THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ANTHONY, APPELLANT.
Nos. 2001-1393 and 2001-1414
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
August 21, 2002
96 Ohio St.3d 173, 2002-Ohio-4008
Submittеd May 21, 2002. APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Auglaize County, No. 02-2001-01, 2001-Ohio-2237.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
In order for a driver‘s license to be suspended or revoked pursuant to
OPINION
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶1} According to the prosecutor‘s statement at the sentencing hearing, on August 25, 1998, Chief John Drake of the Cridersville Police Department stopped a black Lincoln Continentаl on Interstate 75 believed to be carrying three men who had robbed a bank in Allen County. When Drake made the stop, he was able to see only the driver because the other two men, including defendant-appellаnt, Moses B. Anthony, were hiding in the back seat of the car. Anthony emerged from the
{¶2} Anthony was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of attempted felonious assault and one count of having a weapon while under disability.1 The trial court sentenced Anthony to seven years’ imprisonment on these charges. The court also suspended Anthony‘s driver‘s license for life, pursuant to
{¶3} The court of appeals reversed the lifetime suspension of Anthony‘s driver‘s license on the ground that it exceeded the three-year maximum suspension allowed by statute. Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court was warranted in revoking his driving privileges pursuant to
{¶4} At issue is the interpretation of
{¶5} “(A)(1) The trial judge of any court of record * * * shall suspend for not less than thirty days or more than three years or shall revoke the driver’s * * * license * * * of any person who is сonvicted of or pleads guilty to any of the following:
{¶6} “* * *
{¶7} “(b) Any crime punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle laws of this state or any other felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶8} Appellant сhallenges his license revocation, arguing that he did not “use” a motor vehicle to commit the crimes of attempted felonious assault and
{¶9} In contrast, appеllee argues, and the court of appeals found, that a motor vehicle is used in the commission of a felony whenever it is used as part of or in furtherance of the felony. Since Anthony used the vehicle to conceal himself from Officer Drake and as a method to escape the crime scene, the court of appeals held that license revocation was appropriate.
{¶10} In determining what is meant by the term “used” in connection with the phrase “in the commission of a felony” in
{¶11} The term “used” is not defined in the statute. Therefore, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 525 N.E.2d 1386;
{¶12}
{¶13} In State v. White (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 39, 40, 29 OBR 388, 505 N.E.2d 632, we stated that the legislative objective underlying
{¶14} Given this legislative purpose, it makes little sense to take away the driving privileges of a defendant where the motor vehicle is not integral to the commission of the crime itself. The punishment simply does not fit the crime. Moreover, under these circumstances, there is little deterrent value in taking the defendant‘s driving privileges away. This is particularly so under the facts of this case, where appellant was not even the driver, but was simply a passenger in the car.
{¶15} As to the consequences of a particular construction, the court of appeals holding givеs trial courts wide latitude in revoking or suspending driver‘s licenses even where the motor vehicle plays little part in the commission of the felony. This broad interpretation not only undermines the legislative intent behind the statute, but it would also lead to absurd results. In the certified conflict case of State v. Krug, supra, the court of appeals points out the irrationality of such a holding.
{¶16} The Krug court determined that license suspension was inapprоpriate because the use of the motor vehicle was not an integral part of the crime. State v. Krug, 89 Ohio App.3d at 596, 626 N.E.2d 984, fn. 1. The defendant was charged with domestic violence, and his license was suspended because part of his wife‘s beating occurred in a motor vehicle. In reversing the license suspension, the court stated: “[T]here was no basis in the record from which the trial court could conclude that the defendant‘s automobile was usеd in the commission of domestic violence. Such a hypothesis assumes that, whenever an automobile is the means of transportation to or from a crime scene, a driver‘s license suspension is an optiоn available to the sentencing judge.” The Krug court then held that
{¶17} The court in People v. Poindexter (1989), 210 Cal.App.3d 803, 258 Cal.Rptr. 680, in construing comparable statutory language, also recognized that the mere use of a motor vehicle is an insufficient reason to suspend or revoke a driver‘s license. Instead, it stated that “the Legislature must hаve intended the term ‘used’ in the commission of a felony to mean that there was a nexus between the
{¶18} In applying
{¶19} As applied to this case, although the motor vehicle in which Anthony was riding allowed him to shield himself from Officer Drake and provided him with a means of escape, the motor vehicle itself was not integral to the commission of the crimes of felonious assault and having a weapon under disability. Anthony committed felonious assault when he left the vehicle and fired four shots at the offiсer. He committed the crime of having a weapon while under disability by virtue of the fact that he had prior felony drug convictions. Under these circumstances, there is an insufficient nexus between the vehicle and the сharged offenses. Therefore, we conclude that
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
Edwin Pierce, Auglaize County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Alison M. Clark, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, for appellant.