424 A.2d 651 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1980
After a trial to the jury the defendant was convicted of prostitution in violation of General Statutes
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts: At approximately 1:40 a.m. on March 25, 1976, a New Haven undercover officer was stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Park and Chapel streets. He observed the defendant approach a car stopped in front of him and open and close the passenger door. The defendant then approached the officer's car, opened the passenger door and inquired if the officer had twenty dollars. Upon hearing an affirmative response, the defendant got into the car. A conversation ensued during which the defendant offered to have sex for twenty dollars.2 Shortly thereafter, both noticed a marked police cruiser in the area. The defendant urged the undercover officer to say, in the event that they were stopped, that he was taking her home or something to that effect. The officer drove to a prearranged location near a school where the defendant was arrested by other officers. No sexual activity was ever engaged in nor was there any transfer of money. *508
The defendant has assigned five counts of error in the conduct of the trial proceedings. Because our disposition of this case requires a remand for a new trial, we will first consider the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the prostitution statute under which she was convicted.
The defendant claims that General Statutes
Laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly. Stolberg v. Caldwell,
General Statutes
Due process requires only that the law give sufficient warning to enable individuals to conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden. Rose v. Locke,
While the language of this statute has not been previously construed by Connecticut courts, the identical language which appears in the New York penal code has withstood several constitutional vagueness challenges. United States v. Herrera,
Dictionary definitions provide a fair explanation of the meaning of these terms. "Conduct" is defined as "[b]ehavior as portrayed by that which one does or omits to do." Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d Ed.). "Sexual" conduct would thus be defined as conduct "of, characteristic of, or involving sex, the sexes, the organs of sex and their functions, or the instincts, drives, behavior, etc. associated with sex." Webster, Second New World Dictionary. The term "fee" is generally defined to be a remuneration charged for the rendering of professional services — "Compensation often in the form of a fixed charge for professional service or for special and requested exercise of talent or of skill"; Webster, Third New International Dictionary; "[p]ayment asked or given for professional services, admissions, licenses, tuition, etc.; charge." Webster, Second New World Dictionary.
Further clarity is given to the meaning of the terms "sexual conduct" and "fee" by the fact that they appear in the context of a statute prohibiting prostitution. While certain words may appear unconstitutionally vague when viewed in a vacuum, when viewed *511
in the context of a statute they can provide fair notice of the conduct sought to be prohibited. State v. Carter,
The language of
The defendant also claims that
Statutes regulating public morals, including the regulation and punishment of prostitution and related offenses, fall within the exercise of the state's police power. 63 Am.Jur.2d, Prostitution 2. The state clearly has a legitimate interest in regulating the commercialization of sex. People v. Costello, supra. While
Because we hold that this statute has no real and substantial impact on
The final theory upon which the defendant assails the statute is her fundamental right to privacy under the federal and state constitutions. It appears that the constitutional right to privacy under the federal and state constitutions has never been extended to encompass prostitutes plying their trade on the street, and the defendant has cited no authority which persuades us so to extend it. See, e.g., contra, Morgan v. Detroit, supra; United States v. Moses, supra; District of Columbia v. Garcia, supra.
The defendant has also assigned error to the court's instructions to the jury with respect to intent. Because our ruling on this issue is dispositive of the case, we need not address the other claims of error.
Although General Statutes
The defendant claims that this charge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the element of intent from the prosecution to her. Although the defendant took no exception to this portion of the charge, we consider the question as one involving exceptional circumstances because it involves the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. State v. Moye,
In Sandstrom v. Montana,
There is error, the judgment is set aside and a new trial is ordered.
In this opinion PARSKEY and O'BRIEN, Js., concurred.