State v. Akins-DanielsState v. Akins-Daniels
{¶1} Anthony A. Akins-Daniels complains that his 14-year prison sentence — imposed upon his guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter in violation of
{¶2} Akins-Daniels and his armed cоmpanion decided to burglarize a house. While the two were inside the home, the homeowner returned and stumbled into the burglary. The homeowner, a security guard legally entitled to carry a firearm, was armed. Upon being discovered, the co-conspirator attempted to draw his own firearm. Before he could do so, the homeowner recognized the danger, drew his weapon, and fired shots at both intruders, who were standing next to one another. The co-conspirator was mortally wounded in the encounter. Akins-Daniels was wounded, but managed to flee.
{¶3} After agreeing to plead guilty, Akins-Daniels appealed his 14-year prison term. Aftеr expressly considering all that was required under
I. Akins-Daniels has not clearly and convincingly demonstrated that his sentence is contrary to law.
{¶4} Appellate review of felony sentences is governed by
{¶5} Appellate courts must look to the plain language of a statute in determining legislative intent with respect to sentencing review. Marcum at ¶ 8.
{¶6} Quitе simply, we cannot review Akins-Daniels‘s assigned error as presented, in which he seeks reconsideration of the weight to be given to the sentencing factors for the purpose of determining the appropriate length of the prison term in this appeal. Akins-Daniels failed to argue, let alone demonstrate, thаt his sentence was contrary to law, and as a result, he has not presented a basis for us to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.”
{¶7} The trial court, in this case, expressly considered the principles and purposes of felony sentenсing, and therefore, the record supports the imposed sentence. Our analysis has not changed following the Marcum decision. A trial court “need only consider the sentencing factors pursuant to
{¶8} In an attempt to circumvent this outcome, Akins-Daniels cites our decisions in State v. Simmons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103538, 2016-Ohio-2644, and State v. White, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103474, 2016-Ohio-2638, ¶ 9, as supporting a proposition of law that appellate courts can weigh the sentencing factors in some form of appellate, de novo sentencing. Neither panel from this court, much less аny other panel, suggested that an appellate court may independently weigh sentencing factors to arrive at a different sentencing conclusion from that of the trial court as part of the
{¶9} This appeal emphasizes the practical limitations of appellate review of sentencing decisions. Trial courts are vested with discretion to consider the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. That discretion cannot be imputed to, or supplanted by, appellate courts sitting in review of cold records. Although the Marcum decision incorporates into the appellate review process a determination of whether the defendant has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that facts do not support the sentence, such a review is not an invitation to transform appellate panels into sentеncing courts. It merely reflects an opportunity to correct clear errors in the sentencing process. Ongert. Contrary to Akins-Daniels‘s contention, it is not in the purview of an appellate court to “make [our] own assessment of the necessity of maximum sentences.” Once the trial court considers
II. The sentence imposed was a product of a negotiated plea deal, and therefore, appellate review of the sentence is precluded under R.C. 2953.08(D) .
{¶10} Having said that, and contrary to the respected opinion of the remaining members of this panel, this sentence cannot be reviewed for another reason.
{¶11} It must be remembered that Akins-Daniels faced a sentence of at least 18 years to life on the original indictment, based on being charged with murder in violation of
{¶12} Although this case involves a recommended sentencing range, there is no logical reason to distinguish situations in which a defendant and the state jointly recommend a sentencing range as a product of the plea negotiations from that in which a single definite sentence is recommended. See, e.g., State v. Schneider, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98938, 2013-Ohio-2532 (jointly recommended 9-year term of imprisonment was not reviewable on appeal). In both situations, the parties agreed to a definite sentence. If the state and defendant jointly recommend a sentencing range, the defendant implicitly agrees to all definite sentencing possibilities within that range. In this case, wе can only conclude that Akins-Daniels jointly recommended the 14-year aggregate sentence imposed when he agreed to be sentenced to a term of no less than 10 years, but up to the maximum 25-year aggregate sentence of the amended charges.
{¶13} The First District has held that a sentencing range cannot be considered a jointly recommended sentence for the purposes of applying
{¶14} “A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under [
{¶15} A sentence is “authorized by law”and not appealable within the meaning of
{¶16}
{¶17} Nevertheless, having overruled the sole assignment of error, we affirm Akins-Daniels‘s conviction.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY WITH SEPARATE OPINION;
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., CONCURS WITH THE SEPARATE OPINION
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY:
{¶19} The lead opinion asserts that because appellant agreed to a sentence of between 10 and 25 years, his sentencing appeal is not subject to review becаuse it is an agreed sentence under
{¶20} For instance, if the trial court had imposed nonmandatory consecutive sentences even though appellant did not agree to such sentences, the lead opinion would preclude this court from reviewing whether the trial court made the required findings. See State v. Sergent, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 30 (“If a jointly recommended sentence includes nonmandatory consecutive sentences, and the trial judge fails to make the consecutive-sentence findings set out in
{¶21} This illustrates why appellant‘s agreement to a sentencing floor is not the same as an agreed sentence that