STATE OF UTAH v. ISAK JO TATSU ARCHULETA
No. 20180170-CA
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
August 8, 2019
2019 UT App 136
HARRIS, Judge
Second District Court, Ogden Department; The Honorable W. Brent West; The Honorable Jennifer L. Valencia; No. 161901927
Randall W. Richards, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Lindsey L. Wheeler, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES KATE APPLEBY and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred.
HARRIS,
¶1 Isak Jo Tatsu Archuleta pled guilty to burglary and aggravated assault. Later, on the day scheduled for his sentencing, Archuleta attempted to withdraw his plea, but the district court refused to allow him to do so. Archuleta now appeals that decision, and in addition he claims that his attorney provided ineffective assistance. We reject Archuleta‘s arguments and affirm his convictions.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On June 5, 2016,1 two men and a woman—armed with handguns—knocked on the door of a residence. When someone opened the door, the three individuals forced their way inside and held seven adults at gunpoint. The female intruder ordered an adult woman upstairs and stole approximately $400 in cash and a half-ounce of methamphetamine from her. When this woke three children sleeping upstairs, the female intruder ordered the children back into their room at gunpoint.
¶3 Meanwhile, the two male intruders stole cell phones, a computer, and a backpack from the other adults. One of the males—who the State believed was Archuleta—ordered one adult to electronically transfer money into his bank account, but when the individual could
¶4 While the two male intruders wore bandannas over their faces to conceal their identities, the female intruder did not, and she was recognized and identified as Deana Smith by five of the adult victims. When Smith was arrested two months after the incident, she identified Archuleta and Justin Martinez as the two male intruders.
¶5 Based on Smith‘s identification of him, Archuleta was later arrested and charged with two first-degree felonies (aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery) and three second-degree felonies (possession of a firearm by a restricted person and two counts of aggravated assault). After relatively lengthy pretrial proceedings during which the State proved unable to locate anyone other than Smith who could place Archuleta at the crime scene, the State offered to dismiss the remaining charges if Archuleta would agree to plead guilty to one second-degree felony (an amended charge of burglary) and one third-degree felony (an amended charge of aggravated assault). The State also offered to allow Archuleta to enter an Alford plea2 in which he would stop short of admitting guilt, and in addition pledged to recommend to the sentencing judge that Archuleta be placed on probation rather than sent to prison.
¶6 Archuleta agreed to take the deal, and appeared in court on November 15, 2017 to enter his plea. At the outset of the proceedings, after being apprised of the outlines of the proposed plea, the district court—personified at the time by Judge West—inquired as to why the State was recommending probation for Archuleta after it had, in a companion case, previously recommended a prison sentence for Martinez. In response, the prosecutor acknowledged that “the evidence is a little different” in the two cases and that the evidence against Archuleta was not as strong as the evidence against Martinez.
¶7 Archuleta then proceeded to plead guilty in accordance with the agreement. First, his attorney explained to the district court that Archuleta maintained his innocence and was entering Alford pleas for the two amended charges. When the court inquired about the factual basis for the plea, the prosecutor proffered that Archuleta, along with the co-defendants, “entered the victim‘s residence” while “armed with weapons” and “stole some money,” and in so doing he used weapons to inflict serious bodily injury upon the victim. Archuleta did not admit that these facts occurred; instead, his attorney noted that Archuleta agreed that these were “the facts that the State can prove,” or at least that “they [think] they can prove.”
¶8 The district court also conducted a plea colloquy, in which it explained that the charges to which Archuleta was pleading guilty carried the possibility of prison, but commented that “that‘s a heck of a lot better than all the charges that [Archuleta was] facing before [he] entered into this plea agreement.” The court also asked Archuleta whether the plea was “a voluntary plea,” and Archuleta answered in the affirmative. The court asked Archuleta if he was “doing this of [his] own free will,” and Archuleta said he was. In addition, the court engaged in the following colloquy with Archuleta:
Q: Are you under the influence of any alcohol or drugs, receiving any kind of medical treatment, taking any kind of prescriptive medications, suffering
from any kind of mental illness? You‘re thinking clearly? A: Yes.
¶9 The court also asked Archuleta if he had read and understood the written plea agreement form, and Archuleta answered in the affirmative. In that form, Archuleta certified that he “was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair [his] judgment when [he] decided to plead guilty,” and that he was “not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair [his] judgment.” His attorney also certified that Archuleta “fully understands the meaning of [the] contents” of the form, “and is mentally and physically competent.” In addition, Archuleta certified that he understood that the sentencing judge was not bound by the terms of any sentencing recommendation made by the parties. After accepting Archuleta‘s guilty pleas, the district court set sentencing for December 27, 2017.
¶10 In late December, a few days before the scheduled sentencing hearing, Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) issued a presentence investigation report for Archuleta, setting forth its recommendation that Archuleta be sentenced to prison. At the outset of the December 27 sentencing hearing, Judge West informed Archuleta that he was not inclined to follow the State‘s recommendation of probation, but was instead inclined to follow AP&P‘s prison recommendation. Hearing that statement, and perhaps aware that Judge West was scheduled to retire at the end of the year, Archuleta‘s counsel asked the court for a continuance so that he could “brief a couple of issues regarding sentencing.” Judge West granted that request, and rescheduled Archuleta‘s sentencing for January 24, 2018.
¶11 In the meantime, Archuleta had been writing letters to the court in which he asserted various grievances. Among other things, Archuleta accused the prosecution of being unfair, described his co-defendant as unworthy of the bail he received, requested a speedy trial, asked to be let out of jail because his father was sick, took issue with AP&P‘s recommendations, asked to withdraw his plea, and maintained his innocence. In these letters, Archuleta did not mention being intoxicated or under the influence at the plea hearing.
¶12 Upon Judge West‘s retirement, Archuleta‘s case was reassigned to Judge Valencia. At the January 24 hearing, Judge Valencia remarked that she too would be inclined to follow AP&P‘s sentencing recommendation, and Archuleta again sought and received a continuance.
¶13 At the beginning of Archuleta‘s third sentencing hearing, on February 7, 2018, Archuleta‘s attorney informed the court that Archuleta “does wish to withdraw his plea,” but that counsel was “not able to find any grounds for that at this time.” The attorney explained that Archuleta had “recently come across another inmate who has admitted to . . . [Archuleta‘s] portion of the crime in jail” and stated that he knew that inmate‘s identity, and asked the court for a continuance to allow prosecutors to investigate the individual. The State opposed the continuance, arguing that there were no grounds to withdraw the plea at this point, that Archuleta had always maintained his innocence, and that he had provided other names of possible suspects to the State in the past and none of those leads had panned out.
¶14 As the court began to explain that it did not see a basis for withdrawing the plea, Archuleta interrupted, explaining that about a week after entering his plea, he “told [his] lawyer that [he] was under the influence when [he] took the plea and ... that there was proof [of] that in the jail,” and that when he entered his plea, he “was in such a dream state that ... [he] thought [he] was asleep.” After listening to Archuleta‘s explanations about why he believed he should be able to withdraw his plea, which included a renewed claim of innocence and reiteration that he met someone in jail who admitted to the crime, the court informed Archuleta that “[t]here isn‘t [a] sufficient basis that‘s been presented as to why that plea should be withdrawn at this time.” The court observed that “[t]here have been a number of continuances in this case” but that it had not received any briefing on the issues raised by Archuleta. The court also noted that it did not find Archuleta‘s statements regarding his
¶15 All the while, Archuleta continued to interrupt the court, attempting to argue his case, until the court asked his attorney for argument regarding Archuleta‘s sentence. Archuleta‘s attorney first acknowledged the arguments that Archuleta had made himself, stating as follows:
[T]he issues [Archuleta] brings up are valid issues, but the issues themselves are ones that have to be brought up, frankly, post-sentencing. And I‘ll make sure they‘re brought up, and make sure his appellate case is turned over to the public defender to be filed. As far as the case itself, he does maintain that he did not do it.
Archuleta‘s attorney then argued for probation, pointing out that Archuleta had been in jail for “over a year and a half” and that he had been accepted into a drug treatment program in Salt Lake. After hearing from the prosecutor—who still recommended probation per the terms of the plea agreement—the court sentenced Archuleta to prison.3
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶16 Archuleta now appeals his sentence, and asks us to address two issues. First, he argues that the district court erred by denying his oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We review a district court‘s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. State v. Ciccolelli, 2019 UT App 102, ¶ 9. And “we will disturb the court‘s underlying findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶17 Second, Archuleta argues that his attorney was ineffective. “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ¶ 16, 247 P.3d 344 (quotation simplified). In such a situation, “there is no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Beckering, 2015 UT App 53, ¶ 18, 346 P.3d 672 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I
¶18 Archuleta first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion—made orally at his sentencing hearing—to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that the court “did not ... investigate whether or not [he] was under the influence of illegal drugs . . . around the time of the entry of the plea.” Archuleta insists that, after he raised the issue at the sentencing hearing, the district court was obligated to conduct an inquiry into his alleged intoxication at the plea hearing, and that the lack of a detailed inquiry is grounds for reversal. We disagree.
¶19 Under Utah law, a defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea unless the plea was “not knowingly and voluntarily made.”
¶20 Here, Archuleta has not met his burden of showing that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. At the plea hearing, Judge West asked Archuleta if he was thinking clearly, and he answered in the affirmative. Archuleta complains that the actual question posed was a compound question, asking both (a) if he was under the influence of any drugs, and (b) if he was thinking clearly. Archuleta notes that the first part of this question is best answered in the negative, while the second is best answered in the affirmative, and postulates that his affirmative answer might be considered responsive to the first part of the question rather than the second. While we certainly acknowledge that it would have been better for the district court to ask the two parts of the question separately, or at least wait for an audible answer4 to the first part before proceeding to the second, when we consider the record as a whole we do not consider it unclear. The court also asked Archuleta plainly whether his plea was voluntary, and Archuleta clearly answered
in the affirmative. Moreover, the import of the two-part question about drug use was clear enough: it gave both Archuleta and his attorney the opportunity to inform the court if either of them thought that Archuleta was under the influence of mind-altering drugs or medication, or if either of them thought that Archuleta was not in a mental state conducive to entry of a felony guilty plea. Not only did neither of them seize that opportunity orally, but both certified in writing that Archuleta was of sufficiently sound mind that day to enter a plea. “‘Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.‘” Arriaga v. State, 2018 UT App 160, ¶ 15, 436 P.3d 222 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)), cert. granted, 437 P.3d 1247 (Utah 2019). And although a “defendant‘s own assurances of his capacity are not conclusive, courts have commonly relied on the defendant‘s own assurance . . . that the defendant‘s mind is clear.” Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, ¶ 13, 147 P.3d 410 (quotation simplified). Given Archuleta‘s own representations—both oral and written—to the district court at the plea hearing, the court was not obligated to investigate the matter further. See State v. Powell, 2015 UT App 250, ¶ 6 n.1, 361 P.3d 143 (stating that, where the defendant had “assured the court that he had not taken any drugs, alcohol, or medication prior to the hearing,” and where “the court
¶21 We also have no reason to question Judge Valencia‘s conclusion that she found Archuleta‘s claims at the sentencing hearing less credible than his earlier representations. Archuleta did not raise the impairment issue with the district court—despite multiple opportunities to do so, and despite sending in several handwritten letters to the court—until February 2018, after he had learned that both Judge West and Judge Valencia were inclined to sentence him to prison instead of probation. Judge Valencia also noted that, at the time he claimed to have been under the influence, Archuleta had been incarcerated for more than a year, and illegal drugs are presumably difficult to obtain when one is behind bars. While Archuleta claimed, at the sentencing hearing, to have evidence supporting his claim, he failed to submit any to the district court.5
¶22 Moreover, even if Archuleta had borne his burden—and he has not—of demonstrating that he had taken a drug of some kind on the day of his plea hearing, he has in any event not demonstrated that his alleged drug use resulted in him being impaired. We have recently observed that “the use of drugs alone does not render [a defendant] incompetent.” Ciccolelli, 2019 UT App 102, ¶ 12. “Instead, it is ‘the drug‘s effect and not the mere presence of the drug that matters.‘” Id. (quoting Oliver, 2006 UT 60, ¶ 7); see also State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, ¶ 21, 140 P.3d 1288 (upholding a district court‘s determination that a defendant who had consumed alcohol had entered a valid guilty plea); Powell, 2015 UT App 250, ¶¶ 7–8 (affirming the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea where the defendant had ingested drugs on the morning of the plea hearing but had failed to prove any actual mental impairment as a result). In order to meet his burden in this context, Archuleta “must show how his . . . ability to understand the plea agreement was impaired” by his alleged drug use. See Ciccolelli, 2019 UT App 102, ¶ 13 (emphasis added). Other than his general statement to the district court that he remembered being in a “dream state” at his plea hearing, he has not attempted to do so. Like the defendant in Ciccolelli, Archuleta has “provided no evidence of what drugs he used, when he used them, how long they would have stayed in his system, or how they would have affected his competency.” See id. ¶ 14.
¶23 To meet his burden, Archuleta must have presented the district court with “objective evidence” that he was “so impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was incapable of full understanding and appreciation of the charges against him, of comprehending his constitutional rights and of realizing the consequences of his plea.” Powell, 2015 UT App 250, ¶¶ 5, 7 (quotation simplified). When, as here, the only evidence a defendant puts forward are his own “self-serving statements,” “this falls far short of carrying his burden of establishing that, during the plea hearing, he did not understand either the charges against him or the constitutional protections he was waiving by pleading guilty.” Ciccolelli, 2019 UT App 102, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified). Because Archuleta has not carried his burden on appeal of demonstrating that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, we affirm the district court‘s decision to deny Archuleta‘s motion to withdraw his plea.
II
¶24 Second, Archuleta argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance. “To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
¶25 Specifically, Archuleta alleges that his attorney, post-plea, failed to investigate and follow up on two issues: (a) his claim that he was under the influence of drugs and therefore not in a position to enter a guilty plea on November 15, 2017, and (b) his claim that he did not participate in the June 2016 robbery. We discuss each of these matters, in turn.
A
¶26 Archuleta‘s first claim is that his attorney should have more thoroughly investigated the issue of whether Archuleta was under the influence of drugs when he entered his plea. We reject this claim because Archuleta has not carried his burden of demonstrating that his attorney performed deficiently with regard to this issue.
¶27 In establishing that his attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, Archuleta “bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate.” State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 16, 12 P.3d 92. If the record is inadequate, “we construe any deficiencies in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively.” State v. de la Cruz-Diaz, 2012 UT App 179, ¶ 4, 282 P.3d 1041 (quotation simplified). Here, there is no evidence in the record that supports Archuleta‘s claim that his attorney failed to investigate the issue of Archuleta‘s competence at the plea hearing.
¶28 Archuleta claims that he told his attorney approximately a week after entry of his guilty plea that he was intoxicated at the time of his plea hearing and that there was “proof in the jail” in the form of a write-up. But Archuleta never submitted any evidence to support this assertion, or any evidence that his attorney failed to adequately investigate it. Indeed, as the sentencing court observed, Archuleta‘s attorney was with Archuleta when he pled guilty and had an opportunity to observe his behavior and demeanor first-hand. Archuleta fails to explain why, in this case, his attorney‘s observations were an inadequate method of gauging whether Archuleta‘s “ability to understand the plea agreement was impaired,” see State v. Ciccolelli, 2019 UT App 102, ¶ 13, and does not say what else he believes his attorney should have done to investigate further, or what else—other than the jail citation dated December 1, which we have already found to be unhelpful—the attorney might have discovered. In short, Archuleta has not persuaded us that all reasonable attorneys would have pursued the matter further.
¶29 On this record, Archuleta has not carried his burden of demonstrating that his attorney performed deficiently by failing to further investigate his claim of intoxication;
investigation but found nothing helpful. Archuleta has likewise not shown that his attorney was ineffective for failing to bring a motion to withdraw Archuleta‘s plea on that basis, a motion we have already determined was correctly denied. See State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 63, 361 P.3d 104 (“The failure of counsel to make motions that would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance.” (quotation simplified)).
B
¶30 Next, Archuleta claims that his attorney performed deficiently by failing to sufficiently investigate a potential exculpatory witness, and for failing to take some action (such as filing a motion to withdraw the plea, a motion to arrest judgment, or a motion for a new trial) in connection with the investigation. We also reject this claim, because Archuleta has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance on this issue either.
¶31 As an initial matter, Archuleta has failed to introduce into the record any actual exculpatory evidence that his trial counsel should have discovered after the plea hearing.7 But even if such
evidence existed, Archuleta has not demonstrated that—post-plea and prior to sentencing8—his attorney had any sort of useful outlet for such evidence. Although Archuleta‘s arguments along these lines are not well-developed, he does postulate that an attorney, armed with such evidence, could have potentially made three types of motions: a motion to withdraw the plea, a motion to arrest judgment, or a motion for a new trial. We discuss each potential option in turn, but conclude that Archuleta has fallen short of convincing us that any of them would have been viable.
¶32 First, Archuleta has not persuaded us that such evidence would have helped him support a successful motion to withdraw his plea. As discussed above, to withdraw a guilty plea a defendant must show that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶ 32, 282 P.3d 998 (stating that, in light of the amendment to
pleas under such circumstances. See, e.g., In re Reise, 192 P.3d 949, 955 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that by pleading guilty, a defendant “assumes the risk that the State‘s potential trial evidence will weaken: a State witness might not attend trial, might move away, might die; a new exculpatory witness might come forward; or new laboratory tests might be less conclusive,” and noting that “[t]he passage of time always changes the quantity and quality of potential State‘s evidence,” and concluding that, “by pleading guilty, the defendant gives up the right to force the State to prove its case with the potential evidence” and therefore “a guilty plea thus generally bars a later collateral attack based on newly discovered evidence“). After all, evidence discovered after entry of a plea does not necessarily go to whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made at the time it was entered. Because Archuleta cites no law supporting his contention that a motion to withdraw would have been available in this situation, and because he makes no attempt to articulate why a reasonable attorney would have brought such a motion in the absence of helpful authority, see State v. Silva, 2019 UT 36, ¶ 20, he has not carried his burden of demonstrating that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw his plea based on newly-discovered evidence, see State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 63, 361 P.3d 104 (“The failure of counsel to make motions that would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance.” (quotation simplified)).
¶33 Archuleta has likewise failed to demonstrate how the witness‘s statement—or even a statement from a witness claiming that he had committed the charged crimes in Archuleta‘s place—would have been helpful in supporting a motion to arrest judgment. Such motions are reserved for exceptional situations, such as where “the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense” or where “the defendant is mentally ill.” See
¶34 Finally, Archuleta has not carried his burden of demonstrating that filing a motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence would have helped him in this situation. We note that the very name of the motion—for new trial—presupposes the existence of a first trial (or at least a judicial adjudication of some sort, as opposed to a negotiated resolution), as does the language of the rule. See generally
CONCLUSION
¶35 The district court did not err when it denied Archuleta‘s motion to withdraw his plea, because Archuleta has not carried his burden of demonstrating that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Further, Archuleta has not carried his burden of demonstrating that his attorney performed deficiently. We therefore affirm Archuleta‘s convictions.