OPINION
Defendant-Appellant, Anne Louise Apodaea, appeals from convictions of first-degree murder, NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (Repl.Pamp.1984), conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, NMSA 1978, Sections 30-28-2 and 30-2-1(A)(1) (Repl.Pamp.1984), tampering with evidence, NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5 (Repl.Pamp.1984), and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, Sections 30-28-2 and 30-22-5. The crimes for which Defendant was convicted stem from the murder of her husband, Edward Apodaca, Sr. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment on the murder conviction, nine years imprisonment on the murder-conspiracy conviction, and eighteen months imprisonment each on the tampering and conspiracy to commit tampering convictions. The latter three terms run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the life imprisonment term. On appeal, we address three issues: (1) Whether the State’s circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s first-degree murder conviction if it did not preclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence; (2) whether the prosecutor’s closing statement deprived Defendant of a fair trial; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting and excluding various evidentiary information. Because Defendant does not challenge her convictions for tampering with evidence and conspiracy to commit tampering with the evidence, we do not address these convictions. We review this case pursuant to SCRA 1986, 12-102(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1992). We affirm as to each issue; therefore, we need not address the denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial or cumulative error.
I
Sometime during the early morning of April 17, 1990, Edward Apodaca, Sr. was shot in the back of the head while he lay sleeping on a couch in his den. The bullet severed his brain stem, instantly immobilizing him. Gunpowder residue on the pillowcase under his head indicated he was shot from a distance of about two feet. No weapon was found in the house and there were no signs of a forced entry or burglary. The bullet came from a .38 pistol; specifically, the .38 pistol that belonged to Defendant’s mother, Frizelle Aguilar. See State v. Aguilar,
II
On appeal, we review “whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Sutphin,
Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that the circumstantial evidence relied upon to support the verdict was “incompatible with her rational theory of innocence,” see State v. Vigil,
We require that evidence point logically to a defendant and exclude other reasonable hypotheses of innocence to assure that the basis of a conviction is not mere speculation. Id. However, this does not mean that we may reweigh the evidence presented to determine the comparative credibility of Defendant’s theory. Nor may we substitute our judgment for that of the jury. State v. Lankford,
Rather than presenting a new standard of review, “ ‘Garcia merely reiterate[s] the established law that the standard must be viewed in the context of the state’s burden below — to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Sanders,
In the present case, the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed first-degree murder. To meet its burden of proof, the State had to prove that (1) Defendant killed Apodaca, (2) the killing was with the deliberate intention to take away his life, and (3) this occurred in New Mexico on or about the 17th day of April, 1990. See SCRA 1986, 14-201. Defendant does not dispute that Apodaca was murdered during the early morning hours of April 17,1990. To prove Defendant killed Apodaca, the State relied on the accomplice theory and had to prove that (1) Defendant intended that the crime be committed, (2) the crime was committed, and (3) Defendant helped, encouraged or caused the crime to be committed. See SCRA 14-2822.
A
First we review the evidence under the Sutphin/Lankford standard in the. light most favorable to sustaining Defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder. There is no direct evidence as to who fired the murder weapon. We agree with Defendant that circumstantial evidence substantially implicates Aguilar because she “admitted to hating Apodaca and attempted to obtain his death certificate in order to cash in on the insurance proceeds____ [In addition, she] attempted to solicit someone to commit the murder, purchased the gun that was used to commit the murder,” and the day after the murder she concealed the gun in a safe deposit box in a Belen bank. Aguilar,
However, the evidence shows that Aguilar was not alone when she placed the gun in the safe deposit box. Defendant accompanied Aguilar and also signed the bank’s registration form for the box. Although both Defendant and Aguilar told Detective Cantwell what they had done the day after the murder, neither mentioned that they had gone to Belen. Neither mentioned that they had placed the gun in a safe deposit box. The jury saw the witnesses, heard the testimony, and determined its appropriate credibility. Concealment may be considered as a “circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.” SCRA 14-5006. A rational jury could consider Defendant’s participation in concealing the murder weapon, combined with all the other evidence presented, as more than merely helping her mother conceal the crime.
Aguilar testified that on the day before the murder the two of them spent the afternoon and evening together and that night “[w]e slept in the very same bed, with her [Defendant’s] long, beautiful legs wrapped around my legs.” A rational jury could have believed that Aguilar could not have gotten out of bed during the early morning hours to go over to kill Apodaca without Defendant knowing about it. Defendant argues that Aguilar gave her a valium about 10:00 p.m. and, therefore, she could not have participated in the murder. Defendant presents no evidence that a valium would have incapacitated her. However, it is possible that the jury could have dismissed this issue entirely because under the accomplice theory, Defendant did not need to participate in the actual murder. See State v. Ballinger,
In addition to the events of the day before and after the murder, six witnesses testified that Defendant had told them she wanted her husband dead. Several witnesses suggested to Defendant that she should just divorce her husband. She specifically told two of them she could not do that because she wanted the house and insurance. Defendant expressly solicited three of these witnesses to kill her husband.
Witness Cynthia Carpenter testified that every day over a period of time Defendant spoke to her about killing Apodaca. Carpen- • ter finally asked her to “cut it out because [she] didn’t think it was funny.” After the admonition, Defendant mentioned killing her husband only once a week. Witnesses also testified, that Defendant inquired about buying or building a silencer for her gun or finding a substance that could not be traced in Apodaca’s body. While the witnesses stated that they did not take Defendant’s comments seriously, it was the prerogative of the jury to determine what credibility to give the testimony. Defendant presented evidence that people could take advantage of her, that she may have fetal alcohol syndrome, that she is immature and childish, and in anger she would make statements wishing someone were dead. However, a rational jury could view Defendant’s statements made in anger wishing someone were dead quite differently from her repeated attempts to find someone to kill her husband. The jury heard testimony that she appeared to be “joking” when she initiated inquiries about killing her husband. The jury decided what weight to give to the testimony. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the requisite intent to kill her husband or that the crime be committed.
Furthermore, the jury could have found a sufficient motive for the murder. Defendant was the beneficiary of several life insurance policies, which if current, would have totaled about $400,000. Defendant effectively showed that not all the policies were current. A couple of months before Apodaca’s death, the Defendant and Apodaca took out an insurance policy that would pay off the $112,-000 home mortgage when either of them died. Defendant participated in the purchase of the policy, she wrote the check, picked up the policy, and signed the receipt. Yet during the investigation, Defendant told Detective Cantwell when asked about insurance that “she thought that he had something, but she didn’t know what they were. She didn’t know anything about his insurance.” Defendant argued that she would have taken out term rather than a universal life policy had she intended to “weave this web” to murder Apodaca and collect on the policies. However, the jury rejected Defendant’s argument. A rational jury could reasonably infer that Defendant was unconcerned about or unaware of the higher costs of universal life insurance, that she believed the policies were in effect, or that she intended to collect the proceeds from the insurance policies that she knew were current and to obtain title to the house.
The evidence also indicates that Defendant acknowledged owning a handgun, a .25 automatic pistol. When she turned the gun over to Detective Wilson, she explained that it would be dirty because she shot it occasionally. A rational jury could have inferred that Defendant knew how to shoot a gun and that she, herself, shot her husband, using her mother’s .38 which she then left in her husband’s car where her mother testified that she found it the morning after the murder.
The jury weighed Defendant’s theories against the testimony of the various witnesses. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. “[C]onsider[ing] the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in support of the verdict and not the merit of evidence that may have supported a verdict to the contrary,” Vigil,
Next we make a legal determination of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Sanders,
B
We next discuss whether the State proved each element of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet its burden of proof under the theory of conspiracy, the State had to prove that (1) Defendant and another by words or acts agreed together to commit first-degree murder, (2) Defendant and another intended to commit first-degree murder, and (3) Apodaca was murdered on or about the 17th day of April, 1990. See SCRA 14-2810. Circumstantial evidence and conduct of the parties is sufficient to establish a “common design or agreement to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.” State v. Chavez,
Witness Joe Scalf testified that while he was painting Defendant’s house, Aguilar pointedly offered him $5,000 to “eliminate” Apodaca. He laughed off the offer, thinking she was joking. Aguilar approached him again the next day, toid him “it was not a bad joke, that [she] was very serious, and reoffered the $5,000.” While they were talking, Defendant joined the conversation and agreed with Aguilar that Apodaca had to be “eliminated.” When Scalf again declined, Aguilar, in Defendant’s presence, asked him if he could find someone who would do it. Defendant did not object to her mother’s inquiries. See State v. Gilliam,
The evidence also indicates that Defendant and Aguilar were together the day before and after the murder. Their accounts of what they did were sufficiently different to arouse Detective Cantwell’s suspicions that they had constructed a false cover story. They failed to mention to Detective Cantwell that they had gone to Belen the day of the murder. In Belen they opened a safe deposit box for the express purpose of concealing the murder weapon, using aliases of F.L. Riley, Jr. and F.L. Riley, Sr. The jury heard Defendant assert that she was distraught by her grandmother’s death and funeral the day before Apodaca’s murder and could not have participated in the crime. The jury determined the appropriate credibility to give to the evidence presented by both parties. We defer to the jury’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. We review the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support the verdict of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant asserted that she was going to persuade her mother to help her kill Apodaca. She participated in the attempted solicitation of Scalf and agreed that Apodaca had to be eliminated. Defendant spent the day before and after the murder with her mother and both concocted a false cover story. Defendant actively participated in the concealment of the murder weapon by signing the safe deposit registration form. We find the evidence sufficient to support that Defendant and Aguilar together agreed and conspired to commit first-degree murder and intended for the murder to take place.
Ill
We next address whether the prosecutor incorrectly instructed the jury on the law, thereby depriving Defendant of a fair trial. During his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that “I don’t have to prove who pulled the trigger----” and “[i]t doesn’t matter who pulled the trigger that night.” Defendant argues that the State was obligated to prove that either Defendant or Aguilar killed Apodaca. Instead, the State “left it to the jury to decide whether Defendant played a role in that killing.” Because Defendant failed to object to this statement during trial, we review for fundamental error. See Aguilar,
In reviewing the prosecutor’s closing argument in its entirety to understand its potential effect on the jury, State v. Griffin,
IV
Finally, we decide whether the trial court erred in admitting and excluding various evidentiary information, thus depriving Defendant of a fair trial. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting Aguilar’s out-of-court statements to Detective Cantwell, (2) permitting the introduction of the insurance documents contained in Defendant’s briefcase without proper authentication, and (3) limiting the presentation of Defendant’s case by excluding the introduction of Aguilar’s testimony about the death of her ex-husband, Herbert Fischer, testimony about her prior conviction, and her letter to Bud Riley. We discuss these evidentiary issues separately.
A
Defendant argues that the court erred in permitting Detective Cantwell to testify about the statements Aguilar made during the investigation on April 17, 1990. The court permitted Detective Cantwell to compare the statements Defendant and Aguilar gave her concerning their whereabouts the day before and after the murder. On review we defer to the trial judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence and we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion. Garrett v. Howden,
Defendant’s statements, admissible against her under SCRA 1986, 11-801(D)(2)(a) (Repl.Pamp.1994) (admission by party opponent), agree with the first half of Aguilar’s statements. Therefore, there can be no prejudice against Defendant for the admission of this portion of Aguilar’s statements. See Vigil,
Defendant relies on State v. Pacheco,
B
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting some of the contents of Defendant’s briefcase. Determination of the trustworthiness of documents is left to the discretion of the court and is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. See Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft,
Defendant asserts that the insurance policies in the briefcase were inadmissible under any hearsay exception and the admission violates her constitutional rights to confrontation. “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14, of the New Mexico Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to confront the witnesses against him.” State v. Sanders,
Defendant argues that the State failed to show “whether that insurance even pertained to Defendant as a beneficiary,” see State v. Young,
Defendant had the opportunity to confront witnesses for the two major policies that were offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the $112,000 home mortgage policy and the $37,000 life insurance policy. See Sanders,
C
Next Defendant argues that the court improperly limited the presentation of her defense by excluding Aguilar’s testimony about Fischer’s death, testimony about Aguilar’s prior conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and redacting Aguilar’s letter to Riley. The court granted the State’s motion in limine that precluded Defendant from introducing evidence that after Fischer committed suicide, Aguilar kept his body in a closet from 1974 to 1977 before turning it over to the authorities. Initially Defendant sought to introduce this evidence to show that Aguilar had knowledge about donating a body to the university. The court granted this limited use of the evidence. Later that day, Defendant decided to use the full evidence to impeach Aguilar and now argues that this evidence shows Aguilar’s motive to murder Apodaca. Although Defendant failed to object to the court’s decision to preclude this evidence, she contends that her mere mention of the evidence earlier that morning was sufficient to preserve the issue. We disagree.
Defendant had the duty to inform the court of the nature of her objection so that the court could make an informed decision as to its admissibility. State v. Lopez,
Before the court can adequately determine whether the evidence is relevant, the Defendant must inform the court how the evidence relates to the issues before it. This the Defendant failed to do. Defendant did argue that Aguilar had threatened Fischer before he committed suicide. In reviewing the record, it is difficult to connect Aguilar’s threats or her decision to inter Fischer in the closet nearly twenty years ago with Apodaca’s murder in 1990. No allegations or charges were brought against Aguilar for Fischer’s death and there is no proof of any wrongdoing associated with the event. At most the evidence would have confused or misled the jury, possibly resulting in speculation as to whether charges should have been brought against Aguilar nearly twenty years ago. Such digression is specifically what we seek to avoid. See SCRA 11-402 (irrelevant evidence inadmissible); State v. Platt,
Defendant argues that the court erred in refusing to permit Defendant to ask questions a third time concerning Aguilar’s 1983 conviction for attempting to run over Defendant and Riley, ruling that it also was too remote. Defendant intended to show that Aguilar had already “tried to kill her own daughter and she keeps coming back.” We review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Landers,
Defendant acknowledged that the information “already came in through Cynthia Carpenter.,. .. [and] through Frizelle [Aguilar]. I was just going to have him explain it.” The court only prohibited Defendant’s attempt to introduce this same information through Riley. When the court suggested Defendant make a tender, she declined. Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the failure to allow the testimony a third time contributed to her conviction. See Gonzales,
Finally, Defendant argues that the court erred in redacting Aguilar’s letter of June 1, 1990 to Riley. As previously stated, we review the court’s decision to exclude the evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. The letter was not admissible under SCRA 11-801(D)(2)(e) because the conspiracy clearly had ended with Aguilar’s arrest on May 3, 1990, if not before. The record indicates that the only portion of the letter that was omitted was the statement that “Snooky [Defendant] is innocent.” The essence of this statement was presented through other sentences in the letter that were admitted. The trial court carefully weighed the probative value of this sentence against the danger of unfair prejudice. See SCRA 11-403. The court, by permitting the entire letter except for this one sentence, exercised its discretion. We do not find such an exercise of discretion “untenable or not justified by reason.”
y
In conclusion, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain Defendant’s first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder convictions, that the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument did not constitute fundamental error, and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting some and excluding other evidence offered by Defendant. We affirm.