{¶ 2} On August 1, 2003, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Anderson was stopped by Deputy James Dhayer ("Dhayer"). Dhayer effectuated the stop of Anderson because Anderson, and the vehicle in which he was traveling, generally matched thе description received from dispatch regarding a suspicious little blue car with a male driver traveling in the area. The anonymous tip1 received by dispatch did not include any more details of the vehicle, i.e. a license plate number or the make or model of the vehicle. In stopping Anderson, Dhayer did not observe any traffic violations. Although there had been reports of theft in the area, Dhayer did not stop Anderson in connection with the reported thefts. After commencing the stop, Dhayer determined that Anderson's license was suspended, as well as expired.2
{¶ 3} Anderson was charged with driving without a valid license and driving under suspension. Anderson pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress. A hearing on the motion was heard on October 21, 2003. At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court denied Anderson's motion to suрpress.3 Thereafter, Anderson changed his plea to no contest to the charge of driving without a valid license. The driving under suspension charge was dismissed. The trial court sentenced Anderson to ten days in jail аnd fined Anderson $300.00.
{¶ 4} Anderson timely appealed. Anderson's sentence was stayed pending this appeal. Anderson raises the following assignment of error:
{¶ 5} "The trial court erred by denying appellant's motion to suрpress when the state failed to prove that the stop of his vehicle was justified by specific and articulable facts."
{¶ 6} In his sole assignment of error, Anderson argues that Dhayer did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion that Anderson was involved in or about to become involved in criminal activity to effectuate the stop. Rather, Anderson claims that he was stopped for merely appearing suspicious. Thus, as Anderson asserts, the initial stop by Dhayer was unconstitutional.
{¶ 7} The trial court acts as trier of fact at a suppression hearing and must weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses.State v. Hill,
{¶ 8} In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found that Dhayer verified what was called into the dispatch by the anonymous informant, i.e. thаt a little blue car was traveling in the area. The trial court also found that the informant's statement that the vehicle was suspicious was a conclusion made by the informant. The trial court finally found that the call from dispatch obligated Dhayer to investigate the matter and, in so investigating and verifying the presence of a blue car traveling in the area, Dhayer possessed reasonable suspicion to stoр Anderson. Since the trial court's factual determinations are supported by competent and credible evidence, thus, binding this court to accept these factual findings as accurate, we now must "independently determine as a matter of law whether the applicable legal standard has been satisfied." See State v. Burrows, 11th Dist. No. 2000-T-0089,
{¶ 9} The
{¶ 10} A stop of a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring "is not unrеasonable under the
{¶ 11} To justify an investigative stop, an officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."Terry v. Ohio (1968),
{¶ 12} "[A]n anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity" to justify an investigative stop. Alabamav. White (1990),
{¶ 13} In this case, Dhayer merely verified that there was a blue vehicle traveling in the area. Dhayer did not observe any traffic violations, nor did he observe anything to provide him with reasonable suspicion that Anderson was engaged in сriminal activity. Moreover, there were no other articulable facts to support a conclusion that Anderson was engaging in or was about to engage in criminal activity, such as, the time of day or knowledge of recent criminal activity in the area. Rather, upon simply observing a blue vehicle in the area, Dhayer immediately effectuated a stop of the vehicle based on the conclusion by thе anonymous informant that a "suspicious" blue vehicle was traveling in that same area. We find that Dhayer's observance of a blue vehicle traveling in the area does not provide the requisite corrоboration of the anonymous informant's tip, nor does it furnish reasonable suspicion that Anderson was engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, since an officer's mere conclusion that an individual or a situatiоn appears suspicious does not provide the requisite reasonable belief that a defendant is engaged in criminal activity, Brown v. Texas (1979),
{¶ 14} Consequently, we find that, under the facts as testified to at the suppression hеaring, Dhayer did not possess the reasonable suspicion necessary to effectuate an investigative stop of Anderson. See BowlingGreen v. Tomor, 6th Dist. No. WD-02-012,
{¶ 15} An officer has a duty to investigate аn anonymous tip reporting "suspicious" behavior, especially in these times of heightened security. Thus, while Dhayer's efforts in upholding this duty to investigate are understandable, we cannot ignore that the facts, as testified to at the suppression hearing, fail to demonstrate that Dhayer possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop of Anderson.
{¶ 16} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Anderson's sole assignment of error has merit. The decision of the Chardon Municipal Court is reversed and judgment is entered for Anderson.
Christley, J., concurs, O'Neill, J., concurs in judgment only.