State v. AntieriState v. Antieri
Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to defraud Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) by falsifying ownership records of a nonexistent boat and trailer and making false reports of the theft of both. Evon Easton, a codefendant, was indicted on the same charge as well as charges of attempting to obtain money
The Somerset County grand jury subsequently returned another indictment charging defendant, Easton and Donald Clements in the first count with the same conspiracy to defraud Allstate. Although the original indictment did not contain the names of coconspirators other than defendant and Easton, it had identified Clements as a person who wrote the document evidencing ownership of the boat involved. In the second indictment Clements and Easton2 were both indicted and named as coconspirators.
Counts 2 and 3 of the second indictment charged defendant and Easton with attempting to obtain money by false pretenses and giving false information to law enforcement officers. The first indictment was dismissed on the motion of the prosecutor. Clements moved to dismiss the second indictment as to him, and it was dismissed without prejudice. Defendant moved to dismiss the second indictment against him on the grounds that
In June 1981 defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy in return for an agreement by the prosecutor to recommend a noncustodial sentence. As we understand it, defendant claims he was also
After a jury trial defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to defraud Allstate. He was sentenced to a term of not less than two nor more than three years in State Prison. On this appeal defendant contends:
1) Where subsequent to the commencement of the first trial, the prosecutor improperly represented the case to the Grand Jury for the malicious purpose of joinder of additional charges and allegations of conspiracy with an additional defendant in a superseding indictment, the entire indictment including the first count alleging conspiracy should have been dismissed below.
2) Where the defendant alleged a breach of a plea agreement based upon cooperation in an undercover investigation, the trial court erred in summarily denying his application for referral of the investigation to the New Jersey State Attorney General‘s Office or specific performance of the plea agreement, or both.
3) The trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings which had the cumulative effect of denying the defendant a fair trial.
4) The trial court erred in admitting into evidence the October 1977 conversation of Joanne Sehein concerning defendant‘s attempt to solicit her participation in a fraudulent insurance claim without limiting instructions.
5) The trial court erroneously charged the jury as to the applicable law of conspiracy by limiting the knowledge and intent requirements to the acts of defendant, without extending such proof to the acts of other members of the alleged conspiracy.
Based on the record, the jury could well have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt. In the summer of 1977 defendant registered a 24-foot boat referred to as a 1977 Sea Ray, in the name of his then fiancee, Joanne Sehein. In October 1977 defendant asked her to report it as stolen, and he informed her for the first time that he actually owned no boat. She refused to comply with his request to report the false claim of theft. After an argument with defendant over his request she ended her relationship with him. Subsequently, documents were presented to the Division of Motor Vehicles to transfer registration of the boat to Easton. In August 1978 defendant and Easton obtained a policy of insurance from Allstate for the
According to the testimony of Sea Ray boat company‘s assistant comptroller, a search of the company‘s records revealed no serial number identical to the one under which the boat had been registered. Defendant complained because that witness did not produce any records or photocopies of records in court. But see,
In seeking dismissal of the second indictment, defendant relies on Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). Defendant argues that the differences between the indictments are sufficient to show the likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness and that the prosecution of the indictment therefore constituted a violation of due process. A new trial after a mistrial which results from the jury‘s inability to reach a verdict does not itself establish prosecutorial misconduct. We find no merit in defendant‘s argument.
Defendant argues that the trial judge improperly failed to order specific performance of the rejected plea agreement. There is nothing in the record which indicates that there was any impropriety in the prosecutor‘s withdrawal of the plea agreement. Furthermore, a trial judge may reject the agreement if he determines that the interests of justice will not be served thereby.
We have considered defendant‘s remaining contentions in light of the record and the arguments of counsel and conclude that they are all without merit.
Affirmed.