32 Conn. Supp. 324 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1975
The defendant is charged with possession of “a cannabis-type substance,
The defendant, charged with violation of § 19-480 (b), in part bases his constitutional claims on the assumption that violations concerning narcotic substances (morphine- and cocaine-type drugs)
“Equal protection analysis must commence with a determination of whether a legislative classification . . . impinges upon a fundamental right. Where the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right ... it must be struck down unless justified by a compelling state interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 342 .... Where the statute does not involve fundamental rights . . . the legislation will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 . . . ; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 485 ... ; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 . . . ; In re Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 258 ..., rev’d, 413 U.S. 717 ... ; see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 .. . .” Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542; Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 124. Possession of marihuana is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution.
That test requires that the statutory classification “be based upon some real and substantial distinction, bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect to which such classification is imposed; and classification cannot be arbitrarily made without any substantial basis.” Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56, 59 . . . ; State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 506. (But see footnote 59 infra). And it is clear that if the statute includes within the class an object whose inclusion is irrational or arbitrary, such inclusion is in violation of the equal protection clause. “[W]e recognize that the constitutionality of a statute, valid on its face, may be assailed by proof of facts tending to show that the statute as applied to a particular article is without support in reason because the article, although within the prohibited class, is so different from others of the class as to be without the reason for the prohibition.” United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153. But, in “adjusting legislation to the need of the people of a State, the legislature has a wide discretion and it may be fully conceded that perfect uniformity of treatment ... is neither practical nor desirable, that classification ... is constantly necessary and that questions of proper classification are not free from difficulty.” Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 337. “Primarily the question of classification is one for the legislature, and the courts will not interfere unless it is clearly unreasonable.” State v. Zazzaro, 128 Conn. 160, 166.
It is obvious that the purpose of the legislation is not only to protect the health of those who may be tempted to use marihuana but, in the exercise of the state’s police power, to protect society from the effects of a drug which the legislature concluded to be appropriately classified for penalty purposes with amphetamines and barbiturates. This court is therefore required to look at the effect of marihuana on both the user’s
The court is not required to restrict itself to the facts or data that were present before the legisla
The defendant, pursuant to a stipulation entered into with the state, introduced in evidence transcripts of the testimony of expert witnesses for the defendant in the case of United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Sup. 743 (D. Conn.). The state offered no evidence. This testimony was given by Lester Grin-spoon, professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Joel Fort of the University of California and a former consultant to the United Nations World Health Organization, and Edward Breeher, a scientific research writer. The court is satisfied
The facts relied on by the court in its decision are based on the testimony contained in the transcripts. The court has also made references to corroborating empirical data and other studies which include the first report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, entitled “Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding” (1972), cited as “Signal of Misunderstanding,” and its second report, entitled “Drug Use in America: Problems in Perspective” (1973), cited as “Drug Use in America.” This commission was authorized by Congress in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and it was directed to study and report on marihuana.
Marihuana comes from the hemp plant, cannabis sativa. It is a psychoactive drug
The evidence introduced before this court is that there are no significant short-term physiological effects from the use of marihuana.
Marihuana does not have a high potential for abuse.
One misconception must be put to rest and that is the “stepping stone argument.”
There is evidence that marihuana can cause psychological disturbances in users who have a predisposition to these disorders, but such disturbances might equally be precipitated in these persons by alcohol, other psychoactive drugs or a traumatic event.
The short-term psychological effects of a barbiturate
Barbiturates can increase aggression
When asked whether it was reasonable to classify marihuana with barbiturates in terms of the effect on users and the potential for abuse, Fort testified: “It’s not reasonable at all. They are unlike each other pharmacologically, they differ markedly in their short-term effect, differ markedly in their long-term effect. When you compare heavy use of the two drugs, marihuana has a very, very low potential for abuse and barbiturates have a high potential for abuse. Marihuana does not produce death, even in the enormous doses, and barbiturates frequently produce death or commonly produce it with large doses.”
Authorities also agree that amphetamines
The most prevalent difference between amphetamines and marihuana is to be found in the long-term psychological effects, which for amphetamines are characterized by a severe psychological dependence
Fort also testified that marihuana and amphetamines “are totally dissimilar pharmacologically, socioeconomically in their street-pattern use and their potential for abuse and in their effect both from short-term and long-term use, so there is no rationale for . . . [classifying] them together with marihuana.”
The defendant also claims that the exclusion of other psychoaetive drugs, which are far more dangerous than marihuana, from the prohibitive classification is arbitrary and irrational and therefore violates the equal protection clause. The defendant points out that the psychoaetive drugs alcohol and nicotine
Federal decisions under the fourteenth amendment do not hold that the legislature is required to
But the obiter dicta of the Connecticut Supreme Court indicates that irrational exemptions from a statute would be a denial of the guarantees under the due process clause. Our Supreme Court has consistently enunciated this rule as follows: “Legislation, even though it is within the police power, may be violative of due process if it is discriminatory in that it deals differently with different classes of persons without the existence of some natural and substantial difference, germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation, between those within the class included and those whom it leaves untouched.” Schwartz v. Kelly, 140 Conn. 176, 181; State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 505-506; Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 521; State v. Cullum, 110 Conn. 291, 295.
Whether or not such an exemption is the basis for a constitutional attack, it is still the duty of the court in this case to review the effects on the public health and welfare of the psychoactive drugs which are excluded from the classification and com
Heavy use of alcohol is clearly more dangerous than marihuana for the user and society.
Alcohol leads to habituation and can be addicting.
Nicotine also has widespread use; about sixty to seventy million people in this country regularly use the psyehoactive drug nicotine. Long-term use of nicotine may result in lung cancer, high blood pressure and stroke, bronchitis and emphysema, and coronary heart disease.
This court has been unable to find any case wherein the constitutional issue of the rationality and reasonableness of classifying marihuana with drugs such as barbiturates and amphetamines has been decided. The issue of classifying marihuana with narcotics has been before the courts on several occasions. In those instances some courts have held that such a classification violates the equal protection clause and other courts, for a variety of reasons, have failed to declare the legislation unconstitutional.
In People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, the court, voiding the conviction of the defendant for illegal possession of marihuana, was divided on its reasons, but two of the justices were of the opinion that the statutory classification of marihuana with narcotics was unconstitutional in that it denied equal protection of the law.
The federal District Court in United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Sup. 743 (D. Conn.), found the classification of marihuana with narcotics to be constitutional because federal legislation did separate the drugs for penalty purposes. The court also pointed out that Congress established a scheme of penalties that only applied to marihuana. Id., 748. This is not the case under the Connecticut statutes. Possession with the intent to sell or dispense marihuana, whether in small amounts or not and whether
The only conclusion to which this court can come is that there are substantial differences between marihuana and psyehoactive drugs such as amphetamines and barbiturates. Marihuana is a relatively mild drug which causes minimal risk to the public health and does not constitute a danger to public safety.
It becomes clearly apparent that the classification of marihuana under § 19-480 (b) for penalty purposes does not rest on grounds which have a fair and substantial relation to the purposes of this legislation, nor is there any state of facts which can reasonably be conceived by this court to justify such a classification.
With such widespread use, the dangers of an irrational classification undermine a fundamental respect for the law. Those who have used the drug have not experienced the great harm supposedly attributed to it. The law in such instances loses its credibility. It severely punishes a person for conduct he regards as harmless.
The practical aspects of the problem do not stop there. The number of persons arrested for violation of the marihuana laws have steadily increased. It was reported that during the year of 1973, 420,000
It should be emphasized that marihuana is a psychoactive drug, and like all psychoactive drugs, including alcohol and nicotine, it is potentially harmful depending on the intensity, frequency and duration of use. “The state has a legitimate concern with avoiding the spread of marijuana use to adolescents who may not be equipped with the maturity to handle the experience prudently . . . .” Ravin v. Alaska, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alas.). Therefore, under the police power of the state, the legislature may exercise its jurisdiction by prohibiting or at least controlling the distribution of marihuana.
The motion to quash is granted.
The legislation does not distinguish between marihuana and any other form of the drug obtained from the hemp plant, cannabis sativa. General Statutes § 19-443 (7) defines cannabis-type drugs
A “sale” under the statute does not require that the transfer be for profit or for any remuneration. It is defined by § 19-443 (50) as “any form of delivery which includes barter, exchange or gift, or offer therefor, and each such transaction made by any person whether as principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee.” See State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 62. Possession of marihuana with intent to dispense or sell can therefore mean possession with intent to make an “accommodation sale” or even possession with intent to give it for no consideration to another person.
All references to § 19-480 refer to the statute as amended by Public Act No. 74-332 § 2: “(a) Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells, prescribes, dispenses, compounds, transports with the intent to sell or dispense, possesses with the intent to sell or dispense, offers, gives or administers to another person any controlled substance which is a hallucinogenic substance other than marihuana or a narcotic substance except as authorized in this chapter, for a first offense, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years and may be fined not more than three thousand dollars or be both fined and imprisoned and for each subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned not more than thirty years and may be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned. (b) Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells, prescribes, dispenses, compounds, transports with intent to sell or dispense, possesses with intent to sell or dispense, offers, gives or administers to another person any controlled substance other than a hallucinogenic substance other than marihuana, or a narcotic substance except as authorized in this chapter, may, for the first offense, be fined not more than one thousand dollars or bo imprisoned not more than seven years or be both fined and imprisoned; and, for each subsequent offense, may be fined not more than five thousand dollars or be imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or be both fined and imprisoned. . . .”
The motion is entitled “Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss and/or Erase.” A motion to quash is the proper pleading when it is alleged that the statute is unconstitutional. Practice Book § 477B. Accordingly, the court will treat this motion as a motion to quash.
The defendant also argues that the statute is unconstitutional to the extent it pertains to marihuana because the penalty imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, it fringes on his right to privacy, it constitutes an improper, irrational and invalid exercise of the police power, and it is vague. The court finds it unnecessary to go into these claims to decide the motion before it.
“The Connecticut constitutional provision has 'a like meaning to that in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States which prohibits the states from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.' Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 515.” Kellems v. Brown, 163 Conn. 478, 485.
See General Statutes § 19-443 (30).
In an obvious attempt to correct the ambiguity of the statute, the legislature enacted Public Act No. 75-567 § 65.
General Statutes § 19-443 (5) defines barbiturate-type drugs to include “barbituric acid and its salts, derivatives thereof and chemical compounds which are similar thereto in chemical structure or which are similar thereto in physiological effect, and which show a like potential for abuse, which are controlled substances under this chapter unless modified.”
General Statutes § 19-443 (4) defines amphetamine-type substances to include “amphetamine, optical isomers thereof, salts of amphetamine and its isomers, and chemical compounds which are similar thereto in chemical structure or which are similar thereto in physiological effect, and which show a like potential for abuse, which are controlled substances under this chapter unless modified.”
Soler, “Of Cannabis and the Courts: A Critical Examination of Constitutional Challenges to Statutory Marijuana Prohibitions,” 6 Conn. L. Rev. 601, 606.
Some courts have taken this burden of proof and shackled it with almost an ironclad irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality because of the political issue. See United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir.).
But see the concurring opinion in People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 131.
“We proceed not to determine scientific questions, but to judge whether the data presently available provides a reasonable basis for the described classification of marijuana.” People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 342.
“The Commission shall conduct a study of marihuana including, but not limited to, the following areas: (A) the extent of use of marihuana in the United States to include its various sources, the number of users, number of arrests, number of convictions, amount of marihuana seized, type of user, nature of use; (B) an evaluation of the efficacy of existing marihuana laws; (C) a study of the pharmacology of marihuana and its immediate and long-term effects, both physiological and psychological; (D) the relationship of marihuana use to aggressive behavior and crime; (13) the relationship between marihuana and the use of other drugs; and (33) the international control of marihuana.” Public Law 91-513, pt. F, 91st Congress, H.R. 18583 (October 27, 1970).
“A psychoactive drug is any substance capable of modifying mental performance and individual behavior by inducing functional or pathological changes in the central nervous system.” National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, “Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding,” p. 49 (1972) (hereinafter cited as “Signal of Misunderstanding”). Included in this classification are “tranquilizers, stimulants, coffee, cigarettes, alcohol, marihuana and other licit or illicit drugs.” Id., p. 50.
“Drug preparations from the hemp plant vary widely in quality and potency, depending on the climate, soil, cultivation and method of preparation. The drug is obtained almost exclusively from the female plant. When the cultivated plant is fully ripe,- a sticky, golden yellow resin with a minty fragrance covers its flower clusters and top leaves. The plant’s resin contains the active substances. Preparations of the drug come in three grades, identified by Indian names. The cheapest and least potent, called bhang, is derived from the cut tops of uncultivated plants and has a low resin content. Most of the marihuana smoked in the U.S. is of this grade. To the discriminating Hindu bhang is a crude substitute for ganja, a little like the difference between beer and fine Scotch, and it is scorned by all but the very poorest in India. Ganja is obtained from the flowering tops and leaves of carefully selected, cultivated plants, and it has a higher quality and quantity of resin. The third and highest grade of the drug, called charas in India, is made from the resin itself, carefully scraped from the tops of mature plants. Only this version of the drug is properly called hashish; the common supposition that hashish refers to all varieties of cannabis drugs is incorrect. Oharas, or hashish, is five to eight times stronger in effect than the most potent marihuana regularly available in the U. S.” Grinspoon, “Marihuana,” 221 Sci. Am. 17 (1969); Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 50.
See note 1 supra.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 57.
This increase in pulse rate was described by Grinspoon as being “less than that which is produced when you play a set of tennis and the effect is one which as the high wears off, so does the increase in pulse.”
“At low, usual 'social’ doses, the intoxicated individual may experience an increased sense of well-being; initial restlessness and hilarity followed by a dreamy, carefree state of relaxation; alteration of sensory perceptions including expansion of space and time; and a more vivid sense of touch, sight, smell, taste, and sound; a feeling of hunger, especially a craving for sweets; and subtle changes in thought formation and expression. To an unknowing observer an individual in this state of consciousness would not appear noticeably different from his normal state.” Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 56.
This euphoric feeling is influenced by three factors: the amount of the dose, the set of the user, and the setting in which it is used. The dose is the potency of the marihuana measured by the dose the user gets into his body. By the set is meant a person’s personality, his makeup, his attitudes, feelings, knowledge and fantasies. The setting has to do with the social environment in which the drug is smoked. The latter two factors are generally important for all psychoactive drugs but they seem to be particularly important for marihuana. Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 51. There are instances where a dose of marihuana would have no effect on a person if the set and setting are not appropriate.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, pp. 56, 58.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 61. The report describes certain “social, psychological and behavioral changes among young high school and college-age Americans including many who have used marihuana heavily for a number of years. These changes are reflected by a loss of volitional goal direction.” But the commission found that “[n]o evidence exists to date to demonstrate that marihuana use alone caused these behavioral changes either directly or indirectly. ... If heavy, long-term marihuana use is linked to the formation of this complex of social, psychological and behavioral changes in young people, then it is only one of many contributing factors.” Ibid.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 87; Kaplan, Marijuana — The New Prohibition, pp. 157-67 (1971); Bonnie & Whitebread, “The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition,” 56 Va. L. Rev. 971, 1105; Grinspoon, Marihuana Reconsidered, p. 233 (1971); Hellman, Laws against Marijuana: The Price We Pay, pp. 34-35 (1975).
It is important to distinguish between addiction and psychological dependence. Fort defined addiction as follows: “Addiction in recommended terminology by the World Health Organization is now known as physical dependence, so addiction or physical dependence is defined as including two things: tolerance and secondly, a withdrawal illness . . . absent syndrome. Tolerance means with daily use over a period of weeks or months of large and increasing doses of a given drug. The body adapts to that so that more and more is required to produce a desired effect, and that tolerance occurs with all the depressant drugs, alcohol, barbiturates or related sedative hypnotics and, of course, all the narcotics, whether it’s heroin, morphine, opium, methadone, demerol, etc. The second component is this withdrawal illness. That means when the drug is abruptly discontinued or sharply reduced in amount as compared to the amount the body has grown used to, an illness is precipitated which with heroin, morphine or other narcotics involves running of the nose, tearing of the eyes, a rise in body temperature and blood pressure, goose flesh, sweating, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea.”
He defined habituation as follows: “In technical language, habituation is supposed to be officially referred to now as psychological dependence. Habituation and psychological dependency means you get so used to something after a period of regular use or exposure to it, and that something need not be a drug. You get so used to it that when the phenomenon or substance is no longer available to you, you get restless, irritable, out of sorts, so to speak, don’t know what to do with yourself .... In a sense, all the drugs can produce habituation such as caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, marijuana.”
“Although evidence indicates that heavy, long-term cannabis users may develop psychological dependence, even then the level of psychological dependence is no different from the syndrome of anxiety and restlessness seen when an American stops smoking tobacco cigarettes.” Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 87.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 53.
Marihuana does not lead a person to criminal behavior which he might not have participated in without the drug. Grinspoon testified: “[I]f it has any relationship to crime and violence it’s a negative one. . . .” “In sum, the weight of the evidence is that marihuana does not cause violent or aggressive behavior; if anything, marihuana generally serves to inhibit the expression of such behavior. Marihuana-induced relaxation of inhibitions is not ordinarily accompanied by an exaggeration of aggressive tendencies.” Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 73; Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 136; Bonnie & Whitebread, supra, note 25, p. 1105.
Bonnie & Whitebread, supra, note 25, p. 1105.
Fort testified: “Even with enormous doses in human beings no deaths have been reported.”
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, pp. 87-88; Grinspoon, supra, note 25, pp. 235-52; Bonnie & Whitebread, supra, note 25, p. 1105; Hellman, supra, note 25, p. 35.
Grinspoon testified as follows: “[0]ne must consider the possibility that cannabis could, given a susceptible person, precipitate a psychosis. That is to say, in a person who is prepsychotie. It is important to qualify that because that same person is susceptible to something like a surgical assault on his body or severe automobile accident or the loss of a loved one or even an alcoholic debauch. Any one of these might be the last straw that breaks the camel’s back, and in that sense I would have to say, and that I think it is possible for cannabis to precipitate a psychosis.” See also Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 90; People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 344.
National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, “Drug Use In America: Problems in Perspective,” p. 184 (1973) (hereinafter cited as “Drug Use in America”). But in “a controlled study conducted recently [1969] by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of the state of Washington, it was found that marihuana causes significantly less impairment of driving than alcohol does.” Grinspoon, “Marihuana,” 221 Sci. Am. 17, 23 (1969). Moderate doses of marihuana do not produce any marked alteration in coordination or reaction time, but a significantly stronger dose impairs coordination and reaction time. Port, however, testified that “the majority of marihuana users have a kind of self-titration when they use the drug, meaning that if they find that if they use more than an average or moderate dose they fail to get the beneficial effect that they are seeking . . . and, therefore, it’s kind of a built in control so that they don’t go beyond that.”
General Statutes § 14-227a.
See Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, pp. 78, 91.
For the statutory definition of barbiturate-type drugs, see note 9 supra.
Soler, supra, note 11, p. 615.
Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 200.
Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 136.
Drug Use in America, supra, note 34, p. 165.
“Barbiturates appear to be related to death in two ways: consumption of lethal doses is a common means by which persons commit suicide; and their combined effects with alcohol sometimes result in death even in cases where suicide is not apparent. It has been estimated that 400 barbiturate-induced suicides occur each year in New York City alone.” Drug Use in America, supra, note 34, p. 194.
See People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 345.
For the statutory definition of amphetamine-type substances, see note 10 supra.
Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 200; Soler, supra, note 11, p. 615.
Grinspoon explained Ms opinion that amphetamines are addicting drugs as follows: “Well, it gets to be a very technical argument but it has to do with . . . the craving . . . the withdrawal syndrome, [and] tolerance, [as] they all exist. . . . [M]ost people have not believed they are addictive because the opiates have been used as the model for the withdrawal syndrome, . . . [and] the withdrawal syndrome with amphetamines is different. It involves changes in the electroencephalogram and B.E.M. sleep, which can elearly be demonstrated to occur when a person gives up amphetamines. [W]hen a person who is withdrawing from opiates, and he is in the middle of this withdrawal syndrome, you can interrupt it and stop the whole thing by giving Mm some opium, just as an alcoholic can stop the D.T.’s by giving him some alcohol, [and] make him appear to be normal again by giving him the drugs. [W]ell, . . . [as to] these changes that occur in amphetamines during withdrawal, if you give amphetamines the EEG goes back to normal, the B.E.M. time sleep goes back to normal and so on. It is for these reasons that I think that only in the narrow sense that we accept the opium paragon as the only one for addiction can we believe that amphetamines are not addicting. If you accept as my contention that there are other paragons,- amphetamines are addicting: [B]ut in any event no authority will dispute that one can develop a very severe . . . dependence where the craving is enormous and so forth. There are a few who dispute that.”
There apparently is some disagreement as to whether the amphetamines can be addicting. But whether or not they are addicting, all authorities agree that the user can develop a strong psychological dependence on amphetamines. People v. McCabe, supra, note 43; Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 200.
Dr. Grinspoon testified: “If you take a drug like amphetamines, there is evidence that a person will . . . more likely become more irritable, becomes paranoid, and many report of people striking out just at random at other people and hurting them or getting involved in fights with them. There seems to be some inherent psychopharmacological property of the drug which does seem to enhance this kind of behavior, but in the case of marihuana this is not so.”
People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 346; Soler, supra, note 11, p. 616.
Alcohol and nicotine are psychoaetive drugs (see note 16, supra), inasmuch as they are drugs that have the capacity to influence behavior by altering feeling, mood, perception, or other mental states. The general publie has failed to reeognize this fact. Drug Use in America, supra, note 34, p. 10.
Examples of these legislative controls are: (pertaining to alcoholic liquor) General Statutes §§ 30-74, 30-86, 30-87, 30-113; (pertaining to nicotine) § 53-344.
People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 107; Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 305; Soler, supra, note 11, p. 637.
Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 274.
Drug Use in America, supra, note 34, p. 165.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 14; Drug Use in America, supra, note 34, pp. 183, 192.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 15.
For a review of these cases, see Soler, supra, note 11, pp. 641-76.
These conclusions about marihuana have been reached in most credible studies that have been undertaken. The first such study was the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission appointed by the British Government and published in 1894. Grinspoon, supra, note 25, p. 277. Likewise, studies which followed found marihuana to be benign. They were: Panama Canal Zone Study of 1925, “Marihuana Smoking in Panama,” 73 Military Surgeon 269; The Marihuana Problem in the City of New York (1944); Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16; Canadian Government Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Cannabis, Rep. (1972); Drug Use in America, supra, note 34; and the study financed by the Army and conducted between April, 1973, and August, 1974, under the direction of J. H. Mendelson, professor of psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, 3 Juvenile Justice Digest 19.
Drug Use in America, supra, note 34, p. 249.
The statute in question as it applies to marihuana cannot withstand the constitutional challenge whether the rational relationship test to be applied is that the classification must “rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation”; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415; or upon the standard that a "statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426; see Soler, supra, note 11, p. 607; note, “Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection,” 72 Mich. L. Rev. 508.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 26.
Id., p. 32.
Ibid.
Hellman, supra, note 25, p. 29.
Id., p. 31; Kaplan, supra, note 25, p. 38.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 145.
Note, “White House Announces Its New Perspectives On. Pot,” 16 Crim. L. Rep. 2183.
Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 622.
See 15 Crim. L. Rep. 2066.
Quaere whether under the present state of facts the possession and use of marihuana can be criminalized. Are such laws in violation of the rights of privacy? If so, can it be said that the state under its police power can show a compelling reason to justify the invasion of this right of privacy? See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 . . . ; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; see People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 131 (concurring opinion); Signal of Misunderstanding, supra, note 16, p. 142; Ravin v. Alaska, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alas.).