12 Mo. App. 214 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1882
delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant, a wholesale grocery broker in the city of St. Louis, was tried in the court of Criminal Correction, on
“An act to prevent the Manufacture and Sale of Oleaginous Substances, or Compounds of the same, in Imitation of the Pure Dairy products. Sect. 1. Whoever manufactures, out of any oleaginous substances, or any compounds of the same, other than that produced from unadulterated milk or cream from same, any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese, produced from pure, unadulterated milk or cream of the same; or whoever shall sell or offer for sale the same, as an article of food, shall, on conviction thereof, be confined in the county jail not exceeding one year, or fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, or both.
“Approved March 24, 1881.”
The defendant pleaded not guilty.
At the trial the following facts were agreed to : —
“ It is agreed, for the purposes of this trial, that defendant sold to the prosecuting witness, in the city of St. Louis, on the first day of November, 1881, one original package of an oleaginous substance or compound, other than that produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, bearing a general resemblance to butter, and sold as an article of food; that said package was sold as ‘ suine’, or < oleomargerine,’ and was branded as such; that there was no pretence that the same was butter; that suine is known to the trade to be substantially the same thing as oleomargerine, and is produced by the same process; that said article was manufactured in the state of Illinois and shipped to defendant in this city.”
A witness was then called to the stand and sworn on behalf of the defendant, who stated that he was a chemist by profession ; that he had made a chemical analysis of the article sold by the defendant in this case, both quantitive and qualitative. He was then asked to state the chemical com
The defendant then offered to prove by this witness that he had made a comparative analysis of the article sold by the defendant, with pure dairy butter; that the article or compound sold by the defendant was composed substantially of the same elements as pure butter, in slightly varying proportions; that both are mainly composed of pure animal fat, which undergoes no chemical change, either in the process of making butter or in making the said article sold by the defendant, the change in both cases being mechanical; that the said compound sold by the defendant is, in all respects, as healthful and nutritious as pure butter, and is no more liable to adulteration or deception than pure butter; that the said compound, when fresh, is more wholesome than any butter not in a perfectly pure state, and when not fresh is no more injurious than butter equally stale; that the said article will keep as well as pure butter, and, from a sanitary point of view, is in all respects as harmless and desirable a commodity as pure dairy butter. To all of which offer of proof the counsel for the state objected. The objections were sustained by the court, and the defendant excepted.
The defendant was then found guilty by the court, and a nominal fine of $25 imposed.
1. The first point relied on to reverse this judgment, is that the statute must be taken in connection with the previous statute on the same subject (1 Rev. Stats., sect. 1599), and that, taking the two statutes together, the woi’d “ designed,” in this statute, is to be read “ with intent to deceive.” We shall not discuss at length a proposition so obviously unten
2. It is next claimed that if this statute is not to have this meaning — that is, if we are to hold as we do, that it means what it says — it is unconstitutional. Its constitutionality is assailed on the folio wing grounds : 1. It is claimed to be an infringement of section 4, Article II., of the constitution of this state, which declares that “ all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry.” This is, perhaps, the most general declaration of right in that instrument. Clearly it does not mean that all persons have an absolute right to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry. On the contrary, each of these enumerated rights is held in subordination to the rights of society. A person has a natural right to life ; but yet that life may be taken by law as a punishment for crime. He has a natural right to liberty, but yet his liberty may be restrained either to punish or
2. Such an inhibition is supposed, by the learned counsel for the defendant, to be found in the provision of the constitution which declares that “ no person shall be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It is suggested that the statute violates this provision, because it is retroactive in its terms — because it prohibits the sale of all manufactured compounds of the kind designated, including such as were in existence at the time of its passage. There is nothing in this point. A statute may be bad in part and good in part; and if so, that part only which is repugnant to the constitution will be held void. Fisher v. McGive, 1 Gray, 1. It may be invalid in so far as it intends to operate retrospectively, and good in so far as it operates prospectively. If this statute operates retro
3. It is also argued that this statute is void, as being an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State. This is an extensive and undefined power. It has been said to be “ a power to preserve the peace, promote good morals, restrain vice, and protect the property and health of the people.” Ryland, J., in The State v. Searcy, 20 Mo. 490. But extensive as this power is, it may be conceded that an act of the legislature in restraint of liberty or of property, which exceeds a reasonable exercise of it, so that in fact it is not an exercise of the police power, but a capricious invasion of private right, will be held unconstitutional and void by the judicial courts. Thus, it is said by the supreme court of this state: “A law which unneccessarily and oppressively restrains a citizen from engaging in any traffic, or disposing of his property as he may see fit, though passed under a specious pretence of being preservative of the health of the inhabitants, would be void. Such a law would be unreasonable, and would deprive the people of the rights guaranteed them by the organic law of the land. ’ The State
It must also be conceded that courts, in passing upon the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, assume a very grave responsibility; and a statute will never be held void unless it plainly appears that the legislature has transcended its power in passing it. Whenever there is a doubt, it will be resolved in favor of the validity of the enactment. St. Louis County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 192; The State v. Able, 65
But from its very nature, the police power is a power to be exercised within wide limits of legislative discretion; and if a statute appears to be within the apparent scope of this power, it would be a usurpation of jurisdiction for the judicial courts to inquire into its wisdom and policy, or to undertake to substitute their discretion for that of the legislature. Cearfoss v. The State, 44 Md. 403. The decisions in which the nature of this power has been considered will, we think, justify us in stating the following propositions : 1. -The police power of a state can only be exercised with reference to some subject apparently connected with the public welfare. 2. When exercised with reference to such subjects, the limits of its exercise are, in a very large measure, in the sound discretion of the legislature. 3. This discretion, however, is not absolute and unrestrained. The power cannot be exercised capriciously, so as to strike down the right of liberty or properly when no real or apparent public benefit will be promoted thereby.
Quarantine laws, inspection laws, laws regulating the storage of gunpowder, the use of steam-boilers, the carrying of fire-arms, the suppressing of gambling and bawdy-houses, and the sale of intoxicating di’inks, are all familiar illustrations of this power. Within the same
But we do not concede that the mere fact that scientific men may pronounce a manufactured article intended for human food to be wholesome or harmless, renders it incompetent for the legislature to prohibit the manufacture, and sale of the article. Laws, in order to be wholesome, must not only conform to the real needs of the people, but must also respect their tastes, their prejudices, and even their superstitions. Hence it is conceded by jurists and publicists, that laws which in one age or nation are wholesome and beneficial, in another age or nation may be unwhole
Let us see where the argument of the learned counsel for the defendant would lead. Abundance of scientific evidence could, no doubt, be produced to show that the flesh of horses, dogs, cats, and rats is not unwholesome. But an universal popular prejudice —in some cases even a religious feeling — prohibits the eating of the flesh of such animals. If the flesh of such animals could be prepared so as not to be distinguished from the flesh of animals whose flesh is deemed wholesome, — if butchers were knowu in
It seems to us, then, that this whole question comes to this : A practice has sprung up which operates to defraud the people of their right of choice as to what they will eat, with reference to an article of food of constant and universal consumption. The legislature has passed an act which, if properly administered, will nip the practice in the bud. The courts must uphold and administer this act as a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
4. The claim is also made, that this statute is void, as being in conflict with the provision of the constitution of the United States which vests in congress the exclusive right to regulate commerce between the states. The primary design of that provision of the federal constitution was to prevent unjust discrimination by one state against the products or manufactures of other states of the Union, or other countries. Brown v. Mayland, 12 Wheat. 419; Welton v. The State, 91 U. S. 275 ; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. It has never been understood to impose any restraint upon the reasonable exercise of the police power of the states. On the contrary, as the police power of the states is a power founded in the right of self-protection,— as it appeals for its very existence to the maxim scdns populi suprema lex (Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 33), — the power of congress to regulate commerce between the states does not in any way infringe upon its just exercise.
When, therefore, we hold that this statute is a reasonable police regulation, we necessarily hold that it does not in
The industry of the counsel for the defendant has not been able to refer us to any case in which a law of the state prohibiting the manufacture and sale of an article intended as human food has been declared unconstitutional, and but two cases in which any constitutional objection has been found to laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Beebe v. The State, 6 Ind. 501; Wynchamer v. The People, 13 N. Y. 378. Against the doctrine of these two "cases stands arrayed the opinion of every other court in the Union, so far as we know, where the question has been passed upon, and also that of the supreme court of the United States.
Enlightened by so many expressions of judicial opinion, nearly all of them tending in the same direction, we feel bound to hold that a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of an article of food made in imitation of a wholesome article in common use, which imitated article is so repugnant to the tastes and prejudices of our people that they
The judgment of the court of Criminal Correction is accordingly affirmed.