*1 substantial interpretation of the erroneous” Additionally, adopted it rule.
evidence should be particular
view that no deference courts of the district
paid the decisions of adminis- appellate conduct reviews
which of deference agencies. This lack
trative duplication appellate a needless
creates of not incon- constitutes a waste
effort and expertise. strongly urge I judicial
siderable of review
a reexamination standard findings.
of administrative factual
PETERSON, (concurring special- Justice
ty)- opinion Mr. Justice
I concur in the
KELLY.
YETKA, specially). (concurring Justice Justice join
I in the concurrence of Mr.
KELLY. Minnesota, Respondent,
STATE ADAMS, Appellant. Lewis
John
No. 48819. Minnesota.
Supreme Court of
June
529 *3 Jones, Defender, Paul Public and
C. Gaut, Defender, A. Gregory Asst. Public Minneapolis, appellant. for Paul, Gen., Spannaus, Atty. Warren St. Johnson, County Vernon Atty., Thomas L. Chief, County Bergstrom, Atty., Asst. E. Larson, Division, Asst. App. David W. Weist, Atty. A. Minne- County and Thomas respondent. for apolis, ROGOSHESKE, PETER- Heard before SON, KELLY, JJ., and and considered by the en banc. decided court KELLY, Justice. his appeals
Defendant
Lewis Adams
John
conviction of
in the third
murder
dangerous offender
his sentence as a
609.155 and 609.-
Minn.Stat. §§
on
challenges his conviction
request
a lesser
grounds
that
was denied
offense instruction
included
sufficiently
testimony was
accomplice
challenges his
corroborated. Defendant
Defendant, Rob Adams and Duane Clark
dangerous
as a
offender on
sentence
(1978)
ground that Minn.Stat. §
the victim’s
went
the back stairs to
up
He
vague.
addi-
unconstitutionally
apartment. Defendant crouched
at such
tionally
hearsay
is inadmissible
The victim’s
step
Clark and Adams.
below
sentencing hearing and
girlfriend
When she
answered
door.
findings
dangerousness and the
court’s
Prantner, defendant
away
moved
to call
imprisonment pursu-
necessity of extended
Adams and
up
moved
one stair with Rob
clearly
are
ant to Minn.Stat.
side
him. The victim
Duane
Clark
We
defendant’s convic-
erroneous.
affirm
said either
door and defendant
came to the
tion and sentence.
it.” Prantner
“give
dope”
me
“hold
your
most
Viewing
light
the evidence in
gun
moved
held
toward
Hawkins,
state,
favorable to the
hitting
chest.
fired
him the
gun
the facts of
(Minn.1977),
jected manslaughter in the first guilty of sentencing statute challenged the say and imprisonment be sentenced vagueness. as void for payment or to years than 15 for not more $15,000, con- or was of a fine of not more than found that The court re- crimes as prior more both: of one or victed 3) (subd.
quired by predisposed he was (1978) and concluded . of another com- the death Causes that an extended crimes and commit violent a crime to commit mitting attempting or necessary for the imprisonment term and violence death with such force sentenced public’s safety. Defendant any person was great bodily harm to imprisonment. 40-year to a term foreseeable, and murder reasonably I. committed degree was not first or second * * * thereby; trial court argues that Defendant a lesser request for when it denied his erred evidence Murder in included offense instruction.1 have convic- reasonably supported would felony murder is degree or the third defined manslaughter degree. in the first tion of *5 2) (1978) (subd. 609.195 in Minn.Stat. § of not finding The state that a provides: degree was in the third guilty of murder the Whoever, to effect without intent and the lesser by the evidence justified not of causes the death any person, of death properly was offense instruction included means, following of the by either another 414, Leinweber, 303 Minn. v. denied. State degree in the third of murder guilty is 120, (1975). 125-126 See 228 N.W.2d imprisonment sentenced be Jordan, 136 272 Minn. also v. State years: more than 25 for not con- further (1965). Defendant 601 N.W.2d lesser intended a legislature
tends that degree first instruction on included offense to commit a (2) attempts or Commits defend- where the manslaughter given be person upon affecting felony or because charged felony murder is with ant another, or ex- whose death was caused to Minn.Stat. Note Advisory Committee force or vio- cept rape sodomy or 2) (1978) states: (subd. 609.20 609.- meaning § of section lence within the 185. is the term ‘crime’ It will be noted that than (2) of 609.20 rather used in Clause § first requested an instruction on gross misdemeanor.’ or is defined in ‘misdemeanor degree manslaughter which example, another. For caused or question death was Although of we not decide do pure- resulting manslaughter commission of a case, in death from the clear that this it is not ly property fall degree, by crime would not within as defined Minn.Stat. the first Note, Advisory Minn.Stat. (subd. 2) (1978), clause.” Committee is in all circumstanc- 609.20 § manslaughter degree (1978). degree First § third 609.195 es murder, lesser offense of a included bodily great proof harm requires that death or § 609.195 as defined Minn.Stat. "' reasonably (subd. 4) of the com- 2) (1978). a result (subd. foreseeable Minn.Stat. attempt “The to commit a crime. mission or offense as a defines a lesser included charged the crime requirement been added that necessarily proved has if the crime crime or risk of death approach. entails a foreseeable proved. adopted committed We have were neg- essentially requirement Schmit, a of This is g., harm. ligence. 139 e. State v. See culpable negligence.” Felony It is less than (1966). be 800 murder N.W.2d Note, Advisory Minn.Stat. Committee where death was neither an intend- committed Therefore, in it conceivable that is in of ed nor a foreseeable result the commission felony proof of murder person. some circumstances felony against of the “The effect a necessarily prove of all elements would not felonies restricted to those clause therefore degree. manslaughter in the first affecting person upon whose committed 532 have held that where a conviction of a permit jury leeway
The intention
tois
a conviction
manslaughter
support
of
than misdemeanor would
to convict
rather
for a
a lesser
instruction is
felony,
murder
in those cases
death
offense
system
from the com-
in
charged to have resulted
not
“for
the federal
it
appropriate
of a
609.185 and
jury
mission
under
is not
function of
to set the
§§
Bishop,
penalty.” See United States v.
609.195.
412
2008, 2018, 36
346, 361, 93
U.S.
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
Lesser included offense instructions
States,
Berra v. United
(1973);
351
941
U.S.
would
given
should be
where “the evidence
131, 134-35,
685, 687-688, 100
76 S.Ct.
L.Ed.
less
reasonably support a conviction of the
Klugman,
United States v.
time is such that
degree
er
and at the same
(8th
1974).
F.2d
Cir.
greater
of
finding
guilty
a
not
v.
State Leinweb
justified.”
would be
fense
States,
v. United
In
380 U.S.
Sansone
er,
125-
533
jury
from which a
could find that the
ration
legislature intended
our view the
In
charged.
manslaughter,
committed the crime
defendant
that first
Stave,
(subd. 2) (1978), be
Minn.
158 N.W.2d
v.
280
State
a
is a misdemeanor or
underlying
(1968).
crime
it be in
against property and
crime
Minnesota,
accused
In
included offense
on as a lesser
structed
tes
not be convicted on the uncorroborated
indicate that
of the case
where the facts
Corroborating
timony
accomplice.3
of an
felony,
a
it
crime is
underlying
while the
must link or connect the
evidence
against proper
crime
be a
may nevertheless
necessary that
it
is not
to the crime.
It
person.2
felony against
rather than a
ty
of the defend
prima
facie case
establish
here,
underlying felo
Where, as
Minn.
Cooper,
v.
guilt.
ant’s
State
a lesser
person,
against
is a
ny
crime
(1973).
point
must
It
206 N.W.2d
is not appropri
instruction
included offense
de
guilt
in some substantial
defendant’s
basis on
would have no rational
ate. A
evi
of corroborative
gree.
quantum
at the
acquit
greater
on the
which to
depends on the
necessarily
dence needed
offense.
of the lesser
same time convict
Math
case.
v.
of each
State
circumstances
(1964).
393, 127
iasen,
N.W.2d
II.
may be circumstan
Corroborating evidence
trial court
contends the
Stave, 280 Minn.
direct.
v.
tial or
it ruled
error when
committed reversible
(1968).
N.W.2d
accomplice
status as an
Staples’
that Pat
testified,
in
accused
If the
He
question
was a
of fact.
testimony
adequacies and admissions
as a matter of
Staples
accomplice
was an
accomplice’s
corroborative
may be
used
jury could have
Sta
law and that the
be
Corroborating
evidence
testimony.
for the oth
ples’ testimony as corroboration
association
secured from the. defendant’s
find it un
testimony. We
accomplices’
er
in such
in the crime
those involved
of Pat
question
to resolve the
necessary
as
joint participation,
way
suggest
as to
accomplice because
status as an
Staples’
opportunity
the defendant’s
well as from
error,
beyond a reasona
any,
if
is harmless
and his
crime
to commit the
motive
of sufficient corroborat
light
ble doubt in
crime was
where the
place
proximity to the
independent
Staples’
ing evidence
Mathiasen, 267 Minn.
committed. State
testimony. Minn.R.
accomplices’
the other
The defend
535
610,
at 1212.
87
A.
Id. at
S.Ct.
imposed.
was
issue.
hearsay
a
not address
The Court did
the ad-
argues initially
Defendant
this case is mis-
reliance on
Defendant’s
hearing
sentencing
a
hearsay at
mission of
notice, an
afforded
he was
placed because
(1978) con-
pursuant
to Minn.Stat. §
heard, and confrontation
opportunity to be
urges
He
process.
of due
stitutes a denial
witnesses.
and cross-examination
panoply
full
of due
us to hold that
sentencing
a
apply at
process protections
a trial
recognized that
It is well
including the
hearing pursuant
rules of
the same
by
bound
judge is not
in a trial. De-
employed
of evidence
rules
in
sentencing as in the
evidence in
to the introduc-
objects specifically
fendant
v.
Williams
which a defendant is convicted.
to show
which tended
1079,
tion of five affidavits
241,
York,
93
New
69
337 U.S.
S.Ct.
while
uncooperative
and
that he was violent
However,
process
(1949).
due
L.Ed. 1337
affidavit
parole
probation.
and
One
notice,
oppor
guarantees the defendant
was out on
that while defendant
stated
heard,
and cross-
confrontation
tunity to be
robbery of a
with the
parole he
sen
in extended
examination of witnesses
objects to
Patterson,
He also
Holiday
386
Gas Station.
v.
hearings. Specht
tence
They testi-
testimony.
1209,
police
605,
three
officers’
326
18 L.Ed.2d
87 S.Ct.
U.S.
suspected involve-
Furthermore,
defendant’s
Due Process
(1967).
fied as to
Dairy
in a
robbery
hearing
and
Holiday
at a
ment
Clause insures that
infor
imposed all
Queen
might be
robbery.
death sentence
re
investigation
presentence
mation in the
witness-
these
Defendant cross-examined
to the defend
(PSI)
disclosed
port
must be
witnesses of his own.
es
four
and introduced
deny
opportunity
to have an
ant in order
form
hearsay in the
introduced
Florida, 430 U.S.
explain
or
it. Gardner
objections were
testimony.
of oral
No
L.Ed.2d 393
97 S.Ct.
relies on
state. Defendant
by
made
York,
Patterson,
337 U.S.
386 U.S.
S.Ct.
New
Specht v.
In Williams v.
(1949), some of the
Specht
The
93 L.Ed.
18 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
court
by
statute
the trial
sex offender
relied on
case held the Colorado
evidence
un-
appellant concerned
sentencing
The stat-
Due Process Clause.
violated the
Id. at
charged burglaries and
PSI.
opportuni-
require notice or
ute did not
1081.
at
heard before an extended
S.Ct.
ty to be
sentence
been convicted
pro-
he has
notwithstanding
of which
609.02,
crime
for the
subdivision
heard thereon if he
entitled to be
that he is
and
609.13.
visions of section
brings
prior
in issue
convictions or
denies such
2 does
Subdivision
Subd. 4. Limitations.
report,
any
presentence
fix-
and
matter in the
apply
unless:
days
ing
five
after service
not less than
a time
(1)
prior
ten
occurred within
The
convictions
hearing and sentence.
for such
of such notice
years prior
crime of
commission of the
summary hearing
held
(2)
presently
is thereafter
convict-
A
stands
which the
ed;
for
which evidence
notice at
to such
(2)
prior
imposition
for an
against
convictions occurred:
of a sentence
The
state;
(a) In this
or
and at which
be received
extended term
(b)
for crimes
In another
and were
state
heard on the
is entitled to be
the defendant
they
if
had
which would have been felonies
by
represented
counsel.
to be
issues raised and
state;
in this
or
been committed
(3)
such hear-
the basis of
court finds on
(c) In federal court.
admissions,
ings,
the evidence
the defendant’s
report:
presentence
at the trial and
(1978) provides in full: A
(a)
previously con-
imprisonment
That the defendant
an extended term of
sentence to
specified
imposed
not be
under section 609.155 shall
victed of one or more of the crimes
609.155;
unless:
section
(b)
disposed to the
prosecuting
the defendant
attor-
That
At the instance of
motion,
ney
by
court on its own
of criminal acts of violence
order of the
commission
prosecuting
imprisonment
at-
is re-
written notice is served
torney
term of
that an extended
attorney person-
public
on the defendant or
quired
his rehabilitation or for the
prior
ally setting
and ad-
forth
convictions
safety.
*9
vising
that
the court
sen-
the defendant
imprisonment
an
tence him to
extended term of
imposing
extended sen
introduction of
hold that
the
We
Before
find, among
hearing
tence,
must
sentencing
judge
trial
evidence at a
the
hearsay
(1978)
disposed
is
609.16
did
to Minn.Stat.
the defendant
things,
§
that
other
rights.
process
defendant’s due
not violate
crimes
of violent
to the commission
necessary
imprisonment
that extended
B.
by a fair
safety
public
for rehabilitation
that Minn.Stat.
charges
v.
State
the evidence.
of
preponderance
vague.
unconstitutionally
(1978) is
609.16
§
Piri,
295 Minn.
the stat
language of
that the
He contends
to find
judge
a trial
to the
authorizing
ute
Despite
protestations
“[that]
to the commission
disposed
the
challenge
the defendant
did
contrary, defendant
that an
violence and
of criminal acts of
Ab
accuracy grounds.
hearsay or
PSI on
required
imprisonment is
term of
extended
of
grounds
to a PSI
challenge
sent a
public safe
or for the
rehabilitation
for his
felony convic
prior
accuracy, the fact
unfettered discretion
the use of
ty” permits
in Minn.Stat.
specified
as
tions
There
rendering the statute standardless.
finding of
supporting
(1978) and a PSI
fore,
language
the
is too
he
that
ex
necessity of an
the
dangerousness and
persons of what con
indefinite to inform
satisfies
imprisonment
tended term
subject
penalty.6
duct is
preponderance
state’s burden
a fair
Michaud,
calating
robbery, conspir-
simple
are
ny convictions
WAHL,
(dissenting).
Justice
robbery
aggrava-
simple
to commit
acy
the ma-
from
respectfully
I must
dissent
conclude
We therefore
robbery.
ted
court’s refusal
the trial
jority’s holding that
vague as
unconstitutionally
statute is not
first-degree man-
an instruction on
given
applied to defendant.
refus-
justify
To
proper.
slaughter
C.
requested
give
the trial court
al of
instruction,
majority determines
that the trial
contends
Finally, defendant
first-degree
intended
legislature
to Minn.Stat.
findings pursuant
court’s
only where the
manslaughter be
clearly
are
erroneous.
aor
misdemeanor
is a
underlying crime
Michaud,
at 76.
v.
276 N.W.2d
faulty
Duardi,
and alterna-
statute to be
ous offender
tively
6. Defendant cites United States
vague-
to be void
(W.D.Mo.1974),
found the statute
F.Supp.
other
aff’d on
Eighth
1975)
on the
grounds,
(8th
ness. The
ground
Circuit affirmed
the au-
537
relies,
majority
clearly distinguishable
is
lan-
the
plain
The
against property.
crime
the
belies this
cited
guage of
statutes themselves
from this
The
court
case.
Sansone
intent of the
contrary
States,
The
interpretation.
76
Berra v.
351 U.S.
United
the Adviso-
by
made clear
legislature is also
(1956), as authori-
S.Ct.
Sansone v. United for decision. (1965), proper on which case 13 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. *11 case, justified
In the instant the evidence offense, legisla- either and the
conviction of
ture instructions on both of- intended circumstanc- given.
fenses be Under these
es, failure to submit the instruction on first-
degree manslaughter was error. Pursuant 29.02, subd. and Minn. Minn.R.Crim.P. (1978), I reduce the
Stat. would first-degree
defendant’s conviction to man- resentencing by
slaughter and remand for n the trial court.
ROGOSHESKE, (dissenting). Justice join
I Wahl. the dissent of Justice Minnesota, Respondent,
STATE Terry GATLIN, Appellant.
Sherman
No. 49940.
Supreme of Minnesota. Court
June
