State v. ArthurState v. Arthur
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Froeb
OPINION
FROEB, Presiding Judge.
Robert Joseph Arthur was charged by information with second degree burglary (count one) in violation of
Under the terms of the Arizona Criminal Code, effective October 1, 1978, the presumptive term of imprisonment for a class 3 felony is five years and the presumptive term for a class 6 felony is one and one-half years.
C. Theft of property or services with a value of more than one thousand dollars is a class 3 felony. Theft of property or services with a value of more than one hundred dollars but not more than one thousand dollars is a class 4 felony. Theft of any property or services valued at one hundred dollars or less is a class 1 misdemeanor, unless such property is taken from the person of another or is a motor vehicle or a firearm, in which case the theft is a class 6 felony, (emphasis supplied).
Appellant argues that the words: “[Ujnless such property is taken from the person of another or is a motor vehicle or a firearm, in which case the theft is a class 6 felony,” should be read to mean that
all
thefts from a person or of a motor vehicle or firearm are class 6 felonies, regardless of the value of the stolen item. We disagree. Initially, we note that the charging documents herein (both the complaint and the information) charged appellant in count two with a class 3 felony and set forth the correct statutory provisions which he allegedly violated. The written plea agreement which he executed likewise contains reference to the charge as a class 3 felony and sets forth the proper term of sentence. The parties do not dispute that the trial court explained that appellant was pleading guilty to a class 3 felony and that the
Under the cardinal principle of statutory interpretation, we must follow the plain and natural meaning of the language of the statute to discover what the legislature intended.
Dearing v. Arizona Department of Economic Security,
121 Ariz. 203, 589 P.2d 446 (App.1978). In determining the legislative intent, the words of the statute are given their ordinary meaning, unless it appears from the context that a different meaning should control.
State v. Schoner,
121 Ariz. 528, 591 P.2d 1305 (App. 1979). Whenever possible, a statute will be given such an effect that no clause, sentence, or word is rendered superfluous, void, contradictory or insignificant.
State v. Superior Court for Maricopa County,
113 Ariz. 248, 550 P.2d 626 (1976). Finally, a statute is to be given a sensible construction that will accomplish the legislative intent and at the same time avoid an absurd result.
State v. Valenzuela,
116 Ariz. 61, 567 P.2d 1190 (1977). Guided by these principles, we conclude that the proper interpretation of
Thus,
It follows that appellant was properly charged, convicted and sentenced for a class 3 felony.
Judgment of conviction and sentence affirmed.
DONOFRIO and WREN, JJ., concurring.