State v. AndrewsState v. Andrews
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bosson
1. Defendant George Andrews appeals his conviction for concealing identity, contrary to
BACKGROUND
2. On July 4, 1994, after a brief pursuit, New Mexico State Police officers stopped Defendant for driving 66 miles per hour (mph) in a 35-mph zone. Upon a request by the officers, Defendant gave his full name, but did not produce a driver’s license. The officers asked Defendant for his address, date of birth, and social security number which Defendant failed to disclose. At triаl, there was a dispute over whether the officers allowed Defendant a reasonable opportunity to provide the requested information. One officer testified that, in his opinion, Defendant had “simply refused” to provide the
3. Defendant was eventually charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, and concealing identity under
THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
4. The concealing identity statute,
Concealing identity consists of concealing one’s true name or identity, or disguising oneself with intent to obstruct the due exеcution of the law or with intent to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer or any other person in a legal performance of his duty or the exercise of his rights under the laws of the United States Or of this state.
Whoever cоmmits concealing identity is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
The statute makes it an offense to conceal one’s name or identity. Defendant argues that name is synonymous with identity and because he gave his true name, he satisfiеd the statute. We disagree.
5. Identify is not limited to name alone. The use of the disjunctive word “or” indicates that failing to give either name or identity may violate the statute. See State v. Dunsmore, 119 N.M. 431, 433, 891 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct.App.1995) (construction of a statutе using disjunctive “or”). There would be no reason for the legislature to include the word “identity” if it carried the same meaning as “name.” A statute should be construed so that no part of it is rendered surplusage or superfluous. Id A statute is reаd literally if its words are plain and unambiguous, provided such a construction would not lead to an injustice, absurdity, or contradiction. Atencio v. Board of Educ. of Penasco Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 99 N.M. 168, 171, 655 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1982). Penal statutes are not subjected to strained or unnatural constructions in order to infer exemptions from their provisions. State v. Reaves, 99 N.M. 73, 75, 653 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct.App.1982). Legislative intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute, Arnold v. State, 94 N.M. 381, 383, 610 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1980), and from the legislative purpose to be achieved, State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). Given the language of the statute, we hold that Defendant was prohibited from concealing information pertaining to his “identity,” which in this case necessarily includes mоre than just a correct name.
6. We can discern from the statute a legislative purpose to provide police officers the minimal, essential information regarding identity so that they can perform their duties (not bе “hindered” in the “legal performance of his duty”). The legislature has already required every New Mexico driver to carry a driver’s license and exhibit it on demand. See
7. In this case, the officers requested three items of identifying information— address, date of birth, and social security number. According to thе testimony, this information is necessary for officers to verify a driver’s license and otherwise perform their lawful duties. Defendant gave the officers none of this information. Without specifying what identifying information might be appropriate in all situations, we hold that in the context of a valid traffic stop, a failure to provide the information contained in a driver’s license falls within the reach of the concealing identity statute regardless of whether a driver also provides his or her true name.
8. In light of this construction regarding what is needed to establish identity, we now determine whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support Defеndant’s conviction. See State v. Clifford, 117 N.M. 508, 512, 873 P.2d 254, 258 (1994). Substantial evidence is that evidence which is acceptable to a reasonable mind as adequate support for a conclusion. Id. An appellate court views thе evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the verdict and resolves all conflicts and indulges all permissible inferences in favor of upholding the verdict. Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id.
9. In this case, a jury could reasonably infer that Defendant intended to hinder the officers in the discharge of their duties. There was testimony that Defendant refused to supply additional information without a plausible explanation. The jury could reasonably infer that Defendant was being uncooperative in the hope that the officers would not discover he was driving with a revoked license. Defendant admitted being aware that the officers thought he was intentionally concealing his identity, and yet nothing prompted Defendant to offer a reasonable explanation for not answering some of the questions regarding identity. Consequently, we hold that substantial evidencе showing that Defendant refused to identify himself with the intent of hindering the officers in the execution of their duties supports this verdict.
VAGUENESS
10. Defendant urges this Court to find that the concealing information statute violates due process becаuse the term “identity” is unconstitutionally vague. He argues that it does not alert persons with sufficient certainty of what is required to comply with the law. See State v. James M., 111 N.M. 473, 477-78, 806 P.2d 1063, 1067-68 (Ct.App.1990) (to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process, a statute must provide adequate warning to a person of ordinary intelligence that his conduct is prohibited). Defendant carries the burden of demonstrating the statute’s invalidity. See State v. Ramos, 116 N.M. 123, 127, 860 P.2d 765, 769 (Ct.App. 1993). In reviewing a vagueness challenge, the court applies the two-part test enunciated in State v. Brecheisen, 101 N.M. 38, 42, 677 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Ct.App.1984) (relying on Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). We inquire first whether the concealing identity statute is sufficiently definite so that ordinary drivers would understand that they had to provide more than a name, and second, whether the authority to request more than a name, in the context of a motor vehicle stop, encourages arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. Id.
11. In deciding these two questions, we observe that a statute is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language. See State v. Segotta, 100 N.M. 498, 500, 672 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1983). The reviewing court must uphold the statute unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature went outside the constitution in enacting the statute. State v. Ball, 104 N.M. 176, 178, 718 P.2d 686, 688 (1986); Brecheisen, 101 N.M. at 42, 677 P.2d at 1078. The legislature is not required to write statutes for the understanding of persons who cannot or will not apply ordinary meanings to plain words; the person of “common intelligence” is the standard
12. The two-part vagueness test is satisfied in this case. First, the concealing identity statute is sufficiently definite, in the context of a motor vehicle stop, to notify Defendant he must provide more than just his name. Every New Mexico driver must do so in the context of a valid stop. See Reynоlds, 119 N.M. at 386, 890 P.2d at 1318. The record demonstrates that the officers requested only information that ordinarily must be provided on a driver’s license. We fail to see how any New Mexico driver cannot be on notice of an obligation to рrovide this kind of basic information during a valid traffic stop. In addition, the statute requires specific intent, “to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer or any other person in a legal performance of his duty.”
13. Second, the request for identification does not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement. The officer’s inquiry is limited, as it was here, to what is necessary to perform a lawful duty, which in this ease was to check on the validity of the driver’s license. The statute does not permit open-ended inquiry nor inquiry without standards. Cf. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361, 103 S.Ct. at 1860 (finding unconstitutional a statute interpreted to require a person to provide “credible” аnd “reliable” identification to the satisfaction of the police officer). If there is any potential for arbitrary and discriminatory application of this statute by police in a similar factual context, it has not been persuasively argued, and we do not find it present.
CONCLUSION
14. For the reasons previously stated, Defendant’s conviction for concealing identity is affirmed.
15. IT IS SO ORDERED.
WECHSLER and BUSTAMANTE, JJ., concur.