The state appeals from the trial court’s order granting Kennedy Armendariz’s motion for a plea in bar-statute of limitation and finding that a second indictment against Armendariz was untimely, as it did not comply with the special procedural requirements of OCGA § 17-7-50.1. That statute provides that charges against a juvenile whose crimes are within the jurisdiction of the superior court must be presented to a grand jury within 180 days of his detention. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. “As this issue turns on proper interpretation of OCGA § 17-7-50.1, it is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal.”
The record shows that Armendariz, who was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged crimes, was arrested after he sold two pistols and a small amount of methamphetamine to an undercover agent. A delinquency petition was filed with the Juvenile Court of Jackson County and, after a hearing, the juvenile court granted the state’s
1. In its first enumeration, the state argues that the trial court erred because it should have found that OCGA § 17-7-50.1’s 180-day time requirement tolled only as to the three surviving charges in the first indictment. The state reasons that Armendariz could not have been detained on the nullified charges, and therefore the 180-day requirement never applied to those charges, meaning the second indictment was timely.
OCGA§ 17-7-50.1 provides:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided in Code Section 15-11-28 or 15-11-30.2, who is detained shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled to have the charge against him or her presented to the grand jury. . . .
(b) If the grand jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within the time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court. . . ,3
Although the legislature did not address the issue of a subsequent indictment, and no case law resolves the issue, in interpreting OCGA § 17-7-50.1, we must give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.
To determine the legislative intent of a statute, we begin with the literal text; where the literal text of a statute is plain and does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, we apply the statute as written without further inquiry. The language of a statute is given its most natural and obvious import, without resorting to forced or subtle interpretations to either expand or limit the statute’s operation. We interpret a statute to give effect to the real legislative intent and meaning, however, and not so strictly as to defeat the legislative purpose.4
The legislative history of OCGA § 17-7-50.1 indicates that this chapter was amended “to provide for juvenile justice reforms [and] to provide for procedures related to jurisdiction and indictment for children charged with crimes within the jurisdiction of superior courts.”
It is clear that OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a)’s 180-day time clock began running when Armendariz was detained, as “the statute plainly adopts the date of detention ... as the
While the state attempts to distinguish both Hill
2. The state argues that the trial court erred in granting Arm-endariz’s plea in bar-statute of limitation because OCGA § 17-3-3 authorizes a time extension. OCGA § 17-3-3 provides that “[i]f an indictment is found within the time provided for in Code Section 17-3-1 or 17-3-2, or other applicable statute, and is quashed . . ., the limitation shall be extended six months from the time the first indictment is quashed.”
The state clings to the phrase “or other applicable statute,” but presents no case law showing that OCGA § 17-7-50.1 qualifies as an “applicable statute,” nor do we find any case law construing these statutes together. Further, OCGA § 17-3-3’s six-month extension is in direct conflict with OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a), which allows an extension “not to exceed 90 additional days.” Additionally, OCGA § 17-7-50.1 deals specifically with juvenile dispositions; OCGA § 17-3-3 does not. We have held that “a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent, to resolve any inconsistency between them.”
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nunnally v. State,
State v. Bair,
(Emphasis supplied.)
(Emphasis supplied.) Hill v. State,
Ga. L. 2006, p. 172 § 2/SB 135.
Hill, supra at 534.
OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a) provides that “[t]he superior court shall, upon motion for an extension of time . . . and [for] good cause shown, grant one extension of the original 180 day period, not to exceed 90 additional days.”
Supra.
Supra.
Hill, supra at 534.
Nunnally, supra at 559-561 (1).
(Emphasis supplied.)
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Singletary v. State,