STATE OF OHIO v. RIFAT ABUHILWA
C.A. No. 26183
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
August 1, 2012
[Cite as State v. Abuhilwa, 2012-Ohio-3441.]
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR 1993 06 1218(B)
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 1, 2012
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Rifat Abuhilwa, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In October 1993, Abuhilwa pleaded guilty to (1) aggravated murder with a firearm specification, (2) aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, (3) aggravated robbery, and (4) carrying a concealed weapon. In November 1993, the court sentenced him to (1) life imprisonment for aggravated murder, plus three years for the firearm specification, (2) ten to twenty-five years for each of the two aggravated robbery charges, plus three years for the firearm specification, and (3) two years for carrying a concealed weapon. The court ordered the six years for the firearm specifications to be served first, consecutive to all of the other charges. The court further ordered the sentences for the aggravated robberies and the carrying a concealed weapon to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the life imprisonment.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT‘S SENTENCE WAS NOT VOID BECAUSE THE APPELLANT WAS NEVER INFORMED WHEN HE WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER HE PLED GUILTY TO AGGRAVATED MURDER.
{¶4} In his second assignment of error, Abuhilwa argues that the trial court erred when it failed to find his sentence was void. Specifically, he argues that his sentence is void because the trial court did not specify the length of his life sentence by listing when he would be eligible for parole.
{¶5} The validity of Abuhilwa‘s sentencing entry presents a question of law. We review questions of law de novo. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 (1992). When reviewing a matter de novo, this Court does not give deference to the trial court‘s decision. State v. Barclay, 9th Dist. No. 25646, 2011-Ohio-4770, ¶ 8.
{¶6} Abuhilwa argues that his sentence is void because the trial court failed to specify when he would be eligible for parole. However, nothing in the record indicates that the court intended that Abuhilwa would be eligible for parole.
THE COURT: You understand that the penalty for Count 1 is life imprisonment?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
{¶8} Similarly, at the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Abuhilwa to life imprisonment and did not mention the possibility of parole. At a joint sentencing hearing the court clearly indicated that Abuhilwa‘s co-defendant would be eligible for parole in thirty years. Abuhilwa and his co-defendant were both charged with aggravated murder. On those charges, the State recommended life imprisonment for Abuhilwa. By contrast, for his co-defendant the State recommended life with the eligibility of parole after 30 years. Just before imposing the recommended sentences, the court found that the defendants were not able to be rehabilitated. “As such, the only recourse [the court has] is to remove [the defendants] from society.”
{¶9} After reviewing the record, we conclude that Abuhilwa‘s sentence of life imprisonment without any mention of the possibility of parole is a sentence of life without parole. Because he is not eligible for parole, his sentencing entry is not void for failing to include information about his parole eligibility. Abuhilwa does not cite to any authority that stands for the proposition that a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to a plea is void simply because it does not clarify that the defendant is not eligible for parole. See
{¶10} Abuhilwa further argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider his appeal because his sentencing entry is not a final appealable order. Specifically, Abuhilwa argues that
{¶11} Abuhilwa‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INFORMED THAT A GUN SPECIFICATION REQUIRED A MANDATORY TERM OF INCARCERATION OR THAT THE MANDATORY TERM OF INCARCERATION STATUTORILY HAD TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY TO THE OTHER CHARGES.
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Abuhilwa argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not properly advised that a portion of his sentence was mandatory.
{¶13} It is well established law in Ohio that res judicata prohibits the consideration of issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 16-17, citing State v. Hutton, 100 Ohio St.3d 176, 2003-Ohio-5607, ¶ 37; State v. D‘Ambrosio, 73 Ohio St.3d 141, 143 (1995). “This prohibition extends to claims made in support of motions to withdraw a plea.” State v. Molnar, 9th Dist. No. 25267, 2011-Ohio-3799, ¶ 9, citing State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59.
III.
{¶15} Abuhilwa‘s assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
DICKINSON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JANA DELOACH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD KASAY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.
