STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alesha Ann GREEN, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 41736.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Lewiston, April 2015 Term.
June 22, 2015.
354 P.3d 446
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Ben P. McGreevy argued.
J. JONES, Justice.
The State appeals the district court‘s order granting a motion to suppress evidence. The defendant, Alesha Green, was stopped in her vehicle and subsequently arrested for driving without a valid driver‘s license. A search incident to that arrest produced incriminating evidence against her. The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the arrest was an unreasonable seizure under the Idaho Constitution.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2012, an Ada County Sheriff‘s officer stopped a vehicle for failing to maintain its lane. The officer identified the driver as Green, and it was subsequently discovered that Green was driving with an invalid driver‘s license, which Green admitted to knowing. The officer testified at Green‘s preliminary hearing that he had no reason to believe Green was someone other than who she identified herself to be, nor did the officer have reason to believe Green would not appear for court. Although driving without a valid license in violation of
Green was charged with a number of drug-related offenses under two different case numbers. She moved the district court to suppress the evidence found as a result of her arrest in both cases. The district court granted Green‘s motion, finding that the arrest was “unlawful,” therefore violating Green‘s rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The State timely appealed.
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
This appeal presents two interrelated issues for decision:
- Whether a misdemeanor arrest in violation of
Idaho Code section 49-1407 isunreasonable under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. - If not, must any evidence obtained incident to such an arrest be suppressed.
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review.
When reviewing a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this Court defers to the trial court‘s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470, 20 P.3d 5, 6 (2001). However, we exercise free review over whether a constitutional violation has taken place in light of those facts. Id.
B. Analysis.
The district court found Green‘s arrest was unreasonable under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution because it did not comply with
On appeal, the State argues there is no basis for interpreting the Idaho Constitution differently than the U.S. Constitution with respect to the standards for a reasonable arrest. In support of its position, the State argues (1) the uniqueness of Idaho as a state, which has been one of this Court‘s reasons for deviating from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the past, has no application in the context of arrest standards; (2) the language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution are nearly identical; and (3) there is no longstanding Idaho jurisprudence that justifies a differing interpretation. The State therefore concludes that, because the arrest was reasonable under the Federal Constitution, it was likewise reasonable under the Idaho Constitution. Green replies that Idaho‘s long-standing jurisprudence shows Article I, Section 17 is more protective than the Fourth Amendment where there is a violation of state law that impacts constitutional rights. We agree with the State and hold that there has been no constitutional violation here. We further hold that suppression is not the appropriate remedy for statutory violations that do not amount to constitutional violations.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable under both the federal and Idaho constitutions unless they come within one of the established exceptions to the warrant
One such exception under both state and federal law allows officers, incident to a lawful arrest, to search the arrestee‘s person and the area within the arrestee‘s immediate control. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 693-94 (1969); State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 628, 181 P.3d 1231, 1236 (2008). In the context of the Federal Constitution and its interpreting case law, an arrest is “lawful” if “officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence” even if such an arrest does not comply with state statutes governing arrests. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 174-78, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1605-08, 170 L.Ed.2d 559, 569-72 (2008). Individual states are free to interpret their own constitutions as providing greater protection to citizens and greater limitation on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution. Id. at 172, 128 S.Ct. at 1604-05, 170 L.Ed.2d at 568; Donato, 135 Idaho at 472, 20 P.3d at 8. We recently stated in CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Insurance Fund that, absent “clear precedent or circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its constitution” that would justify finding Idaho‘s constitution to have a meaning different from that of the Federal Constitution, the “Court will use federal rules and methodology” to interpret the Idaho Constitution. 154 Idaho 379, 384, 299 P.3d 186, 191 (2013). However, in some instances, we have found Idaho‘s Constitution deserving of a unique interpretation “based on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence.”2 Donato, 135 Idaho at 472, 20 P.3d at 8. A similarity in language and purpose between the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution does not require this Court to follow Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in interpreting the Idaho Constitution. Id. at 471, 20 P.3d at 7.
Green admitted to the officer that she knew she was driving without a valid driver‘s license. Therefore, having witnessed Green driving the vehicle, the police officer had probable cause to believe Green had committed an offense in the officer‘s presence.3 This means the resulting arrest was “lawful” as far as complying with the Federal Constitution. However, the arrest did not comply with
Provisions of the Idaho Constitution must be construed in light of the law prior to their adoption. Higer v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 45, 55, 170 P.2d 411, 416 (1946); see also
A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
- For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
- When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
- When a felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
- On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested.
- At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a felony.
Therefore, arrests made under the circumstances specified in this statute should be accepted as constitutionally reasonable under the Idaho Constitution.4 See State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217, 157 P.2d 72 (1945) (finding that defendant‘s arrest complied with
Because “public offense” in
Since the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted, the Idaho Legislature has enacted several more statutes governing arrests in Idaho under various circumstances. See, e.g.,
Green argues Idaho‘s long-standing jurisprudence holds there is a constitutional violation where a statutory violation by police impacts one‘s constitutional rights, citing State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978); State v. Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 934 P.2d 931 (1997); and State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 45 P.3d 838 (2002). Each of these cases will be discussed in turn. Green argues that her arrest in this case impacted her constitutional rights because the violation of
Rauch involved police officers’ failure to comply with Idaho statutes requiring that, before they enter a person‘s home, they must announce their presence, demand entry, and state the purpose for such entry. 99 Idaho at 588, 586 P.2d at 673; see also
As discussed above, constitutions are to be interpreted in light of the statutory and common law that existed at the time of their adoption. In deciding that suppression was the appropriate remedy, the Rauch Court noted the long common-law history of knock-and-announce requirements, stating “[f]rom earliest days, the common law limited the authority of law enforcement officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest.” Id. at 592, 586 P.2d at 677. In support of this position, the Court cited to an English case dating back to 1603. Id. The Court stated that these protections, long-guaranteed by the common law, are what have resulted in the current statutory codifications of the knock-and-announce standards. Id. In the final statement of its holding, the Court (quoting the United States Supreme Court) made multiple references to the long history of knock-and-announce requirements:
The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. Congress, codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law, has declared in [
18 U.S.C. §] 3109 6 the reverence of the law for the individual‘s right of privacy in his house. . . . Because the petitioner did not receive that notice before the officers broke the door to invade his home, the arrest was unlawful, and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.
Id. at 593-94, 586 P.2d at 678-79 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 1340-41 (1958) (footnote and emphasis added)).
Although the Rauch Court did not discuss Idaho‘s historic codifications of the knock-and-announce requirements, part of the deeply-rooted heritage the Court did mention is the fact that Idaho has had codifications of knock-and-announce requirements nearly identical to those currently in effect since well before the Idaho Constitution was adopted. See Idaho Cr. Prac. Act, §§ 131-32, 637 (1864). Like the warrantless arrest standards in
Green argues that Mathews also supports her proposed rule that a statutory violation impacting constitutional rights amounts to a constitutional violation. We do not agree. Mathews involved police searching a person‘s home under a warrant issued by a magistrate but mistakenly left unsigned by the magistrate. 129 Idaho at 867, 934 P.2d at 933. When police executed the search warrant, the person living in the home questioned the validity of the search warrant because it was not signed. Id. Three Idaho Code sections discussed in Mathews show that a search warrant is required to be signed by the issuing judge. Id. at 869, 934 P.2d at 935; see also
Green extracts the following quotes from Mathews to support her claims: “[t]his Court from its earliest interpretation of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, has held that the right afforded individuals to protection of their persons and homes is so fundamental as to require strict adherence to the constitutional and statutory requirements,” and “[u]nder [Article I, Section 17], it is uniformly held that the search-warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its issuance.” Id. at 869, 934 P.2d at 935 (emphasis added). However, these statements do not mean that any statutory violation by police will result in a search or seizure being constitutionally unreasonable. The Mathews Court noted that the principles found in the code sections requiring a warrant to be signed were part of Idaho law prior to the adoption of the Idaho Constitution. Id. These and other provisions “create a substantive right in a citizen to refuse to permit a search pursuant to an unsigned warrant[, and t]his substantive right existed prior to the adoption of this State‘s Constitution.” Id. The Court further reasoned that this pre-existing “substantive right was affirmed by
Additionally, subsequent Idaho case law has further clarified the Mathews holding. In State v. Bicknell we stated that the holding in Mathews was not based upon the fact that warrant-signature statutes were violated. 140 Idaho 201, 204, 91 P.3d 1105, 1108 (2004). Rather, the holding was based upon violation of one‘s substantive constitutional right to refuse a search under an unsigned warrant. Id.; see also State v. Zueger, 143 Idaho 647, 650, 152 P.3d 8, 11 (2006); State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 415, 313 P.3d 732, 743 (Ct.App.2013), rev. denied (Dec. 9, 2013), cert. denied, U.S., 134 S.Ct. 1342, 188 L.Ed.2d 348 (2014). The subsequent clarifications of the Mathews holding show that, contrary to Green‘s argument, a statutory violation impacting constitutional rights is not enough to justify suppression. The violation must actually be constitutional in character.
Green next turns to Card in support of her argument. In Card, the question was whether the passive involvement of police in executing a search warrant justified suppression of evidence where those persons doing the brunt of the work associated with executing the warrant were not police officers. 137 Idaho at 185, 45 P.3d at 841. Three Idaho statutes relevant to the facts of Card required that the officer mentioned in the warrant‘s directions be the person to serve, execute, and return the warrant. Id.;
the statutes relating to issuance, execution and returns of search warrants supplement the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Violation of the statutory scheme in this case resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure with respect to Card‘s office and home. Suppression of the evidence is an appropriate remedy to discourage the government agents from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the state constitution.
In support of the Card Court‘s holding that the statutory violations amounted to constitutional violations that warranted suppression, the only Idaho case law cited by the Court was Mathews and Rauch. Id. at 185, 187, 45 P.3d at 841, 843. Card was decided without the benefit of the Court‘s subsequent decisions clarifying the holding in Mathews, and it appears Card relied on an incorrect reading of that case. As discussed above, both Mathews and Rauch were actually based on violations of constitutional principles that were made part of a constitutional analysis because those principles were in effect at the adoption of the Constitution. The fact that the principles also remain codified in the Idaho Code simply meant there was both a statutory and a constitutional violation. The suppression was justified pursuant to the constitutional violation. Mathews and Rauch, therefore, do not support the Court‘s holding in Card. Additionally, Card has never been cited by this Court, and the only published Idaho appellate decision to cite Card suggests that Card has been abrogated. See Branigh, 155 Idaho at 414, 313 P.3d at 742. The Branigh court noted that the Idaho Su-preme
Finally, the district court found, and Green argues, the evidence in this case should be suppressed because, otherwise, Green is left without an adequate remedy for being subject to an arrest that violated state statute. However, as stated by Justice Schroeder in his dissent in Card, suppression of evidence is a court-created remedy to ensure compliance with constitutional standards, and it is not appropriate to extend that remedy to violations that are merely statutory. 137 Idaho at 188, 45 P.3d at 844 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Although it is concerning that a violation of
As stated at the outset, we recently reiterated that in order for the Idaho Constitution‘s interpretation to deviate from the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, there must be clear precedent to that effect or circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its Constitution that would compel such a result. Neither the district court nor Green has identified circumstances unique to Idaho or its Constitution in this case. Although Green cites several Idaho cases, arguing that long-standing Idaho jurisprudence establishes that suppression is appropriate where there has been a statutory violation that impacts one‘s constitutional rights, an examination of those cases reveals that Green‘s position is without merit. Whether or not discussed by the Court in its respective decisions, each statute directly at issue in Rauch, Mathews, and Card has a historical, pre-constitution source of the currently codified principles. Therefore, suppression in each of those cases was justified by a direct violation of principles inherent in the Idaho Constitution. There is no historical counterpart to
IV.
CONCLUSION
We vacate the district court‘s suppression order and remand the cases for further proceedings.
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN and HORTON concur.
W. JONES, J., specially concurring.
While I feel constrained by the legal precedent to join the majority, I do so reluctantly because it troubles me that Green is left with no meaningful remedy after being subject to an arrest and search in violation of a plainly worded statute. While Green‘s arrest was
Even though the statute here expressly prohibits the arrest of a person for driving with an invalid license, the lack of statutory authority does not negate an officer‘s constitutional authority to arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence. Thus, I ultimately agree with the majority‘s logic and holding. However, I also agree with the trial court‘s observations that, absent suppression of evidence, Green is left with no meaningful remedy. In enacting similar arrest statutes, other states specifically provide remedies in the same, such as suppression of evidence or a civil tort action.
Notwithstanding, I wish to take this opportunity to point out that the commission of any misdemeanor in violation of
Thus, while the law is clear that there was no constitutional violation in this case, it is troubling that Green, and other potential law-abiding citizens arrested and searched in violation of the same statute, are left with no meaningful remedies for an officer‘s violation of the arrest statute. I agree with the expressed concerns of the district court that the majority‘s holding essentially transforms Idaho arrest statutes into mere guidelines that the police can disregard with impunity and without risk of liability or suppression of evidence. Given the interpreting cases, however, this Court is not in a position to provide Green with the relief she seeks. Only the Legislature, by expressly including suppression of evidence as a remedy into the statutory scheme, can provide Green and other citizens similarly situated with this remedy. For these reasons, I join the majority‘s decision, but seek to emphasize my concerns regarding the absence of fair notice and clarity to the citizens of Idaho, as well as the lack of any real consequences or meaningful remedies for violations of this statute.