State v. AnthonyState v. Anthony
Motor vehicles—Driver‘s license—Requirements for driver‘s license to be suspended or revoked pursuant to
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
In order for a driver‘s license to be suspended or revoked pursuant to
OPINION
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶2} Anthony was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of attempted felonious assault and one count of having a weapon while under disability.1 The trial court sentenced Anthony to seven years’ imprisonment on these charges. The court also suspended Anthony‘s driver‘s license for life, pursuant to
{¶3} The court of appeals reversed the lifetime suspension of Anthony‘s driver‘s license on the ground that it exceeded the three-year maximum suspension allowed by statute. Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court was warranted in revoking his driving privileges pursuant to
{¶4} At issue is the interpretation of
{¶5} “(A)(1) The trial judge of any court of record * * * shall suspend for not less than thirty days or more than three years or shall revoke the driver’s * * * license * * * of any person who is сonvicted of or pleads guilty to any of the following:
{¶6} “*
{¶7} “(b) Any crime punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle laws of this state or any other felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶8} Appellant сhallenges his license revocation, arguing that he did not “use” a motor vehicle to commit the crimes of attempted felonious assault and having a weapon while under disability. Appellant maintains that the statutоry language is ambiguous and urges us to construe the statute to find that a motor vehicle is used in the commission of a felony only when there is a sufficient nexus between the offense and the vehicle.
{¶9} In contrast, appеllee argues, and the court of appeals found, that a motor vehicle is used in the commission of a felony whenever it is used as part of or in furtherance of the felony. Since Anthony used the vehicle to conceal himself from Officer Drake and as a method to escape the crime scene, the court of appeals held that license revocation was appropriate.
{¶10} In determining what is meant by the term “used” in connection with the phrase “in the commission of a felony” in
{¶11} The term “used” is not defined in the statute. Therefore, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 525 N.E.2d 1386;
{¶12}
{¶13} In State v. White (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 39, 40, 29 OBR 388, 505 N.E.2d 632, we stated that the legislative objective underlying
{¶14} Given this legislative purpose, it makes little sense to take away the driving privileges of a defendant where the motor vehicle is not integral to the commission of the crime itself. The punishment simply does not fit the crime. Moreover, under these circumstances, there is little deterrent value in taking the defendant‘s driving privileges away. This is particularly so under the facts of this case, where appellant was not even the driver, but was simply a passenger in the car.
{¶15} As to the consequences of a particular construction, the court of appeals holding givеs trial courts wide latitude in revoking or suspending driver‘s licenses even where the motor vehicle plays little part in the commission of the felony. This broad interpretation not only undermines the legislative intent behind the statute, but it would also lead to absurd results. In the certified conflict case of State v. Krug, supra, the court of appeals points out the irrationality of such a holding.
{¶16} The Krug court determined that license suspension was inapprоpriate because the use of the motor vehicle was not an integral part of the crime. State v. Krug, 89 Ohio App.3d at 596, 626 N.E.2d 984, fn. 1. The defendant was charged with domestic violence, and his license was suspended because part of his wife‘s beating occurred in a motor vehicle. In reversing the license suspension, the court stated: “[T]here was no basis in the record from which the trial court could conclude that the defendant‘s automobile was usеd in the commission of domestic violence. Such a hypothesis assumes that, whenever an automobile is the means of transportation to or from a crime scene, a driver‘s license suspension is an optiоn available to the sentencing judge.” The Krug court then held that
{¶18} In applying
{¶19} As applied to this case, although the motor vehicle in which Anthony was riding allowed him to shield himself from Officer Drake and provided him with a means of escape, the motor vehicle itself was not integral to the commission of the crimes of felonious assault and having a weapon under disability. Anthony committed felonious assault when he left the vehicle and fired four shots at the offiсer. He committed the crime of having a weapon while under disability by virtue of the fact that he had prior felony drug convictions. Under these circumstances, there is an insufficient nexus between the vehicle and the сharged offenses. Therefore, we conclude that
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
Edwin Pierce, Auglaize County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.