[¶ 1] A jury fоund Gino Acker guilty of aggravated assault. He appeals from the judgment arguing the district court’s admission of his prior criminal conviction for sexual assault constitutes reversible error. We agree. We reverse the criminal judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
I
[¶ 2] The State charged Acker with aggravated assault. Acker drove Beau Johnson home after Acker and Johnson had been visiting bars in downtown Fargo. While driving to Johnsоn’s residence, the two began to argue about Johnson smoking in Acker’s vehicle. Acker alleged that when they arrived at Johnson’s residence, Johnson exited the vehicle, walked around the front bumper, and begаn punching Acker through the driver-side window. Johnson denied punching Acker. Both parties agreed that Acker stabbed Johnson; Acker claimed the stabbing was in self-defense.
[¶3] Johnson was impeached at trial. Among other things, hе was asked whether he tried to start a fight with an African American man that night. He denied doing so, and he claimed he had never met the man. The man was then called as a witness and testified he had met Johnson, Johnson had called him a racial slur, and Johnson had tried to pick a fight with him. Another witness, one of Johnson’s friends, testified he was at the bars that night and witnessed Johnson get into an altercation with the African American man.
[¶ 4] Acker was alsо impeached at trial. The State asked him about his prior criminal convictions, which included providing false information to a law enforcement officer, stalking, violation of a protection order, аnd sexual assault. Before trial, Acker moved the court to prohibit his sexual assault conviction from being offered into evidence. The court denied his motion, stating it would rule on the admissibility of prior convictions at trial. At trial, the State asked Acker about his sexual assault conviction, Acker’s counsel objected, and the court overruled the objection. Acker then admitted he had been convicted of sexual аssault. He also admitted he had been convicted of providing false information to law enforcement, stalking, and violation of a protection order.
[¶ 5] Although another individual rode in the vehicle with Acker аnd Johnson that night and witnessed the stabbing, she was never called as a witness because she had died prior to the trial. Consequently, the jury was left with the conflicting accounts of Acker and Johnson — the only witnesses that werе present at the scene of the incident. After deliberating, the jury found Acker guilty.
II
[¶ 6] Acker argues the trial court erred when it admitted his sexual
HI
[¶7] The district court abused its discretion when it admitted Acker’s pri- or sexual assault conviction. Evidence of criminal defendants’ prior сonvictions is generally only admissible to impeach their character for truthfulness; such evidence is not admissible to show general criminal propensity. State v. Doppler,
(a) In General. .-The following rules apply to attacking a.witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant; and
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial ef-feet to that defendant; and
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the elements of the crimе required proving, or the witness’s admitting, a dishonest act or false statement.
N.D.R.Ev. 609(a).
[¶ 8] This Court has explained that the probative value of a conviction must be balanced with its prejudice “because a criminal defеndant faces the unique risk that juries will use prior convictions as evidence of the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, rather than considering the convictions for impeachment purposes only. Bеcause of this unique risk, Rule 609(a)(1) favors excluding rather than admitting the prior felony convictions of a witness who is an accused.” Doppler,
[¶ 9] Trial courts must weigh the following factors when determining whether a conviction’s probativе value outweighs its prejudicial effect: “[1] the impeachment value of the prior crime, [2] the point in time of the conviction and the witness’ subsequent, history, [3] the similarity- between the past crime and the charged crime, [4] the importance of the defendant’s testimony and [5] the centrality of the credibility issue.” Doppler,
A trial court abuses its discretion if the record does not show that the trial courtmeaningfully or appropriately considerеd the relevant factors' when it weighed the prior conviction’s probative value and prejudicial effect. Although we prefer the trial court to articulate expressly how it balanced the relevаnt factors, it is often enough for the court to hold a brief heaping and to make an explicit finding on the record that demonstrates the trial court did not just apply [N.D.R.Ev. 609(a)(1) ] mechanically.
Dopplerat ¶ 10 (altеration in original) (citations omitted).
[¶ 10] In Murchison, we found error when a trial court admitted a prior conviction, and “[t]he trial court’s ruling did not mention the necessary factors, much less ‘expressly articulate’ how it balanced those factors.”
[¶ 11] Here, the record does not demonstrate the trial judge performed the analysis required under Rule 609. The judge made the following cоnsiderations after Acker moved in limine to preclude his sexual assault conviction from being admitted into evidence:
Well, if the original offenses were punishable by one year or more and they are within ten years of the conviction or release of confinement, then they are potential impeachment, so I don’t know if that’s the case or not, but to the extent that is, the motion is denied.
If you have any . objections as to Rule 403 or similar objections, you’re going to have to raise those at the time of the trial so I can judge them in the context of the evidence.
At trial, the judge admitted the sexual assault conviction withоut explaining his reasoning or discussing the factors:
Q. And in 2005, you were convicted of-
MR. EDINGER: I am going to object under 403, Your Honor. This will inflame the jury. '
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MR. VAN DE STREEK:
Q. In 2005, you were convicted of sexual assault here in North Dakota; correct? ■
A. Yep. That was nine years ago, too.
The. judge did not mention any of the neсessary factors, nor did he provide an express articulation of how he balanced the factors. We cannot determine whether he weighed the conviction’s probative value against its prejudicial effect. “A trial court abuses its discretion if the record does not show that <the trial court meaningfully or appropriately considered the relevant factors when it weighed the prior conviction’s probative value and prejudicial effect.” Doppler,
IV
[¶ 12] We must determine whether the district court’s error warrants reversal. “[0]ur objective in reviewing non-constitutionаl trial error is to determine whether the error was so prejudicial that substantial injury occurred and a different decision would have resulted without the error. If not, it is ‘harmless error’ ... and is not ground for reversal.” Murchison,
[¶ 13] In Murchison, we held a trial court’s erroneous admission of prior convictions was harmless error when: (1) the convictions were only mentioned briefly during cross-examination, (2) the prosecution did not embellish the convictions or ask about details, and (3) the convictions were not similar to the chаrged crime.
[¶ 14] In this case, the sexual assault conviction was mentioned three times during the course of the trial — once during cross-examinаtion and twice during closing arguments. Acker’s credibility had already been significantly impeached by admission of a false information to law enforcement charge, and the sexual assault conviction was similar in nature to the crime for which Acker was being tried. “Potential for prejudice is greatly enhanced when the prior offense is similar to the one for which the defendant is on trial.” Eugene,
V
[¶ 15] We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial.