State v. AndeltState v. Andelt
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The question we must resolve today is whether a defendant convicted of a felony drug offense qualifying for a certified drug abuse treatment program under
Facts
In January 2007, Randy Andelt pleaded no contest in Marshall County, Kansas, to possession of methamphetamine. In February 2007, Andelt pleaded no contest in Washington County, Kansas, to possession of methamphetamine in an unrelated case. Both offenses were violations of
In both cases, Andelt’s criminal history score E, combined with the severity level of his offenses, qualified him for the nonprison
Although both of the district courts conducting Andelt’s sentencing hearings noted that
The two sentences were not identical in all respects. In addition to the 20-month prison term, the Marshall County District Court imposed a 12-month term of postrelease supervision for the offense committed in that jurisdiction. And because the Washington County District Court held Andelt’s sentencing hearing after the Marshall County sentencing, the Washington County journal entry indicated that Andelt’s sentence must be served consecutive to his sentence for the Marshall County offense. The Washington County journal entry of sentencing also indicated that Andelt must reimburse the Board of Indigents’ Defense Services (BIDS) $525 for attorney fees and pay the $100 BIDS application fee.
Andelt filed appeals from both sentences.
In the appeal from his Marshall County sentence, Andelt claimed that the imposition of a prison sanction in lieu of commitment to a certified drug abuse treatment program and the imposition of a 12-month postrelease term violated
The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s sentence in a published opinion, concluding that the district court has discretion under
In the appeal from his Washington County sentence, Andelt claimed (as he had in the Marshall County case) that the imposition of a prison sanction in lieu of commitment to a certified drug abuse treatment program violated
The Court of Appeals affirmed Andelt’s Washington County prison sentence for the same reasons addressed in the Marshall County appeal.
State v. Andelt,
No. 98,665, unpublished opinion filed September 19, 2008, slip op. at 5-6. The court also upheld the order that Andelt pay the BIDS application fee, finding this court’s recent decision in
State v. Scaife,
286 Kan. 614, 625-26, 186 P.3d 755 (2008), to be controlling.
Andelt,
slip op. at 2-4. The court reversed on the question of reimbursement of BIDS attorney fees under
State v. Robinson,
281 Kan. 538, 132 P.3d 934 (2006), and
We granted Andelt’s petitions for review of both of these decisions. The cases were
Statutory Interpretation of
Resolution of this case turns on our interpretation of three statutory provisions:
When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule governing that interpretation is that “the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted.” State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts “need not resort to statutoiy construction.” In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007), cert. denied 172 L. Ed. 2d 239 (2008). Instead, “[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent.” State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004). Only where the face of a statute leaves its construction uncertain does the court “look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. [Citation omitted.]” Robinett v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100-01, 12 P.3d 411 (2000).
Discussion and Analysis
The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA),
If the district courts in Andelt’s cases had the authority to impose 20-month prison sentences under the KSGA and the other sentencing statutes (that is, if the sentencing grid was applicable), Andelt’s resultant sentences would not be subject to appellate review. The question, however, is whether the district courts were permitted to impose gridbox sentences, given the language of
“(1) Whose offense is classified in grid blocks 4-E, 4-F, 4-G, 4-H or 4-1 of the sentencing guidelines grid for drug crimes and such offender has no felony convictionof K.S.A. 65-4142, 65-4159, 65-4161, 65-4163 or 65-4164, and amendments thereto or any substantially similar offense from another jurisdiction; or
“(2) whose offense is classified in grid blocks 4-A, 4-B, 4-C or 4-D of the sentencing guidelines grid for drug crimes and such offender has no felony conviction ofK.S.A. 65-4142, 65-4159, 65-4161, 65-4163 or 65-4164, and amendments thereto, or any substantially similar offense from another jurisdiction, if such person felonies committed by the offender were severity level 8, 9 or 10 or nongrid offenses of the sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes and the court finds and sets forth with particularity the reasons for finding that the safety of the members of the public will not be jeopardized by such placement in a drug abuse treatment program.”K.S.A. 21-4729(a)(l) and (2).
If an offender meets these requirements, “[t]he sentencing court
shall
commit the offender to treatment in a drug abuse treatment program until determined suitable for discharge by the court but
the term of treatment shall not exceed 18 months.” (Emphasis added.)
Andelt argues that both district courts should have ordered him to participate in a certified drug abuse treatment program under
Rather than sentencing Andelt to a certified drug abuse treatment program under
“When a new felony is committed while the offender is ... on parole, . . . the court may sentence the offender to imprisonment for the new conviction, even when the new crime of conviction otherwise presumes a nonprison sentence. In this event, imposition of a prison sentence for the new crime does not constitute a departure.”K.S.A. 21-4603d(f)(l) .
This section allows a district court to impose a prison sanction when a nonprison sentence is “otherwise presume[d].”
Despite the plain language of
“Except as provided by subsection (f) ofK.S.A. 21-4705, and amendments thereto, in addition to any of the above, for felony violations ofK.S.A. 65-4160 and 65-4162, and amendments thereto, the court shall require the defendant who meets the requirements established inK.S.A. 21-4729, and amendments thereto, to participate in a certified drug abuse treatment program, as provided inK.S.A. 2007 Supp. 75-52,144, and amendments thereto, including but not limited to, an approved after-care plan.”
The State argues that the “in addition to any of the above” language in this subsection should be read in conjunction with the previous “[e]xcept as provided in [
We reject the State’s and Court of Appeals’ interpretation in Andelt’s cases because such an interpretation is contrary to the plain language of
In contrast,
The “in addition to any of the above” language in
Furthermore, we note that
This interpretation is similarly supported by the plain language of
Likewise,
“(A) Offenders who are residents of another state and are returning to such state pursuant to interstate corrections compact or the interstate compact for adult supervision; or
“(B) offenders who are not lawfully present in the United States and being detained for deportation.”K.S.A. 21-4729(h)(l) .
Offenders who fall into one of these two exceptions (neither of which apply in this case) “shall be sentenced as otherwise provided by law.”
As both of these examples illustrate, the legislature clearly understood that it could put limitations on the scope of the drug abuse treatment program as a sentencing option or that it could exclude certain offenders from the application of the program altogether
and allow other sentencing provisions to control. See also
Finally, we emphasize that our interpretation of these statutes does not render meaningless the fact that an offense was committed while on felony parole. Rather, when the previous felony conviction arises in this state, a court may still revoke the offender s parole for the previous felony. Although the previous felony in this case was committed in Nebraska, that state is free to evaluate Andelt’s sentence for his previous felony theft conviction under its own sentencing laws.
We conclude that the plain language of
For all of these reasons, the Marshall and Washington County District Courts erred when the courts sentenced Andelt to 20 months’ imprisonment instead of appropriate terms of drug abuse treatment under
Postrelease Supervision
Andelt also argues that the Marshall County District Court erred when it imposed a requirement of 12 months’ postrelease super
vision to be completed after Andelt was released from his 20-month prison sentence. We have concluded that the Marshall County District Court should have committed Andelt to a certified drug abuse treatment program under
Andelt claims that the Washington County District Court erred by requiring him in the journal entry of sentencing to reimburse the $100 BIDS application fee when the court did not include the application fee in its pronouncement from the bench at the sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeals found this claim to be without merit in light of this court’s recent decision in State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, 625-26, 186 P.3d 755 (2008).
In Scaife, this court held that because a defendant incurs the obligation to pay the BIDS application fee when the application is completed, an order in a journal entry of sentencing to pay an unpaid application fee — even if not pronounced from the bench— is not improper when the district court references an assessment of costs at the sentencing hearing. 286 Kan. at 625-26. This reasoning is sound. Because Andelt’s arguments on appeal do not bring any new dimension to this discussion, Scaife controls. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that his claim is without merit. See State v. Andelt, No. 98,665, unpublished opinion filed September 19, 2008, slip op. at 2-4.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the Marshall County District Court in Case No. 98,699 is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is reversed. We vacate Andelt’s prison sentence and accompanying postrelease supervision period and remand the case to the Marshall County District Court with directions for resentencing under
The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the Washington County District Court in Case No. 98,665 is affirmed with respect to its assessment of Andelt’s BIDS application fee and reversed with regard to Andelt’s sentence. We note that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the case should be remanded for further findings under
State v. Robinson,
281 Kan. 538, 132 P.3d 934 (2006), and