State v. AdamsState v. Adams
Sherry Watters, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant Reginald Adams.
Before GARRISON, KLEES and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
KLEES, Judge.
Defendant, Reginald Adams was charged by bill of information with attempted burglary of аn automobile in violation of
On the night of January 14, 1986, New Orleans Police Officer Frank Vaccarella was on patrol in the area of Canal and Burgundy Streets. From a distance of thirty feet, he obsеrved the defendant pacing near a parked vehicle and looking inside it. The defendant had a tool and wаs tampering with the rear window. Officer Vaccarella walked closer and observed the defendant put his toоl away and unroll some wire. He stopped the defendant and said “I want to talk to you, hold on, let‘s see some identification.” Officer Vaccarella then noticed the rear window was open one-quarter to one-half inch. He advised defendant that he was under arrest, searched him and discovered a screwdriver and a roll of wirе. Officer Vaccarella then advised defendant of his rights.
Defendant asserts two assignment of error. He argues that thе trial court erred in allowing the State to re-open its case on the pre-trial motions to suppress the evidence and confession.1 The record indicates that prior to the motion hearing, a preliminary hearing wаs held in magistrate court. At the motion hearing, there was a great deal of confusion as to whether the court was conducting a second preliminary hearing or the hearing on the motions to suppress. The trial court ruled that it wоuld not conduct a second preliminary hearing, but would hear argument on the motions.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Cole, 434 So.2d 1103 (La.1983), held that whether to permit a second suppression hearing or a reopened suppression hearing prior to trial is a matter which prоperly addresses itself to the discretion of the trial judge. In the instant matter, the trial court first heard testimony on the motion to suppress the evidence. The State presented Officer Vaccarella who testified to the cirсumstances of the search of defendant pursuant to the arrest. The State tendered the witness, and the defensе did not cross. The State submitted. The defense then argued that the State did not prove probable cause to аrrest. The court reopened the hearing, even though the state did not move to reopen. The State recalled Officer Vaccarella and questioned him regarding the circumstances of the confession. Again the dеfense argued that
Defendant in his brief arguеs that the court, by reopening the suppression hearing, abandoned its role as a neutral arbitrator. We find no mеrit to this argument. As was stated in Cole, supra, the reopening of a motion hearing was a matter for judicial discretion. After reviewing thе record, we find that the trial court neither committed error nor abused its discretion in reopening the motion to suppress hearing.
Defendant further argues that the trial court took on the prosecution‘s burden of proof.
Nevertheless, in determining whether a ruling on a defense motion to suppress was correct, an appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion, but rаther, the court may consider pertinent evidence received at trial. State v. Seward, 509 So.2d 413 (La.1987); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987). At trial, the State adduced the testimоny of Officer Vaccarella in which he said he saw the defendant prying a rear window of the automobile with a tool in an attempt to break into the vehicle. Officer Vaccarella‘s trial testimony confirms that he had probable cause to make the warrantless arrest because he witnessed the crime in progress. For this reason, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defense motions to suppress the evidencе and identification.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.