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State v. Andersen
784 N.W.2d 320
Minn.
2010
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*1 your jurors, fellow that would real- would hold that counsel did not admit question? be the ly guilt. A Prtine’s remand to determine whether Prtine consented is not therefore response, “yes.” In J.B. said necessary. whole, as a testimony Based J.B.’s giving and due deference to district DIETZEN, Justice in (concurring part, ability to court’s observe her demeanor in dissenting part). during answers to the questions her all of dire, during voir I defer posed would in join I the concurrence dissent of credibility court’s determination that Justice Gildea. truthful J.B. was when she said she juror. be a fair impartial “could” I (con- ANDERSON, H., PAUL Justice would court

therefore hold did not curring part, in dissenting in part). abuse its discretion when it denied Prtine’s join part I in B of Justice Gildea’s con- motion to strike J.B. for cause. currence and dissent. B. ANDERSON, (con- H„ PAUL Justice I also disagree majority’s with the con- part, in curring dissenting part). clusion we need to remand this matter I join opinion majority for a of determination of whether Prtine con- except V, for Part V. With Part respect sented his counsel’s concession on I in doing dissent and question join of so in Part B of alleges intent. Prtine that he Justice Gildea’s dissent. received ineffective of assistance counsel because, closing argument, lawyer his you intentionally “that

admitted caused the death someone [has] never been miss- ing” majority from the case. The con-

cludes that this admission one guilt unless Prtine consented to this admission, his counsel was ineffective. I disagree. Minnesota, Respondent, STATE I would hold that counsel did not con- guilt. notes, cede Prtine’s majority As the Prtine’s defense at trial was not that he Eugene ANDERSEN, Kenneth Rather, not kill did Ward. Prtine’s conten- Appellant. tion was that he killed inWard self-de- No. A08-1521. majority notes,

fense. As also “[wjhether justified is using deadly one Supreme Court of Minnesota. objective is an inquiry force ... not an June 2010. subjective evaluation of the defendant’s Moreover, state mind.” majority as the concludes, correctly

also “a criminal defen- subjective dant’s intent to kill does not negate a self-defense claim.” Because

counsel’s statement conceded most

subjective intent to kill and Prtine’s self- claim defense negated thereby, I

OPINION

ANDERSON, BARRY, G. Justice. appeal This arises out of the murder of Swedberg. 34-year-old A Becker Chad An- County jury appellant found Kenneth first-degree premeditated guilty dersen 609.185(a)(1) murder, (2008), § MinmStat. shooting An- Swedberg. for the death *4 arguments ap- dersen makes several (1) peal: application the search-warrant misrepresentations and contained material cause; probable provide not otherwise did (2) insufficient for a con- the evidence was premeditated mur- first-degree viction (3) der; be to required the State should that evidence from trial not de- show did and of An- monitoring recording rive from at- phone dersen’s conversations his with brief, torney. supplemental In a se pro also the district plain ques- error in its court committed jurors of certain about incidents tioning the courtroom. We affirm. outside wife, Swedberg his Leslie lived with Fain, County. in rural A number Becker Swedberg lived with Fain’s relatives also son, Fain; Fain: her Jesse Jesse’s and children; their and Leslie wife and three Swedberg, Ken nephew. Fain’s sister and brother, nearby Swedberg’s older lived their three children. with his wife and murder, morning April The process maple to Swedberg planned the his friend Albert syrup help plan for Fain. The was Baker and Jesse camp Swedberg syruping to arrive at in order and Jesse Fain than Baker earlier and evaporator cut wood to fuel General, Swanson, Attorney John Lori by the the oth- camp ready time have General, Galus, Attorney Assistant St. B. morning. in the Swed- ers arrived later MN; Fritz, Paul, Becker and Michael house left berg delayed and Lakes, MN, for County Attorney, Detroit a.m. around 8 respondent. Swedberg’s departure, Gaitas, Shortly after Public Theodora Assistant State from gunshots loud Paul, MN, Fain heard two Defender, for Leslie appellant. St. approximate syruping any direction notice blood. Fain told the officers it This concerned her because was camp. looking she went for her husband hunting thought there hearing gunshots repeatedly not season she after two gunshots failing no for phone. reason that area. to reach him on his cell Swedberg’s phone cell after Brehm Fain called and Stromme then examined under hearing gunshots. Although was Swedberg’s she coat and shirt and noticed exactly sure what time Swedberg’s right not she heard the blood on Two side. shots, hearing emergency she testified that after medical technicians arrived at immediately began she for shots look 10:11 a.m. phone her cell to call her Her husband. yielded physical scene crime little call Swedberg first was at a.m. 8:13 despite investigation. evidence extensive There was no answer. subsequently She Four led to clearing: trails 8:15, 8:27, 8:45, a.m.; him called and 8:56 south, east, one to the one one he did answer of these calls. Fain northwest, and one to the On north. gun-

was worried because she had heard trail, County the northbound a Becker in- *5 Swedberg answering shots and was not his vestigator scene, that had arrived at the phone. got ready go She to to work and Sieling, Officer John saw what he believed calling him then tried one more time. frost, footprints to be two tracks of in the again answer, was no Fain going When there one track north going and the other the syruping walked down trail south toward the murder Ken scene.1 Swedberg and found motion- camp lying Swedberg Captain McArthur, and Joseph . on ground. County less the No blood or gunshot deputy a Becker sheriff who had immediately residence, wounds were Fain Swedberg visible. arrived at the drove brother, Swedberg’s Swedberg, looking called Ken around They for tracks. did not at 9:55 a.m. and then called 9:57 anything significant, 911 at find other than some initially Swedberg a.m. She Ken called be- evidence foot of traffic believed to be from thought emergency person- cause she the Swedberg. They also across walked Fish Lake, nel would not be able to find looking the location of Hook for tracks. Swedberg’s body without assistance. The medical examiner testified that Earth Tribal Swedberg

White Police Officers Scott shot was twice—once the right Brehm and Nicholas Stromme arrived a back shoulder and once or minute two after 10:00 a.m. Ken Swed- left buttock. The examiner determined at berg met them the gunshot residence and told that the Swedberg wounds caused them that his brother was dead and his bleed a to to death within matter of min- 1,000 body yards was about down trail. any stippling utes. The lack of gunpow- or The officers used Ken’s all-terrain vehicle der around the led wounds the examiner to scene, get path to to the homicide as the believe that Swedberg had not been shot muddy was difficult navigate. and to The at close A range. firearms examiner de- officers found Fain crying screaming. and termined that the bullets removed from pointed She to her husband’s near body Swedberg’s body from a came .30-caliber process weapon. the cooker that he to “reasonably used his was examiner Brehm, maple syrup. Officer as he was certain” that the were bullets Winchester checking body life, signs but, for not Supreme Silvertips, did Ballistic because photographs footprints might 1. No perpetrator tak- were still be the area. As the en, part problems higher sky, footprints because of technical but moved in the sun disappeared. also because there was concern that phone bullets, morning. used his cell to not able to Andersen damage was to weight Baker at a.m. asked Baker to or call 7:52 identify determine positively by way Swedberg’s to stop his resi- the bullets. to a tank dence look at Andersen wanted Ken- Investigators spoke appellant, agreed to use to store leeches. Baker but Andersen, days few after a Swed- neth buy groceries wanted to first. Andersen a suspect Andersen was not death. berg’s at supposed claimed Baker be and Andersen point. Swedberg at that a.m., by Baker his house 8:30 testified and were described grown up together had togo that Andersen knew Baker needed to August On by some as best friends. groceries first and that get Waubun were Swedberg and Andersen while any specific not set time to Andersen did in Roseau pole building a constructing arrive at Andersen’s home. theft of an County, reported there (ATV) from the resi- vehicle all-terrain had police Andersen that he a tax told Swedberg and Andersen where dence at 9:00 or preparer’s appointment 9:30 point, At some Andersen working. were with a morning appointment an bank- Swedberg confessed a.m., and left er at 11:00 that he for had stolen the that Andersen step-nephew between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. appointments In 2006 the Becker mid-November ATV. But, first his cousin a Andersen called County Department located Sheriffs a.m. to for little before 9:17 ask ride Swedberg’s ATV residence. stolen behind agreed cousin to drive Fargo. Andersen’s investigation revealed that Further Fargo; 9:34 a.m. Andersen *6 registered ATV to Andersen’s was stolen cousin, his his while cousin again contacted knowledge Swedberg denied mother. route, asked his cousin to meet was en and called Andersen police the ATV to and house, which him at sister’s Andersen’s listening and investigator an was while to house. An- way on the Andersen’s was investigator. the phone then handed the to so he and Ander- cousin did and dersen’s charged the theft of Andersen was with meet with An- left for Mahnomen to sen that Swedberg unhappy ATV and was the tax preparer. dersen’s Swedberg the ATV found near was preparer’s at tax Andersen arrived his residence. a.m. An- 9:45 and 10:00 sometime between that he did not want Swedberg decided at or was not 9:00 appointment dersen’s Andersen; working continue Swed- to claimed, a.m., rather at 2:00 as he 9:30 agreed Swedberg berg and Fain that for Ander- day. that It was common p.m. Swedberg job. look would for different very for very early or late sen to arrive Swedberg to Fain that intended told Jesse meeting with his tax After appointments. Approxi- Andersen. stop working with to went to Moorhead Andersen preparer, death, Swedberg’s mately one before week did have a loan. He not attempt obtain Swedberg participate not to also decided he day for that told appointment an leeching in a with Andersen business. meet supposed was police, but rather of a financial manager phone his to call with branch Andersen used cell An- 13, 2007, While April 2007. Swedberg April 7:46 a.m. on institution man- meeting with the branch he day police murder. He told dersen and he answered phone rang Far- his cell ager, for a ride to Swedberg looking called conversation, he told loan, phone but Swed- it. After the apply in order to for a go part- manager that his business Swedberg and Bak- the branch berg declined because had to leave. shot and he syrup make that ner had been maple er intended cousin, But Andersen to his when returned Andersen consented the search of his vehicle, waiting who was in the police house. When were proceeding to brother, Swedberg’s told him that Ken however, search outbuildings, Ander- Swedberg, shot. had been This was incon- brother, angry sen became and his said sistent with Andersen’s statement to the Frank, owned buildings those and said manager Swedberg branch because Ken Frank did police searching not want the was not business partner. An- Frank, however, buildings. only had that police dersen told his told niece him said to Andersen that Frank did want shot, Swedberg had Ken been his house searched without a warrant. shortly called a time she second there- The firearms examiner test-fired the after and told Andersen that Ken Swed- Tikka rifle in the outbuilding found But berg was dead. Andersen’s niece concluded because of the absence of only spoke maintained she to Andersen unique marks it not possible to defini- once, and she told Andersen that Swed- tively say that the Tikka rifle fired shot, berg had been not Ken Swedberg. bullets removed from Swedberg’s body, funeral, day Swedberg’s On Ander- but the Tikka rifle could have fired the opened sen a bank account and told the Swedberg’s bullets removed from body. manager yet story bank another about The examiner also concluded that bullets happened day murder, what found in during Andersen’s house namely, stopped by Andersen had search had characteristics similar to the Swedberg’s if Swedberg home to see want- bullets removed from Swedberg’s body. buy ed to go South Dakota to leech traps. jury guilty found Andersen of first- 18, 2006, September On well before the degree premeditated murder and this ap- murder, Swedberg bought Andersen a Tik- peal followed. ka T3 Lite .300 Winchester magnum short

rifle Nikon Buckmaster rifle scope *7 I. at Sporting Walker, Reed’s Goods store argues Andersen police Minnesota. When first the asked Andersen that district rifle, about court suppress this Andersen claimed erred when it failed that the Swedberg had traded it in for two evidence found in the proper- muzzle- search of his 23, ty. loaders on November 2006.2 The Tik- Andersen claims there were material Andersen, ka Swedberg bought rifle for misrepresentations and omissions of fact in however, was day found later that con- the application search-warrant and that cealed under the of an insulation outbuild- without misrepresentations these and ing near Andersen’s house. Andersen’s omissions of fact the application did not palm print was found on the gun. supply Officers probable cause. The State testified that suspi- Andersen also acted that representations the contested and ciously during the execution of the search omissions were not material because even ultimately that warrant led to the representations discov- when the contested are set ery of the Swedberg bought rifle for An- included, aside and the omissions are police dersen. The initially did not application tell still supplied probable cause to they a had search warrant support the search warrant. 2. possible ly Andersen offered exchanged several different been for two muzzleloaders. supposed- locations where the Tikka rifle had

327 See, e.g., novo standard. United States v. search “[a] have said We (2d void, Awadallah, 42, Cir.2003); and the fruits 349 F.3d 65 warrant is excluded, Elkins, 638, application if the be United States v. 300 F.3d 649 search must (6th Cir.2002); Bertrand, misrepre or reckless includes intentional States v. United (9th findings 838, Cir.1991); material to the sentations of fact 926 F.2d 842-43 Unit- Moore, (10th v. 438 723, cause.” State probable Page, v. F.2d 729 ed States 808 (Minn.1989) 101, (discussing Cir.1987). 105 analysis N.W.2d Because of federal two-prong developed test reasoned, applying courts is well we conclude that Delaware, 154, 171- 438 U.S. in Franks v. clearly erroneous standard controls 2674, (1978), 72, 57 L.Ed.2d 98 S.Ct. findings our review of a district court’s 288, 291- Causey, v. 257 N.W.2d and State issue of whether the affiant deliberate- (Minn.1977)). When a defendant seeks ly made statements were false or warrant, two-prong to invalidate disregard reckless of the truth.3 We also to show requires Franks test defendant that the de novo standard con- conclude (1) “deliberately made a the affiant our of a district trols review court’s deter- that was false or reckless statement alleged mination of misrepre- whether (2) truth,” “the state disregard of sentations or omissions were material probable cause ment was material probable cause determination. McDonough, 631 determination.” State v. The district court denied Ander (Minn.2001). misrepre A N.W.2d suppress, explaining motion to sen’s if, omission is material when sentation or the search warrant was valid because the or the misrepresentation is set aside alleged misrepresentations and omissions issue supplied, probable cause to omission were not application in the search-warrant longer warrant no exists. State the search agree. material. We (Minn.2006); Mems, v. N.W.2d (Minn. 247, 252 Doyle, misrepresentations 336 N.W.2d alleged State Most of the 1983). appli- and omissions the search-warrant center property cation for Andersen’s generally have stat Although we about various around statements made findings will not ed that a district court’s The search- weapons Andersen owned. they clearly are errone be set aside unless application stated that warrant ous, McDonough, 631 N.W.2d see “a Tikka had sold Andersen step-nephew squarely addressed the review we have not brand, action rifle.” Mag, 300 Short bolt *8 to a district court’s applied standard to be application was Before the search-warrant two-prong Franks test. analysis of the drafted, however, the affiant had con- courts have held that Several federal firmed, in applica- did not include deliberately of whether an affiant issue warrant, Tikka rifle tion for the that the in were false or made statements that by step-nephew had sold to Andersen his of the truth involves disregard reckless to the murder. pawned prior been under question that is reviewed fact-based standard, application also stat- The search-warrant clearly erroneous one officer that that a taxidermist told materiality presents ques a mixed ed issue of he shot a the taxidermist that reviewed under the de Andersen told tion of law is cases, disregard of the truth. See previous we in reckless our or 3. In at least one of (Minn. Randa, clearly applied the erroneous standard 342 N.W.2d have State v. findings 1984). whether an affiant of review to deliberately that were false made statements Mag fisher “with a 300 Short rifle.” But to borrow a rifle for an hunt in elk October also told the affiant that taxidermist 2006. Andersen argues that because Fain Andersen had said he shot the fisher with could not if Swedberg pur- remember had rifle, a .222 which is what Andersen told Andersen, chased the rifle for this renders police. The taxidermist’s statement about the search-warrant application insufficient. a .222 in rifle not included the search- making But in argument this Andersen application. warrant ignores the other appli- statements cation gun. about this argues Andersen that the remaining al- legations in the search-warrant application argues Andersen that careful review “[a] did not connect Andersen to a Tikka rifle application search-warrant reveals weapon. or other .30-caliber We dis- precisely it was suggest drafted to agree. There were two different Tikka ... the rifle that was sold to [Ander- application: rifles referenced one by sen step-nephew] Andersen’s ulti- bought that Andersen step-neph- from his mately pawned before the murder —was (and pawned) ew which was later and one suspected murder But weapon.” Swedberg purchased for Andersen. rifle sold to by step-nephew Andersen his Andersen pro- the information is not mentioned until two pages after the vided about the Tikka rifles the search- Swedberg Tikka rifle purchased for An- application warrant was not sufficient to Thus, dersen is discussed. while the affi- show he owned a Tikka Although rifle. it ant could have identified the Tikka rifle always gun is not clear which is referred to by sold to Andersen his step-nephew as in the application, search-warrant there having pawned murder, been before the are several -in application references there were substantial allegations that An- the rifle that Swedberg purchased for An- dersen owned another .30-caliber Tikka dersen. rifle at the time of the murder that was The application search-warrant states gun not the purchased Andersen had from that, according to an interview with Ander- step-nephew. his Even with the addition brother, sen’s purchased a “300 of the fact that one Tikka pawned rifle was mini-mag” at Reed’s Sporting Goods some- before the murder and that the taxider- application time 2006.4 The noted that mist said Andersen claimed to have used although no records were indicating found type different of firearm than the taxider- that Andersen purchased had a firearm previously stated, mist had there was a Reed’s, records confirmed that on fair probability that evidence of a crime 18, 2006, September Swedberg purchased would be found on property brand, a “Tikka Mag Short caliber” (i.e., a rifle like that used to commit the rifle at Reed’s Sporting Goods. appli- murder). Gates, See Illinois v. 462 U.S. cation states that Fain remembered Swed- 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d 527 berg telling her that Andersen wanted (1983). Swedberg purchase Andersen, a rifle for *9 Andersen also Andersen was a that the convicted felon and search- could not warrant application improperly do so himself. Although Fain states that could not Swedberg recall in telling Swedberg her that bullets found were “iden- actually he purchase made the for Ander- tified” as .30-caliber rounds marketed un- sen, she did not believe Swedberg pur- der the Winchester Supreme brand as Bal- chased the rifle for himself because he had listic Silvertip bullets when the firearms 4. The other pawned Tikka rifle was in 2005 or 2006.

329 justify of probable that the bul- lished cause to issuance only stated report examiner’s consistent warrant. therefore do not Swedberg were the search We found lets alleged misrepre- But later if the type that of bullet. need determine with to the fact affiant refers or were deliberate or application, the sentations omissions Supreme bullets are Causey, 257 at 291- that the Winchester reckless. See N.W.2d recovered with the bullets “consistent 93. Thus, the body Swedberg.” Chad at terminology use the correct affiant did II. once. least argues that there was argues that the search- Andersen also to convict him of first- insufficient evidence improperly character- application

warrant Recently, v. degree murder. State by McAr- Captain the evidence found ized Stein, review we addressed the standard of Swedberg. The search- and Ken thur in circumstantial evidence cases. 776 Captain states that application warrant (Minn.2010) 709, (plurality N.W.2d foot evidence of “possible McArthur found three-justice plurality opin In a opinion). “possible later refers to the traffic” and ion, suffi reviewing we said that when McAr- by Captain footprints discovered evidence, first ciency of circumstantial “our fact not include the thur.” The affiant did identify task is to the circumstances only print Swedberg saw heel that Ken Stein, proved.” (plural 776 N.W.2d from his print believed the heel and circum ity opinion). identifying In objects to the use brother. Andersen defer, proved, “we consistent stances only when there was “footprints” the term review, jury’s accep our standard una- arguments are print. a heel These proof tance of the of these circumstances vailing. rejection of evidence the record clearly application The search-warrant proved with the circumstances conflicted indi- footprints, which would says possible “in by generally Id. Juries are the State.” tracks prudent reader that the cate to credibility of position weigh the best strong or of eviden- were not well-defined and thus determine which the evidence addition, In the affiant testi- tiary value. weight much to believe and how witnesses hearing that he did not fied at the omnibus Hughes, testimony.” State v. give their about Ken Swed- include the information (Minn.2008). 307, Our 749 N.W.2d footprints belonged berg’s belief that the independently “examine step second is to affiant also omitted Swedberg, but the of all inferences the reasonableness Swedberg Swedberg Ken stated the circumstances might be drawn from type of Andersen wore the same inferences consis proved”; this includes omis- The inclusion of both of these boots. guilt. other than hypothesis with a tent impact proba- no on the sions would have Stein, opin (plurality at 716 776 N.W.2d Finally, the bulk ble cause determination. ion). words, “all the circum In other application focused of the search-warrant be consistent with proved stances must firearms, footprints. possible guilty the accused is hypothesis that hypothesis rational any inconsistent with assembling care in greater While Johnson, guilt.” that of his State preferable, except have been we application would Minn. 217 N.W. alleged not believe that do (1928). give we the deference were ma- Unlike misrepresentations or omissions *10 “we reviewing proved, circumstances when probable terial to the cause determination. fact finder’s no deference to the application give estab- We conclude that camp. choice between reasonable inferences.” Baker informed Andersen that he Stein, (plurality Thus, at 716 opin- buy groceries. needed to N.W.2d Andersen ion). “In assessing the inferences drawn was aware that going Baker was not to the from proved, inquiry syruping camp the circumstances until later. Andersen was generally simply is not whether the familiar with the inferences lead- area around ing guilt Swedberg’s syruping camp; to are reasonable. Although that Andersen had convict, visited the syruping camp must be true in to before and hunt- order it must ed the surrounding also be true that woods. Andersen there are no other rea- sonable, lived approximately away 1.3 miles rational inferences that are incon- syruping camp. guilt.” sistent with Id. Stated another way, the proved circumstances must be Swedberg left go his house to guilt consistent and inconsistent with syruping camp shortly after 8:00 a.m. Af- hypothesis except rational that of left, Swedberg ter Fain gun- heard two guilt. But will not “[w]e overturn a convic- shots, worried, became and called Swed- tion based on circumstantial evidence on 8:13, berg’s phone 8:15, 8:27, and 8:45 conjecture.” basis of mere State v. a.m., but Swedberg did not answer her Lahue, (Minn.1998). 585 N.W.2d Swedberg calls. was shot between 8:00 The State does not have the burden of and 8:13 a.m. doubt,

removing all but removing all Andersen made false po- statements to Hughes, reasonable doubt. 749 N.W.2d at lice about his whereabouts around the time 313. We conclude that proper this is the Swedberg shot. police was Andersen told approach in analyzing sufficiency of the he met his cousin at his cousin’s house evidence claims in circumstantial evidence between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. order to go adopt cases and it our standard. to a 9:00 appointment or 9:30 a.m. with a preparer, tax but fact he did not leave Here, light when taken in a most appointment for the until after 9:30 a.m. State, favorable to the proves the evidence arranged when Andersen to have his cous- the following Shortly circumstances. be in pick him up at Andersen’s sister’s murder, fore the Andersen and Swed- But appointment house. berg’s relationship had deteriorated. actually scheduled for p.m., 2:00 not 9:00 Swedberg longer no wanted to work with or 9:30 a.m. Andersen in construction. Approximately death, one week Swedberg’s before Swed- Andersen also made false statements berg changed his mind and decided not to about his ownership possession Andersen, participate with in a leeching Tikka T3 Lite .300 Winchester short mag- business. phone rifle, Andersen used his cell to num which shoots .30-caliber bullets. call Swedberg at day 7:46 a.m. on the At a time general public when the believed the murder. Swedberg informed Ander that Swedberg had been shot with a sen that Swedberg going to make gun smaller caliber because of information maple syrup with Baker that morning, provided by so police, Andersen neverthe- Andersen knew Swedberg would be at attempted less police to mislead the con- syruping camp that morning. cerning his ownership possession then used phone his call rifle, cell Baker at the Tikka try he did not 7:52 a.m. and asked Baker to drive to conceal ownership his guns. other Fur- Andersen’s house in ther, order to look at a Andersen initially gave consent to the leech tank. agreed Baker police house, drive to An to search his but later when dersen’s going before syruping police were about search the out- *11 house around 9:30 ob- arrived at his sister’s angry and became buildings, Andersen Thus, proved the circumstances do to a.m. false statement made another jected. He of events that would not reflect a timeline them that his brother by telling police a reasonable inference that Ander- support police the to search not want Frank did sen could not have been the shooter. Tikka T3 Lite .300 outbuildings. The the rifle, capable of magnum short Winchester argues Andersen also State’s that killed Swed- of bullets firing type convincingly not rule out Bak- evidence did concealed the insulation berg, was found Swedberg perpetrators as er or Ken An- on Andersen’s land. outbuilding anof But Swedberg. murder of we must as- Bul- gun. on the print was palm dersen’s that at time jury sume that the found had charac- in Andersen’s house lets found shot, at home or Swedberg was Baker was to the bullets recovered teristics similar Swedberg Ken picking up groceries and body. Swedberg’s from his with his wife making food for bees working garage. in his Once these determine whether must next We true, they not accepted facts are do that can be drawn inferences reasonable hypothesis that Bak- support a reasonable proved are consis- the circumstances Swedberg was the shooter. er or Ken inconsistent with guilt with tent than Andersen’s hypothesis other rational the State argues Andersen Stein, (plu- at 718 N.W.2d guilt. See a motive. convincingly did not demonstrate rality opinion). State, however, required not is McArthur, prove motive. See State arguments makes several Andersen (Minn.2007). 44, 49-50 Nonethe N.W.2d claim that the State failed support of his less, Swedberg relationship between proof that he was the meet its burden had deteriorated and Swed- and Andersen the timeline of shooter. He recently decided to end his busi berg had inference supports a reasonable events relationship with Andersen. ness shooter, not have been that he could his the distance between particularly given rea- suggests alternative Andersen also camp and that “it syruping and the home have concealed the why might he sons difficult for [Andersen] would have been of an outbuild- Tikka rifle the insulation return to his [Swedberg] kill and then fact that it was the ing, other than the only instance, business.” But Andersen normal Andersen weapon. murder For syr- from the approximately 1.3 miles lived the Tikka may claims that he have hidden proved The circumstances uping camp. apparent that in fear when it became rifle Andersen used his cell Swedberg’s establish that death was investigation of Swedberg at 7:46 a.m. and circum- to call But the phone focusing on Andersen. Swedberg a.m. was shot that Andersen at- proved Baker at 7:52 establish stances a.m. The ownership 8:00 and 8:13 to conceal his tempted sometime between public knew that jury reject general the assertion rifle before the was free Swedberg. kill rifle used to at his home when he used .30-caliber Andersen was own- attempt a.m. to conceal Swedberg call at 7:46 Andersen did phone his cell Further, spoke he guns other when although ership a.m. Baker at 7:52 Further, angry became phone police. his cell to call his Andersen used searching outbuild- police started a.m. from an unknown loca- when sister at 8:34 rifle was property where the tion, ings on the jury assume the believed we must found, objected to ultimately and he Andersen’s where- evidence that State’s he had outbuildings when for until he search of the could not be accounted abouts *12 given consent for his house to be searched. man who had a Tikka T3 Lite .300 Win- only hypothesis rational to be drawn chester magnum falsely short rifle that he from this is that Andersen hid the rifle owning denied and attempted to hide from police because he did not want the to And Further, police. Andersen created for particular firearm. opportunity himself the to kill Swedberg when Andersen asked Baker to come to Finally, argues Andersen that the lack evidence, his house and physical of such as confirmed that Baker would footprints, scene, coupled around the crime not with the be at the syruping camp right away. during timeframe which Moreover, Andersen would shortly after the time of the have had to walk to the syruping camp murder, steps Andersen took to ensure back, area and indicates that he could not that he would by be out of the area getting have committed the murder without leav- town, a ride out of repeatedly and he made ing any above, evidence. But as discussed false police statements to in an attempt to the tight timeframe on which Andersen Thus, an create alibi. in- reasonable part relies is not of the circumstances ferences that can be drawn from the cir- proved. addition, In Sieling testified that cumstances proved are consistent with An- he saw what he believed to be two tracks being dersen the killer and inconsistent footprints in the on a leading frost trail any with other rational hypothesis. to the north and west of the syruping argues Andersen next that even if the camp general in the direction of Ander- produced State enough evidence to demon- house; sen’s one track went south toward killer, strate that he was the it did not the murder scene and one track went produce sufficient prove pre- evidence to north. Because the other investigators meditation. looking who were We consider evidence for tracks about noticed that motive, they tracks, planning, were leaving any not and the killing the ab- manner of sence of probative tracks is of no when considering value whether there was suffi- when there is no doubt that the killer was cient evidence prove premeditation. present at Therefore, the murder McArthur, scene. 730 N.W.2d at 49-50. Ander- the lack footprints around the crime sen that the act of carrying a rifle scene is not inconsistent with Andersen’s into the woods would not be sufficient to guilt, or consistent with his innocence. premeditation, establish as it is common for residents of the area to take firearms footprint argument, into the woods. But the circumstances along with arguments, his other attempts proved include more than an carry- act of to break the evidence pieces into discrete ing a rifle into the woods. The circum- that, in an effort to establish when viewed proved stances also include the fact that isolation, evidentiary these fragments arranged delay Andersen Baker so that support a hypothesis reasonable other he would not be there when Andersen shot than guilt. But we do not review each Swedberg and that Andersen lying circumstance proved Instead, in isolation. wait for Swedberg. Accordingly, we the cir- must consider whether “the circum proved only cumstances presented support stances a rea- are consistent with guilt inconsistent, whole, sonable inference that on the Andersen shot with Swedberg reasonable hypothesis premeditation, they innocence.” do not Curtis, State v. support hypothesis N.W.2d rational that Ander- (Minn.1980) added). (emphasis sen Swedberg premeditation. Andersen shot without was an experienced hunter and outdoors- We conclude that there was sufficient evi- In first-degree U.S. 97 S.Ct. 837. Weather- dence to convict premeditated ford, murder. the allegedly aggrieved party failed *13 (1) to show that evidence used at trial was

III. produced directly indirectly by or the in that consti Andersen contends his (2) trusion, by govern the the intrusion to counsel was violated when right tutional (3) intentional, ment was prosecution the attorney’s phone phone his cell his calls to received otherwise confidential information argues recorded. were monitored and He about trial preparations or defense strate him nearly impossible that it is for to (4) intrusion, gy as a of or result prove prosecution to listened overheard conversations and other infor prejudicial these infor calls and obtained any way mation were used in to the sub Consequently, calls. he mation from the stantial detriment of the claimant. Id. at case for hearing asks to remand the a us 554, 558, 97 837. The federal S.Ct. courts should be to required which the State appeals agree that a claiming defendant prove that none of evidence introduced a right violation of the to counsel must obtained, by directly the State was either intrusion, show to an something addition indirectly, or from these calls. The State differing required but have views on the investiga none of that because See, factors and apply e.g., how to them. these recordings, tors to listened 782, Roper, United States v. F.2d 874 790 listening as stopped but rather as soon (11th Cir.1989) (holding that defendant had they attorney, the calls were to an realized prove evidence, there was tainted a prejudice there no remand is or his strategy defense was communicated necessary. not prosecution, purposeful or there was A right has a constitutional defendant intrusion); Singer, United States v. 785 Const, XIV; VI, amends. counsel.5 U.S. (8th Cir.1986) 228, (concluding F.2d 234 Const, I, § The attorney- Minn. art. 6. that a must that the defendant show state statutory a Minn. privilege right, client is knowingly attorney-client into the intruded 1(b) (2008), 595.02, § Stat. subd. not relationship intrusion and that the demon Mey right. constitutional See Maness v. defendant); strably prejudiced the United 15, ers, 449, 584, n. 95 466 S.Ct. U.S. (2d 823, Ginsberg, v. F.2d States (1975); 42 L.Ed.2d 574 Clutchette v. Rush Cir.1985) if (concluding that the intrusion (9th Cir.1985). en, 1469, 1471 770 F.2d justifi or intentional but unintentional government But in inter some situations able, the defendant must show there relationship with the confidential ference privileged was a infor communication may a defendant and his counsel between prejudice prosecutor mation implicate right constitutional coun therefrom); resulting v. Clutchette Rush See, e.g., Bursey, sel. Weatherford (9th en, Cir.1985) 770 F.2d 1471-72 U.S. 97 S.Ct. 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (analyzing individually). of the factors each (1977). have a standard that We not articulated In Weatherford, the United States Su defendant, State, show must or that an into preme Court held intrusion on a that an intrusion into prevail claim relationship, attorney-client standing attorney-client relationship alone, law, amounted not, a matter of does consti right to a violation to counsel. Even tute a of the Sixth Amendment. violation undisputed also that calls to and Ander- 5. Andersen does not claim the State lim- attorney. attorney’s land line were not recorded. ited access to his It is sen’s recording, to, if listening the act of based on the district court’s factual find- attorney-client phone conversations is an ings, Andersen’s claim fails under all of the attorney-client intrusion into the relation- standards discussed above.

ship, such an intrusion does not automati- IV.

cally into a violation of a translate defen- right dant’s to counsel. Andersen makes several addition al pro claims his se brief. Andersen The district court determined *14 argues first that there was not sufficient prejudice that no to there was Andersen evidence to convict him first-degree investigators’ testimony based on the at arguments murder. These parallel those hearing they that omnibus ceased lis made on his behalf in this appeal and are tening any call once it was determined addressed in Section II of opinion. this the call was between Andersen and his argues Andersen also that the district further, attorney, they did not hear court plain committed error ques when it anything relating addition, In case. jurors, bailiffs, tioned various and wit the district court found there was no evi nesses about incidents that occurred out anyone dence that else anything overheard side of the trial. argument This is without relating give to the case. great We defer merit for several reasons. findings ence to a district court’s of fact juror-related The first questioning in- and will not set them aside clearly unless juror volved N.K. and a co-worker of N.K. Stephenson, erroneous. See State v. 310 co-worker, The aware that N.K. was serv- (1976). 229, 231, 621, Minn. 245 N.W.2d 623 ing jury, on a asked him how it was going. Findings clearly if, of fact are erroneous replied N.K. that there was a lot of “con- evidence, on the entire we are left with the troversy” about the case and “[t]his one definite and firm conviction that a mistake says, says, this one says.” this one The 231, 623; occurred. Id. at 245 N.W.2d at district court asked the co-worker if N.K. Evans, 854, State v. 756 N.W.2d 870 any made jurors indication that the other (Minn.2008). Our review of the record way felt the same or if any there was confirms that the findings made on this indication that N.K. had discussed this clearly issue were not erroneous. There is jurors. with other The co-worker re- no indication that the intrusions in were sponded in negative. tentional, that presented evidence at trial produced by intrusions, was that the The district court questioned then N.K. prosecution received confidential informa who claimed he never said anything be- tion about trial preparations or yond defense what could be newspa- found strategy, or that information pers. response In questions, N.K. indi- any way calls was used in jurors sometimes, cated that the amongst not, not, detriment.6 We need themselves, and do would make comments about defendant, articulate a standard that a or facial expressions, or that something State, must show prevail on a claim particularly seemed important to an attor- that an attorney-client intrusion into the ney. At no time did object relationship amounted to a violation of the questioning juror. of the witness or right to counsel because we conclude that N.K. was objection dismissed without for recording 6. phones of inmate calls to cell came calls to the attention of the district jail policy. was a court, There was no evidence that the court ordered the cessation of re- recordings anything issue here were cording of attorney. Andersen's calls to his Further, recording routine. when the

335 anything court- heard or saw that the case outside of the would have talking about to a amounted violation of the court’s or room. not to the case. All attorneys der discuss objected to that is not Conduct agreed summary an accurate plain-error at trial is reviewed under happened. what Andersen now Caine, v. 746 N.W.2d standard. See State something may during have occurred (Minn.2008); Reed, 339, State v. 737 light those interviews that would shed (Minn.2007). 572, Plain- 583-84 N.W.2d prejudice ju whether occurred because of requir analysis three-prong is a test error ror misconduct. But Andersen has not there ing appellant to establish alleged any specific information from those (3) (1) (2) error, plain that was interviews that would be relevant. See defendant’s substantial affected Jackson, v. State 773 N.W.2d Griller, rights. State N.W.2d (Minn.2009) (citing Schoepke v. Alexander (Minn.1998). prongs If these three Co., Minn. Carpet Smith & Sons *15 met, are we then assess whether we (1971) (“An 519-20, 187 N.W.2d fair address the error to ensure “should of error assignment based on mere asser integrity judicial pro ness and the by any supported argument tion and not ceedings.” Id. in appellant’s or authorities brief is waived that Andersen’s substantial We conclude appeal and will not be considered on unless rights were not affected here. He in prejudicial error is obvious on mere gained insight valuable into that the State spection.”)). jurors thinking. But both what the were pres- counsel and the State were defense Finally, court the district interviewed in- questioning equally ent at juror, cousin Andersen’s and another knowledgeable about the inci- formed R.F., about a that conversation occurred questioning of importantly, dent. More According the two of them. between juror yielded very little information cousin, R.F., he saw a former glean- of real value. All that was was co-worker, during at a the trial. gas station juror, ultimately was that at least one ed that R.F. managed The cousin to deduce dismissed, a lot of felt there was “contro- jury. serving on Andersen’s When versy” in the case there was con- because jury, the cousin asked if R.F. was on that testimony. not tradictory Andersen does replied that could not talk about it. R.F. he specifically allege how the State could have cousin told R.F. that Andersen then changed, change, presentation its or did good to him. his cousin and to be Thus, it based on the information learned. again responded that he was not R.F. once af- rights Andersen’s substantial were not R.F. speak allowed to about the matter. not, need and do Consequently, fected. we the cousin’s account of the con- confirmed not, decide whether the district court com- and further stated he did not versation plain. an error that was mitted ability to fair. it would affect his be believe N.K., argued that R.F. should be ex- juror the The State

After the incident that he did if cused. Andersen indicated court interviewed all the bailiffs to learn excused, juror contin- any improper conversa want R.F. and the they had observed argues jurors. ued to serve. Andersen now tions between These interviews information might But after these R.F. have shared this were done off the record. interviews, might have jurors, with other and that this the court stated the record of- negative had a effect. But Andersen that none of the bailiffs indicated there argument. any nothing support or that fers this were concerns the bailiffs again, there is no indication that physical Once the timeline and evidence rights Andersen’s substantial were affect- support a hypothesis rational other than not, Consequently, ed. we need and do review, guilt. our Under standard of not, the district decide whether court com- “[cjircumstantial evidence must form a plain. mitted an error that was complete that, chain in view of the evi- whole, directly dence as a leads so sum, carefully In we have An- reviewed guilt of the defendant beyond exclude pro arguments, dersen’s se and find them any reasonable doubt reasonable infer- to be without merit. ence other than guilt.” Taylor, State Because we conclude that the district (Minn.2002); 650 N.W.2d see also properly rejected court Andersen’s chal- McArthur, State v. 730 N.W.2d warrant, lenge to the search there (Minn.2007) (holding when a convic- was sufficient evidence to convict Ander- evidence, tion is based on circumstantial murder, first-degree premeditated sen of “that evidence must be consistent with the and that Andersen failed to establish hypothesis that the guilty accused is prejudice recording phone from the calls inconsistent with any hy- other rational attorney, to his we affirm his conviction. (citation pothesis except guilt”) that of Affirmed. omitted) (internal quotation marks omit- ted). In that the reasonable inferences PAGE, (concurring). Justice *16 from the timeline and physical evidence result, I concur in the but I write sepa- support a hypotheses rational other than rately my disagreement to note with the guilt, question the becomes whether the court’s statement of and application of our evidence taken as a whole makes such standard of review for convictions based theories seem unreasonable. Taylor, See on circumstantial evidence. 650 at (stating “possibili- N.W.2d 206 To the extent that the court’s statement ties of innocence require do not reversal of application of and of our standard of re- jury a long verdict so as the evidence view sufficiency for the of in the evidence taken whole makes such theories circumstantial evidence cases is inconsis- unreasonable”) (citations omitted) seem Meyer’s tent with Justice articulation of (internal omitted). quotation marks Al- Stein, 709, the rule State v. 776 N.W.2d though, on the record before us the answer (Minn.2010) (Meyer, J., 720-26 concur- question one, to that is a close I believe I ring), would follow the standard articu- totality of remaining evidence by Meyer. lated Justice may Juries be in is sufficient to establish guilt Anderson’s position the best credibility determine beyond a reasonable doubt. evidence, weigh and we defer to their of determination the circumstances (con- ANDERSON, H., PAUL Justice proved, jury’s choice between rea- curring). sonable inferences to be drawn from the proved circumstances is not entitled to def- join I in the concurrence of Justice

erence. Page. here, In its decision the court ignores

the fact that neither the timeline nor the MEYER, (concurring). Justice physical exclusively evidence supports an guilt. join inference of That I say, is to in the concurrence of Justice reasonable inferences that Page. can be drawn

337 MEYER, (concurring). circumstantial incorpo- Justice evidence standard proof sufficiency rates the burden of Page join I in the concurrence Justice Tscheu, review....” v. State 758 N.W.2d separately to restate that but write (Minn.2008) 849, J., (Meyer, 869 concur- analytical “unduly framework majority’s ring). review narrows our traditional standard of by replacing evidence

for circumstantial Johnson, State v. the seminal authority ‘cir- the term ‘circumstantial evidence’ with limiting cited for review to circumstances proved’ restricting and then cumstances verdict, in the implied involved the theft of proved’ only ‘circumstances review of potatoes bushels from a farmer’s root by the court those circumstances deemed 543, 544, 683, cellar. 173 Minn. 217 N.W. implicit guilty to be verdict.” State (1928). The State’s evidence was cir- (Minn.2010) Stein, N.W.2d cumstantial. Id. N.W. at 683. (Anderson, J.,H., concurring). Paul Given pre- defendant denied theft and abandoning are our traditional that we testimony sented his own and that of two review, I trial standard of believe 544-45, others to establish an alibi. Id. at jury courts should instruct the on the law affirming 217 N.W. at 683. In the convic- evidence. Minnesota’s of circumstantial tion, court credibility this noted pattern jury reasonable-doubt instruction weight defendant’s witnesses and the proof away to shift the burden of tends testimony jury. their were for the Id. at prosecutions based on State regard 217 N.W. at 683-84. In to im- circumstantial evidence and fails evidence, circumstantial the court said: press upon jury the need to reach the secondary relating Various rules to cir- subjective state of certitude of requisite cumstantial evidence have been stated guilt. by Perhaps gener- the courts. the most protects Due Process Clause “[T]he ally used rule is that all the circum- except upon conviction against accused *17 proved stances must be consistent with beyond every a of proof reasonable doubt hypothesis guilty that the accused is necessary fact the crime with to constitute any hy- and inconsistent with rational In charged.”1 Winship, which he is re pothesis except guilt. By that of his 358, 1068, 364, 397 90 S.Ct. 25 U.S. proved” term “circumstances is not (1970). The L.Ed.2d 368 reasonable-doubt every meant circumstance as to which “impresses standard on the trier of fact in may testimony there be some necessity subjective reaching of a state case, only but such circumstances as the in of certitude of the facts issue.” Id. omitted) (internal (citation jury proved by finds the evidence. quotation omitted). may any testimony well in case marks “Minnesota’s traditional There be Winship explained persuasion by 1. The Court that historical- tions as the measure of ly. prosecution which the must convince the requirement guilt guilt. of a criminal trier of all the essential elements of [t]he charge by proof beyond (citations omitted) (internal be established a 397 U.S. at 361 dates at reasonable doubt least from our omitted). analysis quotation For an of marks early years a as a Nation. The demand for doubt, the historical iterations of reasonable higher degree persuasion criminal in generally Sheppard, Metamorp- see Steve The recurrently expressed cases was from an- Changes Reasonable Doubt: How hoses of the Burden of Proof times, (though) crystallization cient into its Have Weakened the Pre- "beyond the formula a reasonable doubt” Innocence, sumption 78 Notre Dame L.Rev. seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It 1165, (2003). 1176-1223 accepted jurisdic- is now in common law 338 Waltz, 409, 415-16, as to inconsis- State v. Minn. 54

on behalf of the defendant (1952) omitted) circumstances, (emphasis N.W.2d tent facts and not conclu- (footnotes omitted); Stein, see also jury may which the sively proved, and J., (Meyer, concurring) N.W.2d at 723 reject to and. do as not right have a (noting that since least Minnesota logical Followed to its conclu- proved. jury courts instructed the on the law of sion, secondary rule stated reverts evidence). circumstantial For, rule. back to the reasonable doubt if more circumstances found States, one or In Holland United the U.S. Su- guilt, or proved are inconsistent preme proper Court determined a innocence, then a consistent with reason- reasonable-doubt instruction obviated the guilt a rational-hypothesis able doubt as to arises. need for instruction: petitioners The assail the refusal (citation 545-46, Id. at 217 N.W. at 684 judge trial instruct where the omitted). Government’s evidence is circumstantial decided, When instructions Johnson it every must be such as to exclude on the law circumstantial evidence were than hypothesis reasonable other that of given guide jury in evaluating this guilt. support There is some for this evidence: type of instruction the lower court decisions, instructions, the better rule is that place Such which restric- jury properly where the is instructed on upon jury’s inculpatory tions use of doubt, the standards for reasonable such evidence, given circumstantial are an additional instruction on circumstan- protect by confining accused confusing tial evidence is and incorrect. jury, arriving guilt, at a verdict of only upon reliance such cir- 121, 139-40, facts and 348 U.S. 75 S.Ct. (1954) (citations omitted). complete cumstances as form a chain L.Ed. 150 Cit- which, Holland, light ing of the evidence eventually “we abandoned the whole, Stein, special directly guilt jury leads so instruction.” J., exclude, (Meyer, concurring).2 N.W.2d at 723 beyond the accused as to a rea- doubt, any sonable reasonable inference proof beyond “The standard of a reason- guilt. other than that of for need ... ‘plays able doubt a vital role in the protective upon restrictions the use of American procedure,’ scheme of criminal inculpatory circumstantial evidence 'is operates give because it ‘concrete sub- *18 elementary. example, For where cir- innocence, stance’ to presumption of cumstantial evidence consists in reason- convictions, against unjust ensure and to ing from a fact minor or series of minor reduce the risk of factual error in a crimi- fact, facts principal to establish a proceeding.” nal Virginia, Jackson v. 443 process fatally 307, 315, is vicious if the circum- 2781, U.S. 99 61 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d stances, (1979) attempt from which an is made (quoting Winship, 560 397 U.S. 363, 1068). guilt, depends time, to deduce a conclusion 90 “At by S.Ct. the same upon speculation conjecture. and impressing upon the factfinder the need to true, case, 2. special jury Holland court believed that a is whereas in the latter true, jury confusing only instruction would be because must not decide it whether is guilt logically testimonial evidence is no different from also whether can be inferred is, circumstantial evidence. There howev- from such evidence. er, Tscheu, J., categories: a (Meyer, distinction between the two N.W.2d at n. 3 758 870 former, (internal (citations omitted) regard jury concurring) quo- With must omitted). particular determine whether the assertion tation marks

339 subjective happened of near certitude because he wasn’t there a state reach accused, the standard didn’t commit the guilt of the crime. society symbolizes significance that our Id. at 484. to the criminal sanction and thus attaches Moreover, analogy proof beyond a liberty itself.” Id. reasonable people doubt to decisions act pattern Minnesota’s reasonable-doubt in upon important their own most affairs is

jury instruction reads: misplaced: beyond Proof a reasonable doubt is such In people the decisions make in the most ordinarily proof prudent men and affairs, important of their own resolution in upon women would act their most past of conflicts about events does not A important affairs. reasonable doubt is Indeed, usually play major a role. deci- upon a doubt based reason and common important sions we make the most sense. It does not mean a fanciful or affairs of our a choosing spouse, a lives— doubt, it capricious nor does mean be- live, job, place a gener- and the like— all of doubt. yond possibility ally very a heavy involve element of Ass’n, Judges Minn. Dist. Minnesota uncertainty risk-taking. They 10 are Guides, Jury Instruction Crim- wholly jurors unlike the ought decisions Practice — 2006). (5th inal, 3.03 This CRIMJIG ed. to make in criminal cases. incorporates instruction neither the Win- Nebraska, 1, 24, Victor v. 511 114 U.S. ship concept impressing upon jury (1994) (Gins- 1239, S.Ct. 127 L.Ed.2d 583 subjective the need to reach “a state of J., burg, concurring part and concurring certitude,” 364, 1068, 397 U.S. at 90 S.Ct. (internal judgment) in the quotation marks “subjective rigorous nor Jackson’s less omitted) Ctr., (quoting Fed. Judicial Pat- state of near certitude.” 443 U.S. at (1987) Jury tern Criminal Instructions 29 addition, 2781. In result of “[t]he S.Ct. 21)); (commentary on see id. at Instruction focusing jury on the notion reason- (Blackmun, J., S.Ct. concur- government able doubt is that once the ring part, dissenting part) (noting case, one, a it puts appears even weak agreement Ginsburg’s with Justice obser- up to be to the defendant to rebut it.” misplaced analogy “frequently vation on Solan, Convicting Lawrence M. the Inno- high-risk personal people must decisions Beyond cent Doubt: Reasonable Some lives”). daily make in their Jury Lessons About Instructions Case, juror In Sheppard addressing potential Clev. St. L.Rev. confusion (2001). by spend misunderstanding posed And instructions that instruc- time tions similar to Minnesota’s reasonable- formulation, a doubt number of courts explaining jurors what should not *19 have turned to the Federal Judicial Cen- doubt, making count as a reasonable and instruction, ter’s which reads: jurors concept

sure that do not take the beyond doubt too far ... Proof a reasonable doubt is add[ ] reasonable firmly proof you the burden that a defendant must meet that leaves convinced of very are government fairly guilt. when the has a weak the defendant’s There evidence, things case based on circumstantial few in this world that we know certainty, and the defendant does not have with absolute criminal good explanations require proof alternative of what cases the law does not If, every possible supe- doubt. Federal Judicial Center instruction

overcomes formulations”). rior to the traditional the your consideration of evi- based on dence, you firmly are convinced The evaluation of circumstantial evidence guilty charged, is of the crime defendant requires jury closely examine the guilty. him If on the you must find evidence and determine what inferences hand, you think there is a real other a minor fact can and should be drawn from guilty, you not must possibility that he is or of minor facts to establish a series him the benefit of the doubt and give principal rational-hypothesis fact. The in- guilty. him find jury’s struction directs the attention to the appropriate evaluating method for this evi- Ctr., Jury Pattern Fed. Judicial Criminal dence. Given the frailties in Minnesota’s Instructions, See, e.g., Instruction 21. instruction, reasonable-doubt it would be (Utah 305, Reyes, 116 P.3d State in- difficult for me to conclude that 2005) (authorizing use of the model Feder- one, qualifies proper struction as a suffi- instruction); al Center see also R. Judicial preclude for the rational- cient need Richards, An Jason Reasonable Doubt: hypotheses contemplated instruction as Jury and Examination In- Overview appellate Holland. Now that courts re- Colorado, Law., Aug. structions in Colo. only view implicit those circumstances 85, 88, (citing at 91 nn. federal 89-90 verdict, on cir- special instruction approving courts model Federal and state cumstantial evidence is essential to avert instruction). Judicial Center undermining presumption of innocence impress jury Ginsburg upon endorsed the Federal Ju- the need to Justice reach a guilt state of certitude of the dicial Center instruction in her concur- accused. Victor, rence in 511 U.S. at 114 S.Ct. (1994) (“This model instruction sur- PAGE, (concurring). Justice passes stating I have seen in others join I in the Mey- concurrence Justice succinctly

reasonable doubt standard er. comprehensibly.”). Commentators find the Federal Judicial Center instruction su- (con- ANDERSON, H., Justice PAUL

perior to instructions similar to Minneso- curring). See, e.g., ta’s formulation. Jon O. New- man, Doubt," Beyond “Reasonable join I Mey- the concurrence of Justice (1993) (“Notably L.Rev. N.Y.U. er. absent from Judicial Cen- [Federal charge misleading model is the ter’s]

phrase about doubt ‘based on reason’ and the ambiguous language ‘hesitating about ”); Solan, important supra, matters.’ study (citing by psychol-

482-83 conducted ogist Irwin Horowitz and evidence scholar Kirkpatrick “[o]nly

Laird in which Judicial instruction [Federal Center] acquittals achieved when the case was *20 weak, and convictions the case was when Richards,

strong”); supra, (finding at 88

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Andersen
Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date Published: Jun 30, 2010
Citation: 784 N.W.2d 320
Docket Number: A08-1521
Court Abbreviation: Minn.
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