State v. ArmsteadState v. Armstead
We grant certiorari to consider the correctness of a trial court ruling quashing a bill of information filed by the State charging defendant, Warren Armstead Sr., with being a habitual offender.
Defendant was charged by bill of information with three counts of distribution of cocaine, violations of
The transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court quashed the habitual offender bill because sentencing defendant as a habitual offender would violate a plea bargain agreement allegedly entered into between the State and defendant. The court noted that the State had previously agreed that defendant would receive four years on each count to run concurrent.
The State argues in its writ application that it “took no position to the sentence of four years and there was no mention of an agreement on the filing of a [habitual offender information].” However, in the colloquy between the court and an assistant district attorney who was present at defendant’s sentencing hearing, the prosecutor implicitly admitted that in fact the State had earlier agreed that defendant would receive four years on each count to run concurrent.
A bill of information charging a defendant as a habitual offender does not charge a defendant with a criminal offense. State v. Langendorfer,
When a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to have been a part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York,
In the instant case, the State agreed that defendant would receive four years on each count to run concurrently if he plead guilty to the offenses charged. If the State wished to file a bill of information charging defendant as a habitual offender in order that he receive an enhanced sentence for the four offenses, it should have clearly
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court!
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The defendant was sentenced after the effective date of the Louisiana Sentencing Guidelines, La.S.G. § 101, et seq. While the guidelines are not mandatory, (La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.-1(A); La.S.G. § 102(J)), La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(A) requires the sentencing judge to consider the sentencing guidelines in determining the appropriate sentence to impose. La.S.G. § 301 allows the parties to stipulate to the appropriate "cell” within the guidelines grid as part of the plea agreement; however, that was not done in the present case nor did the trial court mention the guidelines before imposing sentence.
. His sentence as to the violation of