{¶ 3} Several Bank tellers handled Ahmad's withdrawals, several of which exceeded $2,500. None of the tellers compared the signature on the checks against the signature card, despite the Bank's policy of checking the signature against the signature card for any person writing checks in excess of $2,500.
{¶ 4} A few of the tellers specifically recalled cashing the checks for Ahmad. All of the tellers were certain that only Ahmad came into the Bank to handle the Inn's business during the time in question. When each teller handled a check, their unique teller number was printed on the check, showing which one of the tellers handled each of the transactions. *3
{¶ 5} The Inn's owner discovered the fraud when he came into the Bank and an employee asked him to sign one of the checks that Ahmad wrote out to cash. The owner denied ever signing any of the checks in question, or giving Ahmad permission to write them.
{¶ 6} An Adams County Grand Jury indicted Ahmad for grand theft, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 7} Ahmad appeals, asserting the following three assignments of error: I. "The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to justify a conviction for theft." II. "In violation of due process, the guilty verdict was entered against the manifest weight of the evidence." And, III. "The trial court erred by sentencing Mr. Ahmad to prison based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by Mr. Ahmad."
{¶ 9} The function of an appellate court, when reviewing a case to determine if the record contains sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction, "is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The *4
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Smith, Pickaway App. No. 06CA7,
{¶ 10} The sufficiency of the evidence test "raises a question of law and does not allow us to weigh the evidence." Smith at ¶ 34, citingState v. Martin (1983),
{¶ 11} The theft offense in question is set forth in R.C.
{¶ 12} Here, sufficient evidence supports Ahmad's conviction for grand theft. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony and to decide the issue of credibility.Smith, supra. The State offered direct and circumstantial testimony to show that Ahmad cashed the checks and knowingly deceived the Bank.
{¶ 13} The Supreme Court has "long held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if that evidence would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."State v. Heinish (1990),
{¶ 14} The State offered the testimony of the Inn's owner who testified that Ahmad had no authority to withdraw money from the Inn's account at the Bank. Five tellers testified that they handled Ahmad's transactions, which eventually totaled more than $5,000.00 from the Inn's account. The State established that when each teller handled a check, their unique teller number was printed on the check, showing which one of the tellers handled each of the separate transactions. A few of the tellers specifically recalled cashing the checks for Ahmad. All five of the tellers identified Ahmad as the only person that came into the Bank to handle the Inn's business during the time in question. This testimony not only established Ahmad's identity as the person cashing *6 the checks, but it also established the element of deception. That is, Ahmad's actions and omissions misled the Bank into believing that he had the authority to withdraw those funds.
{¶ 15} Therefore, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of grand theft proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, sufficient evidence supports Ahmad's conviction.
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we overrule Ahmad's first assignment of error.
{¶ 18} "Even when sufficient evidence supports a verdict, we may conclude that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, because the test under the manifest weight standard is much broader than that for sufficiency of the evidence." Smith at ¶ 41, citing State v. Banks (1992),
{¶ 19} An appellate court, when "determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence,* * *must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted."Smith at ¶ 41, citing State v. Garrow (1995), *7
{¶ 20} Here, we consider the same evidence that we outlined in Ahmad's first assignment of error. The court considered the evidence and listened to the separate arguments as to what the evidence meant. The owner of the Inn testified that Ahmad had no authority to withdraw funds from the Inn's account. The tellers established that each teller's unique number appeared on the checks in question. A few of the tellers remembered cashing an Inn's check for Ahmad. All five tellers testified that only Ahmad came into the Bank regarding the Inn's business during the time in question. Because some of the tellers could not specifically remember the transaction in question, Ahmad argued that the State failed to prove his identity and failed to prove that he was the one deceiving the Bank. The court chose to believe the State's version. We cannot find that in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted. We find substantial evidence upon which the court could reasonably conclude that all the elements of grand theft were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we find that Ahmad's grand theft conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, we overrule Ahmad's second assignment of error. *8
{¶ 23} R.C.
{¶ 24} Here, Ahmad and the State agreed on the prison sentence that the court imposed. Although it is more typical that the parties jointly recommend a sentence as part of a plea agreement, a joint recommendation, for purposes of the statute, can occur without a prior agreement. See, e.g., In re Lee J., Sandusky App. No. S-06-030,
{¶ 25} Accordingly, we overrule Ahmad's third assignment of error.
*9JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is continued for a period of sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay is to allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate in any event at the expiration of the sixty day period.
The stay shall terminate earlier if the appellant fails to file a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec.2 of the Rules of Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of said sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion to Assignments of Error 1 2; Concurs in Judgment Only to Assignment of Error 3. *1