*1
26, 1978, petition
for review
December
August
affirmed
Argued
15, 1979,
May
Allison Assistant Attorney the brief With him on argued respondent. the cause for General, Walter and Redden, Attorney A. James were General, Salem. Barrie, Solicitor L. Thornton Schwab, Judge, Chief
Before Tanzer, Judges.
SCHWAB, C. J.
SCHWAB, C. J. for the seeks conviction Defendant reversal ORS 487.560. while felony suspended. was insufficient "reason- Defendant contends there operating. able the car he had been suspicion” We and affirm. disagree, along
An while observed highway, parked defendant) (the with being a car a man pass driven his marked woman The officer passenger. pulled car onto the same patrol highway heading car, Almost in the officer’s immediately direction. words, stopped.” "swerved to the shoulder and over The had not to be slowing car officer appeared down to onto the pulled high- before the officer car, way. passed The officer traveled á stopped down pulled parked. mile or more off and highway, A minutes few later the same officer passed with riding the woman and the man as a The passenger. highway back onto pulled and followed the car *3 a mile. The male passenger about times. turned and looked the officer The at several violation,” suspecting "license-type stopped Investigation car. the defendant’s revealed that driver’s license had under suspended been This followed. prosecution influence intoxicants. and the con- Defendant relies ORS 131.615 1, Ohio, 88 S Ct stitutional v. 392 US Terry doctrines of (1968), 1868, 20 L Ed 2d for the proposition rules, we have Under these stop unlawful. merely motor be to stopped held that vehicles cannot v. the driver’s State verify license. (1976). 599, The state contends
Or
Measured of what facts can conceivably suspicion, imagine create it is difficult stronger suspecting case for a license offense was being Upon seeing police pull committed. a marked him, onto the road behind defendant "swerved” off the stopped. passenger road and Defendant and his ex changed places. again When the officer followed the driving, kept glanc car defendant had been defendant justified ing Terry-type If is not backward. relating facts, to driver’s of statutes these enforcement ancillary investigation only possible licenses will be perhaps *4 accidents, infractions, of other traffic the We conclude roadblocks or the like. reasonable.
Affirmed.
[682] THORNTON, J., concurring.
I concur. I would here and now Additionally, adopt the rationale of the cases cited in the margin,1 and would declare that under provisions of ORS 482.040(2)(b)2 a police may a vehicle to identity driver, check the of the driver’s motor vehicle or operator’s license the motor vehicle registra tion without of first necessity establishing reasonable doing before so that the driver had committed a See, Johnson, crime. State v. 10 Or 499 P2d rev den with the agree view expressed cited cases to hold otherwise would in effect prevent proper enforcement of our traffic laws.
As the United States Court Supreme recently ob served in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 561, 96 CtS 49 L 1116, 1130 Ed 2d another automobile case: "* * * [0]ne’s expectation privacy of in an auto-
mobile and of freedom in
operation
its
are significantly
different from the traditional expectation of privacy and
* * *”
freedom in one’s residence.
"* * *
practice
[T]his
of stopping
briefly
automobiles
for questioning
long history
has a
evidencing
utility
its
and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use.”
It follows from the necessarily above that I would overrule our decision in State v. (9th States, 1965); 1 Lipton v. United 348 F2d Cir Patmore United (DC
States,
1972);
Holmberg,
I all the agree with of I that the observations paragraph. last would hold to constitute reasonable the officer are not sufficient suspicion. only the
As in the majority opinion, indicated suspicion facts which a reasonable objective upon his car are that the defendant pulled be based might shortly in of the officer sight the shoulder the over to him, that driving the behind began after trunk, that and his opened defendant out of his car got the with thereafter woman was shortly seat, the defend- and that defendant in the passenger the officer his looked toward ant turned head and times. several do not find that majority,
Unlike the I "* * * for stronger case imagine it to is difficult being committed.” a license offense was suspecting defendant, the sight All was that the happened that drivers, there- over, changed of the pulled easily I him. can police after at the car behind looked to and, unless we were cases imagine stronger several all, to I find it difficult no facts at suspicious require articulable case. The imagine requirement weaker has facts a reasonable objective justifying I reason, dissent. met. For that not been of the the additional rationale disagree I also with that ORS is ground The first concurring opinion. 482.040(2)(b), possess requires a licensee which it to display a motor vehicle license when police for offi- demand, authority blanket gives upon license operator’s his any motorist to check cers to Most of reasonable necessity without hold, including two of found, so cases I have which are based concurring opinion, relied cases upon an express provision statute analogous which authorizes to make such police stops.1 Conversely, in those states where the statute does not expressly authorize for most stops inspection, courts have refused to read stops authorization for into statute.2 agree with view we read should not into a statute an authorization to detain police persons where the statute has no words to effect. 482.040(2)(b) ORS requires display motorist operator’s license upon demand, but it does not au *6 a thorize police officer motorist for stop purpose making Therefore, such demand. regard less of any problem, constitutional there is no statuto ry basis in Oregon for without reasonable stop
Furthermore,
the decision of the United States
Supreme Court
Martinez-Fuerte,
United
v.
States
428
543,
3074,
US
96 S Ct
Because I cannot agree that
there was sufficient
objective justification
on
stop
suspi-
reasonable
cion and
because
agree
cannot
is statutory
there
1
Blackwelder,
352,
(1970);
App
v.
State
34
SE2d
v.
NC
238
190
State
337, 231
14,
Benson,
Holmberg,
(1975);
194
672
Neb
NW2d
State v.
198 Neb
State,
(1977);
authorization suspicion, unauthorized I conclude suppress the evidence the motion and that law sup- been have should from which resulted Accordingly, reverse. pressed. I would
