State v. AtkesonState v. Atkeson
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Leeson
Defendant appeals from judgment entered after his conviction for endangering the welfare of a minor.
The victim, who was fourteen years old at the time of the events in this case, lived across the street from defendant, who was the victim’s mother’s ex-boyfriend. The victim’s mother and defendant lived together for most of the victim’s life, and the victim testified that defendant was like a stepfather to her. The victim and her mother had recently moved out of defendant’s residence and were sharing a house with defendant’s brother, Randy Atkeson (Randy). The victim testified that, while Randy was in jail, she and her mother looked through Randy’s backpack and found five pairs of the victim’s underwear, which caused them some concern. Subsequently, an unidentified person told the victim over the telephone that defendant had a homemade videotape that, in part, recorded Randy while he was masturbating.
The victim testified that on February 28, 1996, she went to defendant’s home to pick up some blue jeans that she had left there when she and her mother moved out and to ask defendant about the videotape. The victim asked defendant four or five times to see the videotape, claiming that she had a “right to know” about the man with whom she and her mother were sharing a house. Defendant showed the victim approximately five seconds of the videotape. Defendant then called Portland Police Detective Copp and told him that he had “made a mistake” by showing the victim the videotape. Defendant subsequently gave Copp the videotape, Copp investigated the offense, and defendant was indicted for endangering the welfare of a minor,
*363
Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion for acquittal. The state agrees with defendant that “the critical inquiry in this case is whether the legislature intended to prohibit conduct such as defendant’s through
Resolution of this case is a matter of statutory construction. Our goal is to discern the intent of the legislature as expressed in
“(1) A person commits the crime of endangering the welfare of a minor if the person knowingly:
“(a) Induces, causes or permits an unmarried person under 18 years of age to witness an act of sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse as defined byORS 167.060 [.]”
(Emphasis supplied.)
*364 In construing a statute, we give words their plain, natural and ordinary meaning. Id. at 310. The word “witness” means
“to see or know by reason of personal presence: have direct cognizance of: observe with one’s own eyes or ears: be present as an observer at * *
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary,
2627 (unabridged ed 1993). According to the state, a person may observe an act with one’s own eyes and ears whether the act is performed live or is recorded on videotape. However, the definition of “witness” includes, as defendant argues, personal presence as the act is being performed. A videotape may record an act, but that does not mean that the observer of the videotape is present for the performance of the act. The definition of the word “witness” strongly suggests that the legislature could have intended the words, “witness an act of sexual conduct,” in
We next examine definitions contained in the statute and find that they do not clarify the legislature’s intent in employing the word “witness” in
Senate Bill 40 was part of the legislature’s 1971 comprehensive revision of the Oregon Criminal Code. Section 177, “Offenses Against the Family,” became
However, our review of the legislative history provides a clear and unambiguous answer to the question. During a work session on Senate Bill 40, the Senate Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure considered an amendment proposed by Reginald S. Williams, representative for the Motion Picture Association. Williams proposed that the language contained in section 177(l)(a), which is presently contained in
“What we were getting at with 177 — and I agree that there is some overlap — what we were talking about is an in-the-flesh kind of situation — a contributing to the delinquency of a minor-type of situation where its not a question of showing them a film, but it’s a question of having — having minors witnessing the actual — the actual act that we were talking about — sexual conduct.”
Id. During the ensuing discussion, an unidentified committee member stated that there might be a way to make it more clear that the conduct prohibited by section 177 did not include films, but added: “I was going to suggest ‘live sexual conduct,’ but that might make [the statute] too racy. (Laughter)” Id. The committee did not consider Williams’ amendment further, and subsection (l)(a) of section 177 was enacted as originally drafted.
Legislative history makes clear that the phrase, “witness an act of sexual conduct,” in
In light of this disposition, we need not address defendant’s other assignments of error.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of acquittal.