*1 testimony pleural changes that the responsible were plain- for breath, tiff’s shortness of it improper was for the trial court to preclude jury considering from Epstein’s Dr. testimony and concluding plaintiff had not sustained any compensable injury. Accordingly, Appellate Division was correct in ordering a new trial on portion plaintiff’s this case. judgment Appellate Division is reversed in part, part, affirmed in and the matter remanded to the Law Division. For part, reversal part affirmance remandment —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, O’HERN, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN—7.
Opposed—None.
Virginia Prosecutor, argued M. Assistant the cause respondent (Herbert Tate, Jr., for Prosecutor, County H. Essex attorney). Blair, General,
Teresa Deputy Attorney argued A. the cause curiae, (Robert for amicus Attorney Jersey General of New J. Tufo, Attorney General, attorney). Del opinion The Court was delivered CLIFFORD, J. Adams, defendant, purposeful or Earl
juryA convicted charges. weapons-possession He knowing and of four murder admission of his oral statements contends that the trial court’s police interrogation was reversible error be- response to a protection validly had not waived constitutional cause he interrogation he had refused At the self-incrimination. to discuss the sign but had volunteered a written statement surrounding the victim’s death. events convictions, affirmed the and we Appellate Division certification, 126 petition for granted defendant’s of his (1991). defendant’s invocation A. 2d 881 We hold that preclude did not right to silence for written statements interrogation. that he made at admission of oral statements therefore affirm. We
-I- victim, Joseph leading up the death The events recognized as “a Beaulieu, be originated in what has come to friend, Arnold, gave defen- gone The victim’s drug deal bad.” Believing that he had been exchange cocaine. dant for $80 Arnold, accompanied by Beaulieu and two “short-weighted,” State, According when women, to the defendant. confronted produced gun Beaulieu, and shot questioned by Adams Adams, when Beaulieu According he was unarmed victim. drug transaction. angrily about the complained and the others gun and had had brandished a trial that Beaulieu *4 He testified at gun, dropped the and it. Beaulieu then with hit defendant it, picked up. it although people lunged for defendant several machete, hand then, swung which hit defendant’s Arnold a Just accidentally. The struck and gun to fire bullet and caused killed Beaulieu. a war- obtained fled from the scene.
Defendant after days three arrest, surrendered for his and defendant rant shooting. in, turning On himself immediately placed defendant was Thomas, by under arrest Detective William who informed him Arizona, required Miranda v. as 384 (1966). L.Ed.2d 694 Detective Thomas then read, gave Signed form to entitled “Preamble to (Miranda Warning).” Statements At request, the officer’s de- fendant read the literacy; first line aloud to demonstrate he then read the rest to himself. The form listed defendant’s rights and contained a waiver. Defendant told Detective Thom- although sign statement, as he did not wish to a written he would talk about the incident. He then on wrote the form “I do time,” not wish to a statement at this and it. thereupon Defendant told the officer that ap- Beaulieu had proached machete, him demanding with that defendant return him, given $80 Arnold had and that defendant had turned run away, gun, had taken the and had shot over his shoulder. grand
A jury returned charging an indictment Adams with knowing purposeful murder, and contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 3a(1) (2); first-degree and robbery, contrary armed to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; two third-degree counts of possession unlawful of a handgun permit, 2C:39-5b; contrary without a to N.J.S.A. second-degree possession two counts of handgun of a for un person, lawful use another contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 4a. sought suppress
Defendant the oral statement he had during interrogation. made Miranda At a hearing, Detec- Thomas tive testified that he had inferred from their conversa- tion that defendant had intended to invoke not to make written statement. produced Cross-examination following exchange between defense counsel and Detective Thomas: Did him jury make aware that Q. you records, would then tell your you he
what said? again IA. once he understood and I repeat that, told him that. How did indicate he understood Q. that? *5 give telling going I to a but am not me, well, conversation okay, you A. By intelligent enough, me be signed to impressed and the man statement, telling intelligent enough I him. to understand what am against him in can be used a court Did tell him that oral statement you Q. law? again, I him me would be in my I told that what he told incorporated A. repeat to from records court. and I would have testify my record [********] oral statement would from he knew an [that How did learn [defendant] Q. you given jury]? used and to the
be telling talking him he knows I am him to it’s from him, my A. I am impression telling right, going He I what me. all but am incorporate says I am signed a going give knew difference statement. He between a you signed statement and my report. suppress, the trial court made denying the motion to (1) in- following findings properly Thomas of fact: Detective (2) defendant rights; his constitutional defendant of formed indication of his rights and them with an those read statement; (3) although refused to give a defendant refusal statement, willingness to tell the sign any he indicated written happened attempted exculpate himself officer what had telling had him with officer that Beaulieu attacked shoulder; (4) defen- had shot over his and defendant machete being advised of consti- made his oral statements after dant (5) fully understood his constitu- rights; and tutional statement but and did not intend written tional death. leading events to Beaulieu’s only to tell his version robbery on convicted acquitted defendant of but jury defendant to life charges. The trial court sentenced other murder, four parole ineligibility for the prison thirty years' with handgun of a possession for unlawful years’ imprisonment imprisonment years’ for unlawful permit, and seven without a against another handgun for unlawful use possession of a concurrently the mur- with person, latter sentences to run merged the sentencing court purposes, the sentence. For der as- charges. The court also weapons-possession duplicative penalties. Compensation Board in Violent Crimes $90 sessed *6 appeal On defendant claimed that the trial had improp- court erly admitted his interrogation; oral statements made at the improper by that prosecutor during closing conduct his argument prejudiced had defendant’s state and federal fair-trial rights; charged that trial passion/provo- court should have manslaughter; cation that the court trial had abused its discre- admitting prior tion impeach conviction to defendant if he trial; testified at and that the trial court had committed reversi- by allowing investigator ble error prosecutor’s an from the expert office to testimony regarding offer ballistics. Appellate unreported opinion. Division affirmed an The court found that defendant right had waived his to silence “knowingly, voluntarily intelligently” police and that the scrupulously had right honored remain We silent. limit- grant ed our petition of defendant’s for certification to the single issue police of whether interroga- conduct at defendant’s right tion had violated his constitutional self-incrimina- tion. We hold under both federal constitutional law and law, State common right defendant’s invocation of his to silence preclude for written statements did not admission of oral interrogation. statements he had at made -II- -A- Federal and state developed courts have an body intricate addressing law the means and suspect’s effect of a waiver of (also constitutional of silence and of counsel an integral part Jersey’s See, of New common e.g., law. State v. Hartley, (1986).). 103 511 A.2d 80 The United Supreme Miranda, States supra, procedur- stated safeguards al necessary were “to assure that the exercise of be scrupulously will 384 [of silence] honoredI.]” 478-79, U.S. 86 at at S.Ct. 16 (emphasis L.Ed.2d at 726 added). In Michigan Mosley, v. S.Ct. (1975), L. Ed.2d 313 scrupulous- that Court found that had ly honored the defendant’s invocation of the to silence they questioning invocation ceased after defendant’s when invocation, rights, waited more than two hours after that of his warnings questioning the fresh Miranda before and issued a crime unrelated the one about which defendant about 104-07, to silence. Id. at had asserted 326-28, at 321-23. 46 L.Ed.2d imposed bright-line, state-law rule
This Court has stating that once invokes may questioning they until issued officers not resume have warnings. supra, Hartley, fresh Miranda 103 N.J. at *7 80. A.2d analysis to used decid Hartley, we defined the be alleged to
ing suppress to a confession have been whether protection in violation of a defendant’s constitutional extracted against compelled inquiry A self-incrimination. court’s first right it finds suspect the to silence. Once whether the invoked invocation, whether law- the court should next determine scrupulously suspect’s have honored the officials enforcement right Fifth Amendments. to silence under the and Fourteenth Lastly, suspect if has invoked 511 A.2d80. the N.J. at scrupu right officials have the to silence law-enforcement the right, the court must ascertain whether lously honored that suspect’s voluntary, and knowing, confession is result of the intelligent right of the self-incrimination. Ibid. waiver suspect’s scrupulously If honored have not silence, issue. “Care not reach the waiver court should * * * blurring separate no of the that there be must be taken ‘scrupulous analysis respect followed in lines of that are on requirement on one hand and the waiver issue ly honor’ the other.” Ibid. or does not invoke his her Miranda
When
scrupu
rights were
rights, an examination of whether those
inquiry
focus on
necessary,
not
and the
must
lously honored is
intelligent, and
knowing,
the defendant’s waiver was
whether
Gerald,
v.
113 voluntary.
State
-B- Defendant refused to make a written statement but was willing However, an make oral statement. he contends that by invoking his not to make a written statement and “I writing give do wish to a statement at this on time” form, Miranda unequivocally waiver invoked the purposes. silence for He all also claims that because Detective only Thomas realized that defendant believed that admissible, statement was and because the officer did not clarify alleged misconception, the waiver was neither know- ing, intelligent, voluntary. nor The State counters that defen- Appel- dant’s invocation included written statements. The Division completely late found that defendant had invoked the right to knowingly, intelligent- but had voluntarily, and ly immediately waived it almost offering afterwards shooting discuss the with Detective Thomas.
Defendant never invoked beyond silence sign Any refusal to a written statement. confusion about his when intent he wrote “I do not towish a statement at this dispelled by time” contemporaneously-stated, unambig *8 willingness uous to talk to Thomas Detective about the circum surrounding shooting. (Furthermore, stances Detective scrupulously Thomas rights honored defendant’s to the extent of the invocation: when defendant refused to a written statement, dropped matter.) the officer Barrett, v. Connecticut 523, 828, S.Ct. 479 107 93 (1987), Supreme L.Ed.2d 920 Court held that a defendant protection against can invoke Fifth Amendment self-incrimina purpose, tion for a limited and that statements outside the 529, 107 of that invocation are admissible. Id. at scope S.Ct. at 832, 93 L.Ed.2d at 928. The circumstances in Barrett were presented in similar those this police case: local informed
447 signed form ac and he and dated a of his that also told the rights. those Barrett knowledging give a without coun although written statement he refused to 525, willing the incident. at present, he was to discuss Id. sel 830, reasoned at 925-26. 107 at 93 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. * * * accom requests for counsel were that “Barrett’s limited willingness announcements of panied by affirmative authorities,” simply he that therefore had speak and with advantage affords defendants that Miranda taken * * 529, 107 Id. speech and silence at “to choose between 832, 93 at 928. at L.Ed.2d S.Ct. distinguish ground
. on the attempts to Barrett Defendant unambiguously willing to talk although had been Barrett warnings, the same clearly the Miranda and had understood argument unpersuasive. Defen- in this case. The true shooting Thomas with Detective dant’s to discuss desire found, and, he unambiguous, as the trial court entirely was rights. The waiver sheet that thoroughly understood “Anything you say can be used read and said: added). Moreover, (emphasis Thomas of you a court law” telling he is me” would be included told Adams “what Thomas’ report form the basis for the detective’s and would testimony in court.
-III- right to Fifth Amendment suspect’s A waiver of his “voluntarily, knowingly intelli if made silence is valid 1612, 16 Miranda, 86 at supra, 384 U.S. gently.” 278, 286, A .2d 707; Kennedy, 97 478 v. L.Ed.2d at State cf. counsel). In New (1984) (regarding 723 waiver beyond validity waiver Jersey, the State must demonstrate Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at v. doubt. State reasonable 123, 134, 548 A .2d (citing Bey, 112 N.J. .2d 792 State v. A 404-05, (1978); A .2d218 (1988); Miller, v. 76 N.J. State (1972); v. A .2d 41 State Kelly, N.J. State v. (1967)). 600-01, The trial .2d 231 A Yough, 49 N.J. *9 by examining determination totality court must make its of Zerbst, the circumstances. Johnson v. 458, 464, U.S. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. (1938) (determination S.Ct. depends “particular surrounding facts on and circumstances case, including background, experience, that and conduct of accused”).
Defendant claims that his oral statement was not a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amend rights. argues ment He that Detective Thomas knew that defendant believed that an oral statement could not be used trial, him at and that the rectify officer failed to (Defendant misconception. has never contended that he actual ly inadmissible.) However, believed his oral statements to be the trial properly court found that Detective Thomas had ad vised defendant of rights his Fifth Amendment and that defen dant understood them when he made his statement. The re sponsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform defen of proper dants their ends with the administration of Miranda McKnight, State v. warnings. Illinois, (1968); Patterson v. 285, 292-94, 487
A.2d 240 cf. 2389, 2395-96,101 108 (1988)(holding L.Ed.2d 272-73 Miranda warnings that because make defendant aware consequences waiving counsel and of Sixth Amendment rights, defendant’s waiver of receiving to counsel after valid). warnings such That Detective Thomas told defendant rights, gave read, his Fifth Amendment him a form waiver form, ensured that defendant was able to read and had read the and informed testimony defendant that the detective’s in court would be based on defendant’s oral recitation as included investigation report undisputed. are all argues any
The concurrence
invocation of the
silence embraces that
as it relates to all forms of commu
nication, noting the obvious fact
conviction based on an
just
oral statement
as onerous as one based on a written
statement. Post
449 proper- assertion. Detective Thomas undercut former case rights. Adams of his Whatever reason ly informed defendant respect only choosing to silence with for to invoke had ignorance of clearly did include those statements not written been, decision, though it rights. may have was Adams’ unwise ambiguity no whatsoever. expressed with right to of the this Speaking question to the of waiver imprudence of a defendant’s waiver has held that the Court was otherwise not our conclusion that waiver does alter intelligent, A waiver is knowing, voluntary. and defendant’s McKnight, is In unintelligent merely because it unwise. a properly-warned declared that defendant’s supra, this Court ‘intelligent’ ‘knowing’ and ‘voluntary’ less waiver “no inculpatory of facts he he misconceived the thrust because admitted, thought he said could not be he that what or because * * 55, 243 52 at A.2d because it was oral used guilty when a not at all offended 240. “The Constitution 52, 2d 240. stubs his Id. at 243 A. man toe.” Supreme adheres to the same rule. States Court The United 564,107 851, 93 L.Ed.2d Spring, v. 479 U.S. S.Ct. Colorado (1987), rejected the contention that 954 the Court defendant’s extend to Amendment did not of Fifth his waiver one from the for questioning crime different later about said, “The he Constitution which had been arrested. Court know and understand suspect a criminal require does not Fifth Amend every possible consequence of waiver 966; 857, at 574, 107 at 93 L.Ed.2d at privilege.” Id. S.Ct. ment 1285, Elstad, 298, 316, 105 S.Ct. Oregon v. accord (“This (1985) has never em 84 L.Ed.2d ignorance of the full theory that a defendant’s braced the voluntariness.”). their consequences of his decisions vitiates probe duty has for defendant’s A officer no of Fifth of the effect the waiver misconceptions about unstated Elstad, 470 U.S. at rights. supra, Amendment Cf. (noting law-enforcement at L.Ed.2d “ill-equipped pinch-hit pur- officers are for counsel” for the telling pose admissibility defendants about of their statements). Furthermore, if defendant was about confused legal statement, making effect of his an oral Detective above, Thomas not the As was source his confusion. noted go that the officer told defendant that the oral statement would report into the from testify which would is uncontroverted.
-IV- Because invoked Fifth defendant Amendment and com- to the mon-law silence to extent of state- written ments, regarding and waiver because his oral statements was knowing, intelligent, voluntary, judgment and we the affirm of Appellate upholding the Division defendant’s convictions. HANDLER, J., concurring.
The concern of appeal privilege against central this is the self-incrimination.
The Court characterizes to defendant’s refusal right statement an of respect as invocation the to silence with and, conversely, to written communication it characterizes his willingness speak right to of his as waiver to silence with respect to oral communication. Ante at 605 2d at A. Having applied 1101. those characterizations to defen acts, dant’s the Court able to conclude that defendant selec tively is, right invoked his Fifth Amendment to that he it in part part. that invoked and it in The then waived police determines the scrupulously that honored defendant’s partial right interroga invocation the to silence the because sought tion neither nor elicited a written statement. Id. at Court, finding 605 A.2d 1101. fully at that defendant silent, right understood his remain finally to able to conclude knowingly, he voluntarily intelligently that and waived that right part relating of his to remain silent oral to communica- statement. Ante at 447-450, 605 an tions when made oral A.2d 1101-1102. sufficiently ad- agree
I Court that defendant was with the believe, however, right I that vised of his to remain silent. right, ambiguous of that initially made an invocation entirety. find invoking right that in its I would also thereby si- scrupulously right defendant’s to police that the honored clarified Miranda lence, warning to defen- defendant, obligated do, almost they and that dant as were remain with of his contemporaneously the invocation silent, gave oral statement. spontaneously an points.
My with the Court revolve around two differences First, remain is divisible. I silent do believe that and to To to silence allow State fractionalize part part it it in permit defendant to invoke waive scope privilege against self-incrimi- greatly reduces the right, nation, constitutional seriously weakens that fundamental efficacy of the Miranda protections. and undermines the accept addition, I the notion even if were *12 divided, re- always against can be I would self-incrimination suspects who waive their quire officers confronted with ambiguous. The initially as selectively to treat those waivers helpful emphasis on officer’s elabora- heavy the places tions on Miranda from warnings it refrains establish- the but bright-line this time. ing rule at
I recapitulation. case careful The facts the warrant argu- after an Joseph Beaulieu was shot April On Ac- suspect. a drug Adams became ment over a transaction. mother, New- himself companied by he surrendered police station and was arrested. ark The Miranda to Adams. Detective warnings were recited setting forth the gave a form then defendant William Thomas reading rights. On Miranda warnings of those and a waiver form, line, signature “I do not defendant wrote above give this time.” to a statement at wish Thomas, According that he “didn’t to defendant stated want hap- tell give to statement but would what [him] incorporate that he pened.” Thomas then told defendant would report him into his and that he would what defendant told testify report from that in court. Thomas also described his same, explanation you going tell me is to be as “it’s what my report, going in court.” incorporated to Thomas testified right, going I response that in defendant stated “all but am not give you signed going sign or “I am not it. I statement” you happened, going sign I am not it.” will tell what crime, on to his account of the indicat- Defendant went ing shooting that the had been self defense. When Detective questioned asked he had Thomas was whether while “Somewhat, talking, replied, yes.” defendant was the detective mother she recalled Detec- Counsel asked defendant’s whether asking questions respond- Thomas the case and she tive about ed, “My telling judge him The son was about case.” trial asking, you question clarified the for Ms. Adams “do recall asking any specific questions him the detective about the case your just talking or son Ms. Adams was about case?” answered, talking.” just “He was Thomas then asked defen- happened gun, had to the said dant what but when defendant anymore “he didn’t it” the want talk about conversation ended.
II The Fifth Amendment secures an individual compelled any to “be criminal case be a witness Const, privilege protects himself.” U.S. amend V. values,” centerpiece privilege *13 “complex of but the of the is the person] speak chooses to in “to remain silent unless [the Malloy the unfettered exercise of his own will.” v. [or her] 1, 8, 1489, 1493, 653, 12 659 Hogan, 378 US. 84 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d
453 (1964); Arizona, 436, 460, see also Miranda v. 384 86 694, (1966)(privilege grounded L.Ed.2d principle prove “by on that state should its case its own independent labors, cruel, simple expedient rather than compelling mouth”). of from own [evidence] [the defendant’s] privilege against The testimonial of nature self incrimina- Thus, scope protections. tion drives the of its is clear that “[i]t protection privilege of the reaches an accused’s communica- take____” tions, they might whatever form Schmerber v. 757, 763-64, California, 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. (1966).
L.Ed.2d privilege against The of essence self-incrimination is to privilege, refrain from testimonial communication. The charac silent, any terized as the to remain extends to form of Id.; communication that is testimonial in nature. State v. 427, 448-51, (1989) (Handler, J., Irving, 114 555 .2d 575 N.J. A (notice nature); dissenting) in of alibi is testimonial In re Guarino, 244-45, Jury Proceedings Grand (1986) (Handler, J., (the dissenting) implied A .2d 1063 admis production sions involved certain documents are testi nature). privilege monial in to the Crucial whether the “testimonial,” communication is form the communica what notes, happens tape recordings, tion to take. Hand-written words, spoken physical gestures, and all other forms of commu protected. any if nication are It follows that communication is form, fact, expressed in any then as a and as a no exists, longer acquires ability for the State to use the suspect’s communication convict. capacity to in the testimonial
Because the incriminate inheres comparative weight content of the communication—not in its or probative worth—it makes no sense to consider testimonial communication in one form to different from testimonial be purposes privilege against communication another for equal finality by self-incrimination. Silence broken with written, orally, or testimonial communications that are made expressed through ignores conduct or actions.
454 acceptable find it to be fact that almost no one would
obvious unacceptable of an oral statement but convicted on the basis recogniz- By statement. on the basis of a written be convicted right solely to silence that turns ing partial a invocation communication, negates the Court the values on the form of the privilege against in self incrimination. that inhere right Accordingly, suspect to silence when invokes apply any deemed to any respect, that invocation should be Consequently, I and all forms of testimonial communications. right to remain silent fully invoked believe give writing of the form that he did “not wish to on bottom effectively that a statement at this time.” Defendant indicated Further, he did not wish to make a testimonial communication. police to the officer that he did not when defendant indicated tell him had statement but would what want right happened, he continued to invoke his to remain silent with respect any form of testimonial communication.
Ill
accept
partial
of the
Even if I were to
the notion of
invocation
suspect
I
that
states
would submit
when
initially
part
he or she
to invoke the
and to
wishes
suspect’s
always
inherently
part,
it in
wishes
are
waive
Therefore,
ambiguous.
suspect’s response
regard
must be
ed,
initially,
complete
of the
to silence.
as a
invocation
“Any
reasonably appear
or conduct that
to be inconsist
words
willingness
case
ent
defendant's
to discuss
with
[or her]
to an
with the
are tantamount
invocation
123, 136,
II, 112
Bey
incrimination.”
v.
N.J.
self
State
Johnson,
263,
(1988);
2d 887
see also
v.
120 N.J.
548 A.
State
(1990)(“
281,
equivocal
desire
L.Ed. 2d 1019 State (defendant’s (1988) request questioning, “how to terminate honored); II, supra, ambiguous,” Bey must be State v. ever (Handler, J., (“Even if dissenting) 2d 548 A. 887 *15 ‘ambiguous,’ expression is viewed it must be the defendant’s as rights.”). assertion of considered an not, Often, suspect a perhaps and more often than when the to that partially a desire to waive indicates opera- faulty assumptions the premised on about desire will be Brennan noted our and our courts. As Justice tions of laws Barrett, 828, 107 93 479 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Connecticut v. U.S. (1987): 920 nothing but allow them, he would talk statement [The] —that
writing
whether he
understood
without counsel —created
doubt about
actually
against
anything
the statement
said
words,
could be used
him.
other
that
intelligent
knowing
of the
to silence. As a
on its
waiver
not,
face,
(a willingness
juxtaposition
general
to talk and an
I
that this odd
matter,
believe
finding
knowing
anything preserved)
unwillingness
militates
to have
intelligent
waiver of the
to silence.
or
(Brennan,
J.,
at
I that when a believe self-incrimination, open are right against two avenues may defendant’s clarification police. The officer seek may or right to remain silent apparent invocation of the necessarily will be Because the officer the interview. terminate right to suspect his or her has invoked unsure as to whether questions only may ask entirety, the officer remain silent in its John suspect’s intentions. clarify the they designed to if are Wright, 834; State v. son, A.2d supra, N.J. (1984)(police inquire can about 113, 120 n. 477 A.2d ambiguous assertion interpretation of an the correct silent). explaining oral statements Only by remain in a court of law would be used to convict as written can as well purpose of the Mi major A Miranda goals of be met. noting any or portion oral warnings least that randa —at apprise suspects used in court—is statements can be written statements will have. When of the testimonial effect their right only partially, I never his or her suspect initially invokes portion of suspect has understood that presume that the would warning. IV he at- case, testimony established that the officer's In this *16 right apparent invocation tempted clarify defendant’s explained to defendant that he would silent. He to remain report and that he told him into his incorporate what defendant essence, in the officer testify report court. from would gave or defendant a written defendant that whether informed in statement, against him would be used the evidence an oral privilege against self-incrimina- comports the court. That with against protecting the involun- tion; purpose it reflects in of testimonial communication disclosure tary and uninformed any form. clarification, made his oral
Following the officer’s question- given response to additional It statement. was Hence, initially had to the extent defendant ing by the officer. silent, clarifying expla- officer’s remain invoked his breach the questioning did not additional nation without duty scrupulously police officer’s or to silence violate by defendant was right. subsequent statement honor interrogation, volunteered, response additional not in was backdrop adequate was made advice concern- ing circumstances, to silence. Under defendant’s properly statements were volunteered and admissible. See Miranda, supra, at 16 L.Ed.2d (“Volunteered at 726 any by statements of kind are not barred admissibility by Fifth Amendment and their is not affected holding today.”); Israel, our Wayne R. & Jerold LaFave H. 6.7(d), (1984) (a Criminal Procedure at 514 volunteered § when, for example, statement admissible the defendant walks admission; into a station and confesses or blurts out an may qualify though statement as “volunteered” even made custody or one had previously who asserted his silence). judgment
I therefore concur in the of the Court.
HANDLER, J., concurring in result. WILENTZ, For Justice and Justices affirmance —Chief CLIFFORD, HANDLER, O’HERN, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN-7.
For reversal —None.