction without first conducting the constitutionally mandated colloquy required by Rule 17.
See Morales,
CONCLUSION
¶ 14 In summary, the record on apрeal does not demonstrate that the trial court committed any error in finding that defendant’s 1994 forgery offense was a historical prior felony conviction within the purview of § 13-604(W)(2)(c). Thus, the fundamental error exceptiоn to the forfeiture rule does not apply and defendant is procedurally precluded from obtaining relief on direct appeal. We therefore affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences. 4
Notes
. In
Derello,
a
pre-Henderson
cаse, the defendant raised for the first time on appeal the possibility that the trial court's enhancement of his sentence with two prior felony convictions was error because the two offenses only constituted one historical prior felony conviction pursuant to § 13-
*100
604(M), which provides that “[c]onvictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviсtion[.]”
. Indeed, had defendant objected at trial that the forgery offense was too old to qualify as a historical prior felony conviction, the State would in all probability have then sought to admit defendant’s prison "pen pack” that was in the prosecutor’s possession.
. The State argues that, even assuming defendant earned one day of rеlease credit for every six days served pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1604.07(A) (Supp.2006), he would have been incarcerated for a minimum of 6.375 years between April 12, 1994 and March 23, 2003. Based on our resolution of the case, we need not address this argument.
. We express no opinion on whether defendant may obtain relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.
