172 Ind. 10 | Ind. | 1909
The record in this appeal covers and pre sents the same questions as are involved in State v. American Express Co. (1909), post, 717, and State v. United States Express Co. (1909), post, 717, consequently the three cases will be considered together, and the decision herein will rule each of the latter appeals.
The complaint in the case now before us is in three paragraphs, each of which involves shipments by appellee commencing at a place in the State of Indiana and terminating in the city of Indianapolis, Indiana. The complaint in the case of State v. American Express Co., supra, contains nine paragraphs, and each involves an express shipment by appellee which originated at a point in the State of Indiana and terminated at the city of Indinapolis. Pour paragraphs constitute the complaint in the case of State v. United States Express Co., supra, and each of these involves express shipments which originated in this State and terminated in the city of Indianapolis. These several actions were instituted in the name of the State, by the Attorney-General, tq. recover certain alleged penalties. A demurrer for insufficiency of facts to each paragraph of complaint in said actions was sustained by the lower court, and judgments were rendered upon demurrer. Prom these judgments the State appeals, and in each ease assigns errors on the rulings of the court in sustaining the demurrers in question. The paragraphs of the several complaints are substantially the same, the only differ
The following is the first paragraph of the complaint against the Adams Express Company: “The State of Indiana complains of the Adams Express Company and says: That defendant is a joint stock company, engaged in the express business, usually called an express company, and continuously since April 15,1905, has been regularly engaged in the business of carrying and transporting gold and silver coin and paper currency, and also valuable papers, books, goods and merchandise, commonly known as express matter, for hire, over railroads and other thoroughfares within Indiana and to and from points in Indiana, and has been and now is engaged in business in Indiana as a common carrier of express matter for hire, and is an express company, and during such period has continuously maintained and now maintains offices in the city of Indianapolis for the transaction of such express business and for the receipt and delivery of express matter consigned over its lines, and has accepted and does now accept in Indianapolis express matter for shipment to other places, and in many other places throughout the State of Indiana has accepted and does accept express matter for transportation and delivery for hire to persons residing in Indianapolis; that the city of Indianapolis now is, and on June 1, 1900, was a city duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Indiana, which contained, by the
Counsel for the State assert that the purpose of each
Section 3913, supra, is as follows: “That all copartnerships, associations of persons, individuals, joint-stock associations, corporations, or companies, usually called express companies, now engaged, or that may hereafter engage in the business of carrying or transporting money, merchandise or other articles, over, or upon any of the railroads operating in this State, and receiving or agreeing to receive compensation for such services, shall grant to each and all consignors,
In Adams Express Co. v. State (1903), 161 Ind. 328, 342, §§3913-3917, supra, were involved. This court said: ‘ ‘ The object of the act * * * was to prevent unfair or unjust discrimination by one express company or combination of express companies acting as common carriers in this State against any consignor or other responsible company engaged in the same business, and to secure to all consignors, including other responsible express companies, equal terms, facilities, accommodations, and usages in the receipt, carriage, continuance of carriage, and delivery of money and property usually carried by express companies. To this end the act prohibited the granting by such companies to any one carrier, class, or combination of carriers, any terms, credit, privileges, advantages, usages, accommodations, or facilities in the receipt, transmission, or delivery of express matter which they did not grant to all others. ’ ’ See, also, American Express Co. v. Southern Ind. Express Co. (1906), 167 Ind. 292.
It follows, for the reasons stated, that the complaint is insufficient. Therefore the lower court did not err in sustaining the demurrers in question.
Judgment affirmed.