OPINION
{1} Defendant Christopher Armijo was convicted of armed robbery (firearm enhancement), conspiracy to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault (deadly weapon) (firearm enhancement), conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (deadly weapon), tampering with evidence, conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Defendant rаises three issues on appeal: (1) whether there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for tampering with evidence and conspiracy to tamper with evidence; (2) whether the convictions for aggravated assault and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault violate his right to be free from double jeopardy; and (3) whether the convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery violate his right to be free from double jeopardy. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} On May 30, 2000, David Brown (Victim) met Defendant and Travis Zabroski (Zabroski), a minor, in an alley behind a fast-food restaurant in Albuquerque. Victim was in his pickup truck; Defendant stood up against the truck on the driver’s side, and Zabroski slid into the passenger seat. Zabroski and Defendant stole marijuana that was on the seat beside Victim, and Victim was shot in the head. Victim also testified that Defendant struck him in the head with the butt of a gun. At trial, there was disputed testimony as to the purpose of the meeting among Victim, Defendant, and Zabroski; who shot Victim; and what occurred after the shooting.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Tampering with Evidence and Conspiracy to Tamper with Evidence
{3} Defendant claims that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for tampering with evidence аnd conspiracy to tamper with evidence. We agree.
1. Standard of Review
{4} In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must determine whether substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for every essential element of the crime at issue. State v. Rojo,
2. Analysis
{5} To convict Defendant of tampering with evidence, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant “hid a handgun” and “intended to prevent the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of himself and/or Travis Zabro[]ski.” See NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5(A) (2003). To convict Defendant of conspiring to tamper with evidence, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant “and another person by words or acts agreed together to commit [tjampering with [ejvidence.” See NMSA 1978, § 30-28-2 (1979). Finally, Defendant could be convicted as an accessory to tampering with evidence if he intended the crime to be committed and if he “helped, encouraged or caused the crime[ ] tо be committed.” See NMSA 1978, § 30-1-13 (1972).
{6} The State presented the testimony of Officer Bieniek, who testified, without a hearsay objection, to an earlier statement made by Zabroski during the investigation. Bieniek testified that Zabroski told him that Defendant was with Zabroski when the shooting took place, when he ran down the alley, and when he ran back to get the marijuana. Bieniek then testified that Zabroski told him that they drove around and that hе dropped Defendant, along with the marijuana, at Defendant’s apartment. When asked if Zabroski indicated what happened to the weapon, Bieniek responded, “He dumped it in a portapotty[,]” where it was later found. Officer Herrera testified that she located the gun in the portapotty. At trial, Zabroski testified he took the gun apart and threw the pieces out, one by one.
{7} Review of the triаl transcript reveals no evidence placing Defendant with Zabroski when he disposed of the gun and no evidence suggesting that Defendant and Zabroski ever discussed disposal of the gun. See Roybal,
{8} The State argues that Defendant’s tampering convictions are supported by State’s exhibit 28. This exhibit, a taped recording of Zabroski’s earlier statement to Bieniek, was played to the jury at trial. In the taped statement, Zabroski states that Defendant was driving the car when Zabroski threw the gun into the portapotty.
{9} The State errs in relying on Zabroski’s earlier taped statement as substantive evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction because the taped statement was admitted only for purposes of impeachment. See State v. Gutierrez,
{10} In the absence of the taped statement by Zabroski, there is no evidence suggesting that Defendant encouraged Zabroski to dispose of the gun or was present when Zabroski threw it in the portapotty. Cf. Stаte v. Nieto,
B. Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Assault
{11} Defendant claims that his convictions for aggravated assault and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault violate his right to be free from double jeopardy. We agree that the conviction for cоnspiracy to commit aggravated assault must be reversed because the conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery is based upon the same agreement. Although we are not bound by the State’s concession, State v. Foster,
{12} Defendаnt does not challenge his conviction for conspiracy to commit armed rob-beryl! The evidence shows that before meeting with Victim, Defendant and Zabroski had agreed to rob Victim of marijuana. Zabroski stated that they planned to get back'from Victim what he had previously stolen from Zabroski. However, there is no evidence of an additional, separate agreement to commit an aggravаted assault upon Victim. As there was only one agreement, there can only be one conviction for conspiracy. See State v. Ross,
{13} Therefore, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.
C. Aggravated Assault and Armed Robbery
1. Standard of Review
{14} Defendant сontends that his convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery violate his right to be free from double jeopardy. We disagree.
{15} The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy “protects against both successive prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Mora,
2. Analysis
{16} In determining whether the conduct was unitary, we consider whether the illegal acts are “separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness.” Swafford,
{17} The State contends that the acts constituting the two offenses are not unitary because they were committed by different persons. It argues that Zabroski committed the acts constituting the armed robbery and that Defendant was found guilty of armed robbery as an accessory. The State further contends that Defendant personally committed the act constituting the assault (striking Victim with a gun). Our review of the record does not indicate such a clear demarcation between the acts of Zabroski and those of Defendant.
{18} To the contrary, there was evidence from which the jury could infer that Defendant was an active participant in thе armed robbery. Victim’s testimony suggests that Defendant hit him shortly before or after the marijuana was taken by either Defendant or Zabroski. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that in committing the armed robbery and aggravated assault, Defendant and Zabroski surrounded Victim in his pickup truck with Zabroski in the passenger-side seat and Defendant standing by the driver-side window, where Victim was seated. After taking the marijuana from Victim, Zabroski and Defendant drove off together. There was also testimony that Defendant took the marijuana with him, once Zabroski dropped him off. Finally, Victim’s testimony that Defendant struck him with the butt of a gun suggests that Defendant, as well as Zabroski, was armed at the time of the robbery. Based on the foregoing, the jury could have determined that both Zabroski and Defendant robbed Victim and that during the robbery, Defendant assaulted Victim. Therefore, we hold that thе armed robbery and the aggravated assault were not sufficiently separated by time, space, or objective to be deemed non-unitary.
{19} We further observe that it is impossible to discern from the record whether Defendant was convicted as a principal on both the aggravated assault and the armed robbery charges. Our review of the jury instructions, the verdict forms, and the judgment and sentence do not clearly indicate that Defendant was in fact convicted of armed robbery as an accessory, rather than as a principal. Our case law provides that in such a situation, we must find that double jeopardy is implicated. See Foster, 1999— NMSC-007, ¶¶ 27-28,
{20} The State has failed to provide us with any information establishing that Defendant was convicted of armed robbery as an accessory. Instead, the State merely argues that the evidence supports an accessory theory. However, the pertinent inquiry is not whether the jury could have convicted Defendant as an accessory, but whether the jury could also have found Defendant liable as a principal and, if so, whether it is possible to determine upon which theory the jury convicted Defendant. See id. As the record and transcripts indicate that the jury could have determined that both Zabroski and Defendant robbed Victim, we hold that Defendant’s actions in connection with the armed robbery are unitary with his act of assaulting Victim.
{21} Having determined that the conduct was unitary, we reach the second step in the Swafford analysis, which asks “whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for unitary conduct.” Swafford,
{22} In this case, we are comparing the elements of aggravated assault, a compound offense that has three alternate ways of being charged, with armed robbery, another offense for which the statute contains altеrnatives. See NMSA 1978, § 30-3-2 (1963); NMSA 1978, § 30-16-2 (1973). When applying the Blockburger test to compound offenses or offenses that may be charged in alternate ways, we look only to the elements of the statutes as charged to the jury and disregard the inapplicable statutory elements. See Carrasco,
{23} The jury instruction for aggravated assault required the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
1. [Djefendant struck at David Brown with a handgun;
2. [Defendant's conduct caused David Brown to believe [Defendant was about to intrude on David Brown’s bodily integrity or personal safety by touching or applying force to [him] in a rude, insolent or angry manner; ...
3. [a] reasonable person in the same circumstances as David Brown[’s] would have had the same belief; [and]
4. [Defendant used a handgun.
See UJI 14-305 NMRA.
{24} In order to convict Defendant of armed robbery, the jury had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
1. [Defendant took and carried away a bag of marijuana from David Brown, or from his immediate control[,] intending to permanently deprive David Brown of the property;
2. [D]efendant was armed with a handgun, a deadly weapon[; and]
3. [Defendant took the marijuana by threatened force or violence.
See UJI 14-1621 NMRA.
{25} A defendant could be convicted of aggravated assault by merely threatening the victim with bodily harm. See § 30-3-2 (“Aggravated assault consists of either ... unlawfully assаulting or striking at another with a deadly weapon.”). However, in this case, the jury could only convict Defendant if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant struck at Victim. So, in this case, aggravated assault contains an element that armed robbery does not: striking at Victim, instead of just threatening him. Likewise, armed robbery contains an element that aggravated assault does not: taking Victim’s property with the intent to рermanently deprive Victim of the property. See § 30-16-2.
{26} In the abstract, both aggravated assault and armed robbery may involve the use of force or the threat of force. Therefore, the two statutes share common ground in theory, and a defendant’s conviction could rely on similar, if not identical evidence. See State v. Fuentes,
{27} In his reply brief, Defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed, based upon our previous holding in State v. Maes,
{28} We no longer consider Maes to be the controlling authority, however, because the analysis contained therein predates, and has been replaced by, the two-pronged analysis mandated by Swafford. See Fuentes,
{29} Finally, we consider whether there are any other indicators of legislative intent that might serve to rebut the presumption that the statutes punish different offenses, thereby permitting separate punishments. See Fuentes,
{30} Although there is some overlap in the purpose of the statutes, they are directed toward protecting different social norms. The armed robbery statute is directed primarily toward protecting against the loss of property. See Fuentes,
{31} Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, we hold that Defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy is not violated by his convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault.
III. CONCLUSION
{32} Based upon the foregoing, we reverse Defendant’s convictions for tampering with evidence and conspiracy to tamper with evidence because there is insufficient evidence to support those convictions. We also reverse Defendant’s conviction for • conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, as violating Defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy. Finally, we affirm the remainder of Defendant’s convictions.
{33} IT IS SO ORDERED.