107 Wash. App. 532 | Wash. Ct. App. | 2001
Lead Opinion
Nelson Argueta appeals his conviction of attempting to elude a police officer. The statute under which he was convicted, RCW 46.61.024 (the eluding statute), requires that the signaling officer’s vehicle be “appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.”
FACTS
On the evening of July 23, 1998, Trooper John McAuliffe of the Washington State Patrol (WSP) was on routine patrol in King County. He was in uniform. He was driving a green 1997 Ford Crown Victoria that bore no official decals or other markings to identify it as a state patrol vehicle. The car was equipped with black push bars on the front bumper, which are used to push disabled vehicles to the side of the road. The car was also equipped with several antennas and an exterior spotlight mounted on the driver’s door post. The car had numerous emergency lights, visible only when activated: white strobe lights in the parking light area, wig-wag headlights that alternate from left to right and from high to low beam, a red and blue flashing light mounted on the passenger’s side of the front dashboard, red strobe lights in the rear parking lights, blue flashing strobe lights in the rear window dash, and an arrow indicator that flashes amber to signal vehicles approaching from the rear to move to the right or left. The car was also equipped with a three-tone siren. The car’s license number was 865 WSP; “865” is Trooper McAuliffe’s badge number and “WSP” signifies that the car is owned by the Washington State Patrol.
While traveling westbound on Route 520 in that car on July 23, 1998, the trooper saw a pickup truck repeatedly
Argueta was charged with attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle and driving while under the influence. He was convicted of both charges and sentenced within the standard range. He appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempting to elude because the State failed to prove that Trooper McAuliffe’s car was appropriately marked.
DISCUSSION
The issue presented is one of pure statutory interpre
The eluding statute provides in part:
Any driver of a motor vehicle who wilfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and who drives his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and his vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.[3 ]
The statute does not define “appropriately marked.” Nor does it indicate that a definition or standards set forth elsewhere are incorporated into the statute for purposes of defining that term. The rules of statutory construction require that we give undefined words their common and ordinary meaning.
The dictionary defines “appropriately” as “in an appropriate manner,”
Our conclusion is supported by another rule of statutory construction, namely, that we will not interpret statutes in such a way that would render a word or provision superfluous.
To give meaning to the “appropriately marked” require
Here, it is undisputed that the car Trooper McAuliffe was driving when he signaled Argueta to stop did not bear an insignia that identified it as an official police vehicle. Accordingly, Trooper McAuliffe’s car was not “appropriately marked” for purposes of the eluding statute. The evidence was therefore insufficient to support Argueta’s conviction, and it must be reversed.
Our conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support Argueta’s conviction is compelled by the language of the eluding statute as interpreted through application of rules of statutory construction. The logic and practicality of this result are, in our view, matters worthy of the Legislature’s attention. The eluding statute, as presently worded, requires the presence of some identifying insignia in order for a vehicle to be appropriately marked. Without it, a defendant cannot be convicted under the statute as it is written.
Although the evidence was insufficient to support Argueta’s conviction of attempting to elude a police officer, it was sufficient to support a conviction of the lesser-included offense of reckless driving.
Because the jury was explicitly instructed on the lesser-included offense of reckless driving, we reverse Argueta’s conviction of attempting to elude a police officer and remand for the entry of judgment on the offense of reckless driving.
Kennedy, J., concurs.
State v. Merritt, 91 Wn. App. 969, 973, 961 P.2d 958 (1998).
State v. Keller, 143 Wn.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001).
RCW 46.61.024 (emphasis added).
Merritt, 91 Wn. App. at 974.
Id.
Under the marking statute, all vehicles owned by the State “must be plainly and conspicuously marked on the lower left-hand comer of the rear window with the name of the operating agency or institution or the words ‘state motor pool,’ as appropriate, the words ‘state of Washington—for official use only,’ and the seal of the state of Washington or the appropriate agency or institution insignia, approved by the department of general administration.” RCW 46.08.065(2). All
State v. Trowbridge, 49 Wn. App. 360, 362, 742 P.2d 1254 (1987).
See RCW 46.08.065(1), (3), (4); see also Trowbridge, 49 Wn. App. at 363 n.3.
94 Wn. App. 784, 973 P.2d 493 (1999).
We note that the court in State v. Refuerzo, 102 Wn. App. 341, 7 P.3d 847 (2000), stated “Refuerzo also relies on the ‘marking’ statute, which applies to the eluding provision.” Id. at 346. The statement was in fact a recitation of what the appellant contended rather than a statement of our opinion. The correct reading of the statement is that Refuerzo contended that the marking statute applies to the eluding statute, not that the court stated it does. Moreover, the issue of whether “appropriately marked” under the eluding statute means marked in accordance with the marking statute, or whether the marking statute otherwise applies to the eluding statute, was not presented in Refuerzo. Even if our statement were interpreted as our opinion, it did not dispose of an issue presented in the case and is therefore dicta which we need not follow. See Stikes Woods Neighborhood Ass’n v. City of Lacey, 124 Wn.2d 459, 463, 880 P.2d 25 (1994).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 106 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1382.
See State v. Rodman, 94 Wn. App. 930, 932-33, 973 P.2d 1095 (1999) (“A statute must be construed so that no word, clause, or sentence is superfluous or insignificant.”).
See State of Parker, 102 Wn.2d 161, 164-65, 683 P.2d 189 (1984) (reckless driving is a lesser-included offense of attempting to elude a police officer); RCW 46.61.024; RCW 46.61.500.
See State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 234-35, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring) — I concur in both the result and in the reasoning of the majority. I write separately only to add a plea directed to the Legislature that it clarify this statute as to its application to what are commonly referred
Reconsideration granted and opinion modified October 5, 2001.