State v. AnsemanState v. Anseman
On September 13, 1990, the Jefferson Parish Grand Jury returned an indictment charging the defendants, Theodore and Cheryl Anseman, each with оne count of manslaughter (
Further, counsel for Theodore Anseman contends the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the dead child into evidence. Also, counsel for Cheryl Anseman contends that if
We first consider the defendants’ contention the Louisiana manslaughter statute (
“A. Manslaughter is:
* * * * * *
(2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm.
(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 30 or 30.1,1 or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person ...”
The state identified cruelty to juveniles, a violation of
Counsel for the defendants urged the trial court and now urges this Court to interpret
Under the well-established law of Louisiana, the provisions of criminal statutes “shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.”
The Louisiana manslaughter statute is not ambiguous, and the provisions of that statute refute the interpretation here urged by the defendants.
As an extension of the argument, counsel for defendant Cheryl Anseman also contends that
In Louisiana, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence is not capable of discerning its meaning and conforming his conduct to it. State v. Greco, 583 So.2d 825 (La.1991); State v. Barthelemy, 545 So.2d 531 (La.1989); State v. Wilson, 588 So.2d 733 (5th Cir.1991), Additionally, a penal statute must provide adequate standards by which the guilt or innocence of the accused can be determined. State v. Greco, supra; State v. Broom, 439 So.2d 357 (La.1983).
A crime is that conduct defined as criminal in the Louisiana Criminal Code, or in other acts of the legislature, or in the state constitution.
The Louisiana legislature has exercisеd its authority and has defined, as separate offenses, the crimes of felony-manslaughter [
Defendant Cheryl Anseman entered a plea of not guilty at her arraignment on September 28, 1990. Upon completion of jury selection in the case, but prior to the jury being sworn, she moved to withdraw her previous plea and enter a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied that motion.
Article 561 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to withdraw a plea of “not guilty” and enter a plea of “not guilty and not guilty by reason
Next, defendants contend the trial court misapplied
Cheryl Anseman contends the ruling was in error because, absent an insanity plea,
The Louisiana Supreme Court and this Court have previously rejected the interpretation of
Furthermore, Theodore has a duty independent from Cheryl‘s in properly looking after his children. Although a socalled division of labor may exist between a husband and wife concerning which parent supports the family and which parent cares for the children, there can be no instance where the breadwinner is relieved from his duty to see that the children are properly cared for. This duty includes seeking appropriate medical care when a child appears in need of same. Thus, Theodore‘s claim that the trial court‘s evidentiary ruling prevented him from presenting a defense is without merit.
Both defendants challenge the state‘s evidence as being legally insufficient to support their convictions and, since the evidence submitted was largely circumstantial, they contend the state was required, but failed, to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
An appellate court called upon to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965 (La.1986); State v. Honore, 564 So.2d 345 (5th Cir.1990).
When the state offers circumstantial evidence to prove an offense,
The trial testimony established the Anseman children were poorly cared for. The flea-infested apartment where they lived had dog hair throughout, feces smeared on the walls, smelled of urine and had trash and dirty dishes accumulated in the kitchen. Although food was found in the apartment, Heather‘s flea-bitten body appeared malnourished and, according to Dr. Fraser MacKenzie who performed the autopsy on Heather, her death was the result of wasting and nutritional deprivation. Dr. MacKenzie testified Heather‘s weight when she died was less than at birth. He explained “wasting” as a condition in which the subject‘s muscular development is below the standard for an individual of the particular age (13 months old). Nutritional deprivation, according to Dr. MacKenzie‘s testimony, occurs in two ways—either the food intake is insufficient and starvation results; or the food intake is sufficient but the body does not properly metabolize the food. Testing to determine which of the two
The state also presented evidence that defendants were aware of Heather‘s life threatening predicament. Witnesses testified that in August of 1989, Cheryl was approved for WIC7 assistance to cover herself and Heather, but she failed to show up for follow-on visits after her initial food vouchers were exhausted. She was ultimately dropped from the program although remaining fully eligible for assistance.
Further, the four younger children, including Heather, were taken by a neighbor who was babysitting the children to the hospital because of their very thin condition and poor personal hygiene. Before being disсharged in October of 1989, the Child Protection Agency was notified of the children‘s condition and a caseworker assigned to the Ansemans.
Monica Martin, a friend of the defendants, testified that she visited the Anseman residence several times from January, 1990 until the week before Heather died. She related that the Anseman children always appeared to be dirty. In particular, Heather looked malnourished to Ms. Martin. About two weeks prior to Heather‘s death, Ms. Martin noticed what she believed to be a breathing problem in Heather. The child also had a severe diaper rash. Shortly thеreafter, Theodore Anseman told Ms. Martin that he was worried that Heather might die. According to Ms. Martin‘s testimony, she went to discuss the problem with the defendants and found that Heather was too weak to eat. Ms. Martin further told the jury that she offered to take Heather to a doctor on four or five occasions, but the defendants refused her offers.
Then, shortly after 8:00 P.M. on August 4, 1990, Officer Nick Huth of the Kenner Police Department responded to an emergency call from the Anseman residence. He entered the residence and found Cheryl Anseman in a frantic state, holding thirteen month-old Heathеr Anseman, the youngest of the five Anseman children. She appeared lifeless to Officer Huth. The child‘s body was emaciated, her skin was cold to the touch, and Officer Huth could not detect a pulse. He noted the strong odor of urine in the Anseman residence and also that the pajamas on Heather were covered with what appeared to be dog hair. Paramedics, who arrived shortly after Officer Huth, were also unable to find any sign of life in the child. Heather was rushed by ambulance to a nearby hospital where she was officially pronounced dead.
Heather‘s deаth and the conditions at the Anseman residence were immediately reported to authorities. Officer Rodney Roy of the Kenner Police Department and Mark Goldman of the Jefferson Parish Coroner‘s Office met Officer Huth at the hospital and asked Cheryl Anseman to describe the circumstances surrounding Heather‘s death. Cheryl told the officers that Heather seemed normal when she laid the child in bed at 2:00 P.M. that day. However, when she checked Heather at 8:00 P.M. that evening, the child was not breathing and Cheryl called for emergency assistance. Cheryl also told the officers that, at thе time of her death, Heather had a problem gaining weight and was scheduled to be seen by a doctor for that condition. However, Cheryl had made numerous arrangements to bring Heather to the doctor beginning some four months prior to her death and had consistently failed to do so.
Theodore Anseman, Heather‘s father, was not at home when the child‘s death was discovered. He was at a skating rink with the oldest of the Anseman children, 5 year-old Theodore, Jr., also known as Rocky. After a neighbor contacted him at the skating rink and reported the incident, Theodore Anseman went to his mоther‘s house and left Rocky. He then drove to the hospital where officers interviewed
Pictures of Heather taken shortly after her death and introduced into evidenсe, over defense objection, clearly showed the extent of the wasting and nutritional deprivation suffered by Heather. The pictures buttressed the other evidence presented concerning the defendants’ obvious knowledge of the child‘s condition and their complete failure to take any action. Defendant Theodore Anseman argues these photographs were prejudicially gruesome and, hence, should not have been admitted into evidence.
Article 403 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence provides that, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be еxcluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.” As it applies to allegedly gruesome photographic evidence, Article 403 codifies the well settled test for determining admissibility: whether the probative value of the photograph outweighs its prejudicial effect on the jury. State v. Richard, 525 So.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir.1988), writ denied, 538 So.2d 609 (La.1989). The evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case, and the balance must favor the evidentiary value of the photograph over its tendency to overwhelm reason and to associate the accused with the offense without sufficient evidence. State v. Moore, 498 So.2d 82 (5th Cir.1986).
The photographs here challenged graphically depict 13-month-old Heather Anseman a brief time after she died. However, these photographs are relevant to and probative of important issues in this case. Reference to the photographs afforded the jury the opportunity to evaluate defendant Theodore Anseman‘s defense that he relied on Cheryl to care for the children and that he saw nothing which alarmed him about Heather‘s condition prior to hеr death. The photographs also corroborated the coroner‘s testimony concerning the nutritional deprivation and wasting he observed in the victim. Finally, the photographs illustrated the poor state of hygiene which the defendants maintained for their young daughter. The probative value of this photographic evidence thus outweighed the possible prejudicial effect on the jury. State v. Richard, supra.
After hearing the evidence, the jury disagreed with the defendants and found the circumstantial evidence presented by the state sufficient to prove manslaughter. The credibility of the witnesses was a deciding factor in the jury‘s factual finding that the defendants’ treatment of their children constituted cruelty to juveniles, the predicate felony for the manslaughter offense in this case. In criminal matters, the court of appeal does not function to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and overturn a jury on its factual determination of guilt. State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (5th Cir.1983). Therefore, the defendants’ contention that the circumstantial evidence presented failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is without merit.
When the defendants appeared for sentencing, counsel for Cheryl Anseman requested leave to call Phyllis Campo and Mark Zimmerman, Ph.D.8 as witnesses prior to the imposition of sentence. According to counsel, the testimony of these witnesses was necessary to establish certain mitigating factors allegedly applicable in the sentencing of Cheryl Anseman. The trial court denied the request and proceeded with sentencing. Cheryl Anseman urges that the trial court erred in that ruling.
The record further reveals that the evidence in mitigation offered on behalf of Cheryl Anseman was thoughtfully analyzed by the trial judge. Prior to the sentencing hearing, сounsel for Cheryl Anseman filed a memorandum which incorporated the psychological findings of Ms. Campo and Dr. Zimmerman regarding Cheryl Anseman. A copy of Dr. Zimmerman‘s written evaluation of Cheryl Anseman was also attached to that memorandum. The transcript of Cheryl Anseman‘s sentencing demonstrates that the trial judge carefully evaluated those psychological findings. In stating his reasons for the sentence imposed, the judge referred extensively to the conclusions reached by Dr. Zimmerman after an examination of Cheryl Anseman.
In arguing this assignment of error, the defendants primarily rely on State v. Ray, 423 So.2d 1116 (La.1982), wherе the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the defendant‘s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing after finding that the trial judge had failed to adequately consider the
The trial judge sentenced each of the defendants to 21 years at hard labor, the maximum sentence available under the manslaughter statute.
Excessive punishment is prohibited by Article 1, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution. Although trial judges are granted great discretion in imposing sentences, under certain circumstances, even a sentence which is within stаtutory limits may be considered excessive. A sentence which is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or is nothing more than the needless and purposeless imposition of pain and suffering may be set aside as unconstitutionally excessive. State v. Robicheaux, 412 So.2d 1313 (La.1982); State v. Accardo, 466 So.2d 549 (5th Cir.1985), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1204 (La.1985).
The trial judge exercises wide discretion in imposing sentences within the statutory limits, and sentences will not be set aside as excessive absent manifest abuse of that broad discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475 (La.1982).
Maximum sentences are reserved for cases involving the most serious violations of the charged offense and for the worst kind of offender. State v. Quebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009 (La.1982). As notеd in the previous assignment of error, the trial judge adequately complied with
Considering the facts of this case, the imposition of the maximum sentence for manslaughter on these defendants is not excessive punishment. Heather Anseman, a 13-month-old helpless child, died at the hands of her own parents. The defendants had every opportunity to prevent this senseless death. Family friends and government agencies offered needed assistance to the Ansemans. Cheryl and Theodore Anseman chose to ignore those offers of assistance, despite the ever worsening physical condition of Heather prior to her death. During trial, the coroner explained that Heather‘s death occurred when her body had deteriorated to the point that it could no longer sustain life. The action and inaction of the defendants, as parents of this young victim, are inexcusable. The offense committed by these defendants was particularly cruel and heinous, and therefore warrants imposition of the maximum sentence for manslaughter. State v. Weiland, 562 So.2d 950 (5th Cir.1990).
This assignment lacks merit.
We have also reviewed the voluminous record in this case for errors patent and find none.
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of both defendants, Theodore and Cheryl Anseman, are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
“Cruelty to juveniles is the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect, by anyone over the age of seventeen, of any child under the age of seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child. Lack оf knowledge of the child‘s age shall not be a defense.”
“.... Negligent homicide is the killing of a human being by criminal negligence.”