These consolidated appeals present the issue of whether the amendment to Iowa Code section 811.1 (1981), contained in 1982 Iowa Acts chapter 1236, section 1, and effectivе July 1, 1982, is applicable in determining the right to bail for appellants admitted to bail on appeal prior to the amendment’s effective date. The trial court ruled that the amendment to the statute served to terminate the eligibility of both appellants to remain free on bail pending appeal. It accordingly ordered that the appeal
During the pendency of these appeals, the conviction of defendant Anderson was affirmed by the court of appeals. Procedendo and mandate have issued on that decision, and Anderson is now serving the prison sentence which had been imposed upon him. The case is therefore moot as to him, and his appeal should be dismissed. The conviction of the defendant Hartman has аlso recently been affirmed by the court of appeals, but an application for further review is pending in this court. Procedendo and mandate have not issued from the decisiоn of the court of appeals, defendant Hartman remains free on appeal bond, and the issue is therefore not moot as to him. We therefore consider the issue on dеfendant Hartman’s appeal.
Defendant Lawrence Hartman was convicted by jury trial of murder in the second degree as defined in Iowa Code section 707.3 (1979). On December 15,1981, he was sentenced to an indeterminate 25-year prison term. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and sentence on that same day and was released from custody by pоsting a $100,000 appeal bond. At the time defendant Hartman was admitted to bail on appeal, Iowa Code section 811.1 (1981) provided:
All defendants are bailable both before and aftеr conviction, by sufficient surety ... except that the following defendants shall not be admitted to bail:
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2. A defendant appealing a conviction of a class “A” felony.
Murder in the second dеgree is a class “B” felony, and defendant Hartman’s eligibility for appeal bond under the statute in effect at the time of his sentencing is not disputed.
By an amendment which became effective July 1, 1982, section 811.1 was changed so as to provide as follows:
All defendants are bailable both before and after conviction, by sufficient surety ... except that the following defendants shall not be admitted to bail: .
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2. A defendant appealing a conviction of a class “A” felony, murder, felonious assault, sexual abuse in the second degree, sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of section 709.4, subsection 1 and 3, kidnapping, robbery in the first degree, arson in the first degree, or burglary in the first degree.
Based upon this change in the statute, the State requested that defendant Hartman’s appeal bond be revoked. The trial court so ordered, and defendant Hartman has appealed this ruling based on theories of statutory interpretatiоn and constitutional limitations. We consider his arguments and affirm the trial court.
I. Defendant’s Statutory Interpretation Argument.
Defendant Hartman’s first contention on appeal is that by determining his eligibility for appeal bond under the provisions of the amended statute, the trial court failed to apply the usual presumption that statutes operate prospectively. In particular, it is urged that such an interpretatiоn runs contrary to the provisions of Iowa Code section 4.5 (1981) which provides: “A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospectivе.” In ordering revocation of defendant’s appeal bond, the trial court considered the provisions of section 4.5 but reasoned that “terminating defendant’s right to continue to remain free after the effective date of the amendment does not give the statute retrospective effect.” The State urges that this conclusion by the trial court is correct because eligibility for bail is by its nature a continuing issue. It notes in this regard that Iowa Code section 811.7(1) (1981) provides that the court may order that a defendant who has been admitted to bail be recommitted to custody for a variety of reasons — a circumstance which the State suggests enforces the conclusion that bail entitlement may be periodically reexamined by thе court. We find merit in the State’s
The action of the trial court which we approve does no more than treat defendant Hartman in the precise manner which the legislature prescribed for persons convicted of one of the felonies enumerated in 1982 Iowa Acts chapter 1236, section 1. Defendant has been convicted of such a felony. Denial of his future right to bail appears to us to be entirely consistent with the legislative intent embodied in that legislative act. No reason has been made to appear why the legislature would intend that the policy established for postconviction bail by enactment of the 1982 amendment not apply to those persons who, because their sentences were imposed prior to the effective date of the amendment, were able to obtain bail status under the former law. We refuse tо recognize such intent on the part of the legislature.
II. Defendant’s Ex Post Facto Argument.
Defendant Hartman also asserts that the order appealed from violates the ex post facto provisions found in article I, section 9, of the United States Constitution and article I, section 21, of the Iowa Constitution. We disagree.
A criminal statute will not stand scrutiny under the ex post facto provisions of the state or federal constitutions if it punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commissiоn; or deprives one charged with the crime of any defense available according to the law at the time when the act was committed.
See Beazell v. Ohio,
III. Defendant’s Equal Protection Argument.
Finally, we cоnsider the claim of defendant Hartman that section 811.1(2), as amended in 1982, denies him equal protection of the law. This argument is based entirely on the assertion that there is no rational basis fоr concluding that those convicted of the felonies enumerated in the amendment, other than class “A” felonies would be poor bail risks.
Defendant has the burden of negating every reasonable basis for the classification which the act embodies.
State
v.
Conner,
[A]fter conviction the balance shifts. Once a person has entered a plea of guilty, or has been found guilty by a jury or court, the presumption of innocence has been extinguished. The neсessity to protect society against further criminal acts by a convicted, but unpunished, person [may be found to outweigh] society’s interest in protecting persons who may have a reversible conviction.
We find defendant’s equal protection argument to be without merit. We have considered all arguments presented and find no basis for reversal of the trial court’s order revoking the bail of defendant Hartman. The stay of that order previously granted is dissolved.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN NO. 69098; AFFIRMED IN NO. 69099.