STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAMONCITO D. ABION, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-18-0000600
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
DECEMBER 29, 2020
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-18-0000600; CASE NO. 2PC161000043)
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND WILSON, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE CASTAGNETTI, IN PLACE OF POLLACK, J., RECUSED
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OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction
We address whether a defendant whose substance use results in permanent psychosis is prohibited by the self-induced
The issue arises from the jury conviction of Ramoncito Abion (“Abion”) on one count of assault in the second degree in violation of
After Abion was arrested and charged with assault second, a panel of three medical examiners deemed Abion fit for trial. One of the examiners, Dr. Martin Blinder (“Dr. Blinder”), however, opined that Abion suffered from amphetamine psychosis and may be entitled to a lack of penal responsibility defense.
Before trial, the State filed a motion for a finding of inadmissibility of the
Abion was convicted of assault second and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) affirmed. Abion’s application for writ of certiorari (“Application”) raises the following question:
Did the Intermediate Court of Appeals gravely err by tolerating the trial court’s exclusion of Mr. Abion’s only witness, violating his Due Process right to present
evidence in support of his defense, and undermining the jury’s exclusive task to resolve ultimate issues of fact?
A defendant in a criminal case has the right to be accorded “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” State v. Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 185, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (1990) (citation omitted). “Thus, ‘a defendant has the constitutional right to present any and all competent evidence in [their] defense.’” State v. Acker, 133 Hawaiʻi 253, 301, 327 P.3d 931, 979 (2014) (citation omitted). “[W]here the accused asserts a defense sanctioned by law to justify or to excuse the criminal conduct charged, and there is some credible evidence to support it, the issue is one of fact that must be submitted to the jury,” and it is reversible error for the court to “reject evidence which, if admitted, would present an essential factual issue for the trier of fact.” State v. Horn, 58 Haw. 252, 255, 566 P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (1977).
Abion essentially asserts there was “competent evidence” presenting an “essential factual issue” regarding “a defense sanctioned by law . . . to excuse [his] criminal conduct.” Id. at 255, 566 P.2d at 1380. The circuit court and ICA ruled, however, that under the circumstances of this case, there was no such defense based on
As explained below, however, Young did not consider or decide whether
Hence, Dr. Blinder would have presented “competent evidence” on an “essential factual issue” regarding “a defense sanctioned by law . . . to excuse [Abion’s] criminal conduct.” Thus, the circuit court “reject[ed] evidence which, if admitted, would [have] present[ed] an essential factual issue for the trier of fact” and violated Abion’s due process right to present a complete defense by precluding Dr. Blinder from testifying at trial. Horn, 58 Haw. at 255, 566 P.2d at 1381.
We therefore vacate the ICA’s April 14, 2020 judgment on appeal, which affirmed the circuit court’s June 13, 2018 judgment of conviction and sentence and July 26, 2018 stipulation and order to amend judgment of conviction, and we
II. Background
A. Circuit court proceedings
On January 13, 2016, Abion was charged with assault second in violation of
1. Abion’s motion for HRS § 704-404 examination
On March 8, 2016, Abion filed a motion for a
One examiner, Dr. Blinder, diagnosed Abion with “[m]ethamphetamine psychosis,” and noted that “protracted use of methamphetamines causes permanent brain damage at a cellular level, its effects apparent long after an individual has been free of the drug.” Dr. Blinder’s report also noted Abion “was not using methamphetamines on the day of his offense or several
2. State’s motion for inadmissibility of HRS § 704-400 defense
On September 22, 2017, the State filed a motion for inadmissibility of
Dr. Blinder had diagnosed Abion with methamphetamine psychosis. Methamphetamine is capable of “caus[ing] structural changes in the brain” “powerful enough to render somebody periodically psychotic.” “[T]hese changes in the brain are permanent long after [a person has] given up methamphetamines,” and the person may “continue to have paranoid thoughts . . . [and] be susceptible to auditory hallucinations.” However, not everyone experiences these effects from long-term methamphetamine use. Dr. Blinder explained that methamphetamine use may also cause people with a genetic predisposition for schizophrenia to develop symptoms that would not otherwise have manifested:
A. So -- so let’s say you have a genetic endowment of some sort of the genes that contribute to the outbreak of schizophrenia, you don’t have nine or ten, you just have three or four, you can probably sail through life and never exhibit any psychotic symptoms. You’re okay. But if you use methamphetamines, you don’t need the whole nine genetic endowments to develop the psychoses. It will eliminate this genetic predisposition that, absent the methamphetamines, you never would have known about.
Dr. Blinder determined that “to a reasonable degree of medical probability, [Abion] would not have had [] psychos[i]s absent his use of methamphetamine.” Abion also told him that he had “an auntie who spent a lot of time in a mental hospital,” which meant “in [Abion’s] genetic pool there’s something floating in there that he’d be better off if he didn’t carry it.” In Dr. Blinder’s opinion, the incident between Abion and Visaya probably would not have happened absent Abion’s long-term methamphetamine use.
On cross-examination, Dr. Blinder affirmed his opinion that Abion may carry a genetic predisposition for psychosis that was activated by prolonged methamphetamine use. As far as Dr. Blinder could tell, Abion was not under the influence of methamphetamine during the incident with Visaya, but “rather was suffering from its permanent or long-term effects.”
Before redirect, the circuit court asked Dr. Blinder how the aunt who had spent time in a mental hospital was related to Abion, because “In Hawaii everybody calls everybody auntie.” Dr. Blinder testified that he did not determine how Abion’s aunt was related to him, and “if it’s not a blood relative, then it’s
THE WITNESS: It doesn’t change it, it just pulls out from under my conclusions one of its bases, so it makes me less confident that this man is carrying some sort of low grade genetic endowment that predisposes him for psychoses. It shifts all of the responsibility onto the methamphetamine, since I have indicated earlier, there are some unlucky people with no genetic predisposition, they use these drugs, and that’s enough to send them into a mental hospital.
On November 11, 2017, the circuit court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting the State’s motion for inadmissibility (“order granting motion for inadmissibility”). The circuit court’s order included the following conclusions of law (“COLs”):
- Preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. H.R.E. 104(a).
- Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect within the meaning of
HRS Section 704-400 .H.R.S. 702-230(3) . - Intoxication is not a defense to any offense, unless specifically provided for in
H.R.S. § 702-230 . - A drug-induced or exacerbated mental illness does not constitute a defense. State v. Young, 93 Hawaiʻi 224, 232, 999 P.2d 230, 238 (2000).
- Dr. Blinder’s testimony that Defendant was suffering from a psychosis caused by long-standing drug abuse does not constitute a defense.
- Further, Defendant cannot now benefit from long-term drug abuse by asserting that the voluntary damage he did to his body now constitutes a defense.
- Therefore, Dr. Blinder’s testimony is not relevant pursuant to H.R.E. 104, and shall not be admissible at trial.
The order stated that the “State’s Motion for Finding of Inadmissibility of
On February 28, 2018, Abion filed a notice of intent to rely on an HRS chapter 704 defense and call Dr. Blinder to testify (“notice of intent”). On March 1, 2018, the State filed its motion in limine no. 2 to preclude Abion from introducing evidence inconsistent with the circuit court’s order granting motion for inadmissibility.
On March 2, 2018, a hearing was held on the State’s motion in limine no. 2. Defense counsel acknowledged that the court “already made a decision” regarding Dr. Blinder’s testimony, but explained that the notice of intent was filed “to make the record clear that this is a defense that I think should be available.”
The circuit court granted the State’s motion in limine and denied Abion’s notice of intent. The circuit court stated:
[THE COURT:] What I’m precluding is Dr. Blinder from coming in and testifying, because we already had a full-blown hearing on this back in November, that it doesn’t offer any -- any scientific explanation to -- to amount to a defense. It was, as far as all the parties agreed, or the facts came out to the examiners, this was voluntary intoxication on the part of the defendant, and that is not a defense . . . .
So this case will not include Dr. Blinder, at least not as to testifying to Mr. Abion being under a self-induced methamphetamine condition . . . .
So I don’t feel there’s any prejudice to the defense in this case because they’re not precluded from presenting their defense, they’re just precluded from calling Dr. Blinder [from] coming in and calling it a mental defense, because that, I find, it’s not.
So the Court -- I suppose I’m granting the State’s motion in limine number two, I’m denying the Defense notice [of] intent to call Dr. Blinder to testify, and we’ll leave it at that.
4. Jury trial
Abion’s jury trial commenced on March 19, 2018.8 Only the State called witnesses; Abion did not call any witnesses and did not testify.
a. Witness testimony
i. Alana Kahai
Alana Kahai (“Kahai”) testified as follows.
On January 11, 2016, Kahai and her fiancé, Haumanu Tuuafu (“Tuuafu”), went to the Waiehu Shell gas station. They parked the car at the front of the store, and Tuuafu went into the store while Kahai waited in the car. Kahai saw Visaya cleaning an oil spill by the gas pumps. Tuuafu came out of the store, and as they were leaving, Kahai saw Visaya talking to someone near the corner of the gas station. Kahai could not see who she was talking to. As Visaya started to go into the alley next to the store, a man struck her from behind with a hammer, and she fell backward. The man then put his backpack on his chest, put his right hand with the hammer into the backpack, and started to
Kahai jumped out of the car, went into the store to get Visaya’s coworker, and called 911. While calling 911, Kahai observed the direction Abion left and told the police where he was going. Abion seemed calm as he walked away.
ii. Haumanu Tuuafu
Tuuafu testified as follows.
On January 11, 2016, Tuuafu and Kahai went to the gas station, and Tuuafu went into the store while Kahai waited in the car. As he pulled out of the parking stall, Tuuafu saw a woman employee. The woman went into the alley next to the store, and Tuuafu saw a man reach into his bag, grab a hammer, and hit the woman on the head from behind. At trial, Tuuafu identified that man as Abion. After Abion hit the woman, he put the hammer back in the bag and walked toward the road.
On cross-examination, Tuuafu testified that after striking the employee, Abion walked “casually walked” away and did not run. Tuuafu gave a statement to the police and said that he had seen Abion “at the parking lot from time to time,” and that he had seen Abion sleep at the gas station.
iii. Temehane Visaya
Visaya testified as follows.
Visaya swept cat litter onto the oil spill about three or four feet away from where Abion lay. She then asked Abion to leave, but he did not respond. Visaya walked toward the alley next to the store to wash the broom and dustpan. After entering the alley, the next thing Visaya remembered was her legs buckling and that she could not breathe. Visaya remembered waking up on the ground in the alley, seeing police, and being put into an ambulance. Visaya could not remember what happened at the hospital.
iv. Officer Charles Taua
Officer Taua testified as follows.
On January 11, 2016, Officer Taua was dispatched to the Waiehu Shell gas station. Officer Taua was given a description of the alleged offender, and he saw someone matching that description about a quarter of a mile away from the gas station. At trial, Officer Taua identified the person he saw as Abion.
On cross-examination, Officer Taua testified that when he approached Abion, Abion was not running and did not attempt to hide. Abion did not hide that he had a hammer and did not hesitate in providing a statement. Abion told Officer Taua that the woman at the gas station had swept dust into his face and that she had hit him first. Abion did not appear to have any guilt or regrets. When asked if Abion appeared to be intoxicated or experiencing withdrawal from drugs or alcohol, Officer Taua said he was not sure, but Abion was “really animated” and may have acted “passive” “at times.”
v. Dr. Beth Jarrett
Dr. Beth Jarrett (“Dr. Jarrett”) testified as follows.
Dr. Jarrett was a general surgeon at the Maui Memorial Medical Center who treated Visaya on January 11, 2016. Visaya had a laceration on her head, and Dr. Jarrett determined that she had “a couple fractures” and “a hematoma to the skin and soft tissues of the fracture.” Dr. Jarrett opined that a strike to the head with a hammer could cause a substantial risk of death “especially if the brain is injured,” could cause serious permanent disfigurement, and could cause protractive loss or impairment of the brain.
b. Jury instructions and closing arguments
Despite pretrial rulings precluding Dr. Blinder’s testimony and disallowing “a mental defense,” the circuit court instructed the jury not only on self-defense, but also on the “affirmative
In closing, defense counsel argued that Abion was unable to conform his actions to societal norms, as indicated by testimony that he was talking and laughing to himself despite Officer Taua’s report indicating that he was not intoxicated.
c. Jury verdict and sentencing
On March 20, 2018, the jury found Abion guilty of assault second.
On June 13, 2018, the circuit court entered its judgment of conviction and sentence. Abion was sentenced to five years imprisonment.10 Abion appealed the June 13, 2018 judgment.
B. ICA proceedings
1. Abion’s arguments
Abion raised a single point of error: “the circuit court erred in preventing [him] from using Dr. Blinder to explain to the jury [he] was suffering from a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect.”
Abion asserted that in his case, Dr. Blinder’s testimony that he had a genetic predisposition for psychosis showed that he suffered from a preexisting condition aggravated by drug use, which was “defensible under
In a footnote, Abion asserted that “[a]ny reliance on Young is perilous at this point” because in State v. Eager, 140 Hawaiʻi 167, 177, 398 P.3d 756, 766 (2017), this court held that “juries must reconcile evidence of a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect with evidence of intoxication to determine if ‘the mental disturbance would excuse the defendant’s criminal conduct absent the influence of the intoxicant.’” Abion
2. The State’s arguments
The State argued that even though the circuit court did not allow Dr. Blinder to testify, Abion had not been precluded from presenting other evidence in support of his
The State distinguished this case from Eager, where the defendant had not taken his prescribed medication and had tested positive for marijuana, and “the trial court did not distinguish the effects of medication withdrawal from the effects of marijuana consumption.” In comparison, Dr. Blinder testified that Abion had a genetic predisposition for psychosis that would not have manifested absent drug use, not that Abion had a “pre-existing mental disease, disorder, or defect[.]” Therefore, there was no question of fact raised as to whether Abion’s mental disturbance would excuse his conduct absent drug use.
On February 28, 2020, the ICA issued its memorandum opinion affirming Abion‘s conviction. State v. Abion, CAAP-18-0000600 (App. Feb. 28, 2020) (mem.).
The ICA found no merit in Abion‘s argument that his genetic predisposition for psychosis was a “preexisting condition” and a defense under
The ICA held the circuit court erred to the extent its COL 4 cited Young for the proposition that a drug-exacerbated mental illness does not constitute a defense because that issue was not addressed in Young. Id. The ICA, however, held that this error was harmless because Dr. Blinder‘s testimony did not establish that Abion suffered from a drug-exacerbated mental illness. Id.
On April 14, 2020, the ICA filed its judgment on appeal affirming the circuit court‘s June 13, 2018 judgment of conviction and sentence and July 26, 2018 stipulation and order to amended judgment of conviction and sentence.
C. Application for certiorari
Abion maintains the circuit court‘s exclusion of his only witness violated his due process right to present evidence in support of his defense and undermined the jury‘s exclusive task to resolve ultimate issues of fact. Citing Horn, 58 Haw. at 255, 566 P.2d at 1380, Abion asserts that when “the accused asserts a defense sanctioned by law to justify or excuse the criminal conduct charged, and there is some credible evidence to
Abion asserts that this court did not expand the self-induced intoxication exception to include “preexisting mental illnesses aggravated by drug abuse” in Young. Furthermore, he contends that the jury “determines if the defendant‘s physical or mental condition was the result of intoxication,” and that by preventing his only witness from testifying at trial, the ICA “usurped the jury‘s constitutional role to determine ultimate issues of fact.”
Abion also contends the self-induced intoxication exception “should be limited to temporary conditions that arise while a person is under the influence of an intoxicant,” and that the legislative history of
III. Standard of Review
A. Statutory interpretation
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Arceo, 84 Hawaiʻi 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996). When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the
B. Right to present a complete defense
“Central to the protections of due process is the right to be accorded ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.‘” Matafeo, 71 Haw. at 185, 787 P.2d at 672 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). “Thus, ‘a defendant has the constitutional right to present any and all competent evidence in [their] defense.‘” State v. Acker, 133 Hawaiʻi 253, 301, 327 P.3d 931, 979 (2014) (quoting State v. Kassebeer, 118 Hawaiʻi 493, 514, 193 P.3d 409, 430 (2008)). “Nevertheless, a defendant‘s right to present relevant evidence is not without limitation and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Kassebeer, 118 Hawaiʻi at 514, 193 P.3d at 430 (citations omitted).
A. Young has been misconstrued and the self-induced intoxication exception of HRS § 702-230(1) applies only when a defendant is temporarily under the influence of a voluntarily ingested substance
We first provide context to our discussion. As we recently explained in State v. Glenn, 148 Hawaiʻi 112, 468 P.3d 126 (2020):
In order to commit a crime, a defendant must be capable of intending to act wrongfully. The bedrock principle that a crime requires a wrongful intent “is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). For this reason, if a mental illness or impairment results in a defendant lacking substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the law, then the defendant cannot be held criminally responsible. Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 704-400 (2019).11
148 Hawaiʻi at 115, 468 P.3d at 129 (footnote omitted).12
Notes
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if:
- The person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes substantial bodily injury to another;
- The person recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another;
- The person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a dangerous instrument[.]
. . .
(1) A person is not responsible, under this Code, for conduct if at the time of the conduct as a result of physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect the person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person‘s conduct or to conform the person‘s conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this chapter, the terms “physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect” do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated penal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
(1) Self-induced intoxication is prohibited as a defense to any offense, except as specifically provided in this section.
(2) Evidence of the nonself-induced or pathological intoxication of the defendant shall be admissible to prove or negative . . . the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is admissible . . . prove state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is not admissible to negative the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect within the meaning of section 704-400.
(4) Intoxication that is:
- Not self-induced; or
- Pathological,
is a defense if by reason of the intoxication the defendant at the time of the defendant‘s conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its wrongfulness or to conform the defendant‘s conduct to the requirements of law.
(5) In this section:
“Intoxication” means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.
“Pathological intoxication” means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the defendant does not know the defendant is susceptible and which results from a physical abnormality of the defendant.
“Self-induced intoxication” means intoxication caused by substances which the defendant knowingly introduces into the defendant‘s body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication the defendant knows or ought to know, unless the defendant introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of a penal offense.
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subsection (b). In making its (continued . . .)
(continued from page 8) determination the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
As we noted in Young, however, in 1986, the legislature
(1) Self-induced intoxication is prohibited as a defense to any offense, except as specifically provided in this section.
(2) Evidence of the nonself-induced or pathological intoxication of the defendant shall be admissible to prove or negative . . . the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is admissible to . . . prove state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is not admissible to negative the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect within the meaning of section 704-400.
(4) Intoxication that is:
(a) Not self-induced; or
(b) Pathological,
is a defense if by reason of the intoxication the defendant at the time of the defendant‘s conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its wrongfulness or to conform the defendant‘s conduct to the requirements of law.
(5) In this section:
“Intoxication” means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.
“Pathological intoxication” means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the defendant does not know the defendant is susceptible and which results from a physical abnormality of the defendant.
“Self-induced intoxication” means intoxication caused by substances which the defendant knowingly introduces into the defendant‘s body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication the defendant knows or ought to know, unless the defendant introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of a penal offense.
148 Hawaiʻi at 116, 468 P.3d at 130. Glenn‘s prospective holding does not apply to Abion‘s case. In any event, the jury in Abion‘s case was given a lack of penal responsibility instruction.
The circuit court and the ICA misinterpreted Young. In Young, we did reject the assertion that “a drug-induced or exacerbated mental illness, in and of itself, constitutes a criminal defense as a matter of law[,]” and we stated:
In 1986, the legislature added subsection (1) to
HRS § 702–230 , specifically prohibiting self-induced intoxication as a defense except in limited circumstances. 1986 Haw. Sess. L. Act 325, § 2 at 687–88. The conference committee stated that it “believes that when a person chooses to drink, that person should remain ultimately responsible for [their] actions.” Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 36, in 1986 House Journal, at 928.HRS § 702–230(3) provides that intoxication alone cannot negate penal responsibility underHRS § 704–400 . To adopt the rule suggested by Young would be contrary to this statutory scheme. If an intoxicated person cannot escape ultimate responsibility for his actions, neither should a defendant who chronically engages in substance abuse. Only in the instance when the intoxication causes the person to lack the ability to form the requisite state of mind is intoxication a defense. The same is also true of someone with a drug-induced mental illness.
93 Hawaiʻi at 232, 999 P.2d at 238.
Young must, however, be construed in light of its circumstances and factual findings. In Young, the defendant was
Also, Young argued that he suffered brain damage during a 1997 fight and that this brain damage constituted a physical (not mental) disease entitling him to a
Thus, in Young, whether a permanent mental illness caused by substance use was precluded by the self-induced intoxication exception was not at issue. Rather, Young applied the self-induced intoxication exception to an offense committed by a defendant who, at the time of the offense, was temporarily under the influence of voluntarily ingested substances. Young therefore involved a temporary impairment resulting from voluntary intoxication. Young did not address whether a defendant suffering from a permanent mental impairment caused by substance abuse is subject to the self-induced intoxication exception of
Also, it is the language of
Thus, as we stated in Eager, “the purpose of
Hence, we now hold that the self-induced intoxication exception of
Our holding is consistent with the approach of other states. A majority of jurisdictions hold that a lack of penal responsibility defense may be available to defendants suffering from permanent or “settled insanity” as a result of voluntary intoxication. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d. Criminal Law § 48 (2020)
Thus, the circuit court and the ICA erred in precluding Dr. Blinder‘s testimony based on the self-induced intoxication exception of
B. Abion‘s constitutional right to present a complete defense was violated
Under the Hawaiʻi Constitution, “[c]entral to the protections of due process is the right to be accorded ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.‘” Matafeo, 71 Haw. at 185, 787 P.2d at 672 (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485). “Thus, ‘a defendant has the constitutional right to present any and all competent evidence in [their] defense.‘”
The right to present a complete defense is also a federal constitutional right. As stated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ellis v. Mullin, 326 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that exclusion of pretrial psychiatric report diagnosing defendant as chronic schizophrenic violated petitioner‘s due process right to present evidence critical to his defense):
“[S]tate evidentiary determinations ordinarily do not present federal constitutional issues . . . . However, the Supreme Court, in, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979) (capital sentencing proceeding), has provided an exception, under some circumstances, if a state court applies the State‘s evidentiary rules unfairly to prevent a defendant from presenting evidence that is critical to his defense.” Romano, 239 F.3d at 1166. “[T]o determine whether a defendant was unconstitutionally denied his or her right to present relevant evidence, we must balance the importance of the evidence to the defense against the interests the state has in excluding the evidence.” Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 1997). Further:
[T]o establish a violation of . . . due process, a defendant must show a denial of fundamental fairness . . . . It is the materiality of the excluded evidence to the presentation of the defense that determines whether a petitioner has been deprived of a fundamentally fair trial. Evidence is material if its suppression might have affected the
outcome. In other words, material evidence is that which is exculpatory-evidence that if admitted would create reasonable doubt that did not exist without the evidence. Richmond, 122 F.3d at 872 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Romano, 239 F.3d at 1168 (“[W]e need ask no more than whether the trial court‘s application of this state evidentiary rule excluded critical exculpatory evidence.“).
This court has also recently recognized that defendants have a right under the Hawaiʻi Constitution to assert a lack of penal responsibility defense. Glenn, 148 Hawaiʻi at 116, 468 P.3d at 130:
Lack of penal responsibility is not merely a statutory affirmative defense; it reflects a precept that is fundamental to due process under the Hawaiʻi Constitution: “A defendant who, due to mental illness, lacks sufficient mental capacity to be held morally responsible for his actions cannot be found guilty of a crime.” Kahler v. Kansas, --- U.S. ----, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1039, 206 L.Ed.2d 312 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Abion asserts his right to present a complete defense was violated when the circuit court precluded any testimony from Dr. Blinder. We agree.
Whether Abion acted during a period of temporary self-induced intoxication, is, at minimum, disputed. Officer Taua‘s report and testimony did not indicate that Abion was intoxicated at the time of the offense. Dr. Blinder opined that Abion‘s psychosis was activated by methamphetamine use, and that he was suffering from the “permanent of long-term effects” of methamphetamine at the time of the offense. Dr. Blinder‘s psychiatric report noted, however, that Abion “was not using
Also, in his psychiatric evaluation of Abion, Dr. Blinder opined that Abion may be entitled to a mental defense because his “commerce with reality was hugely impaired at the time of his assaultive conduct[.]” At the pre-trial hearing, Dr. Blinder also testified that “to a reasonable degree of medical probability, [Abion] would not have had [] psychoses absent his use of methamphetamine,” and that he may have had a genetic predisposition for psychosis that caused him to develop symptoms that would not otherwise have manifested. In Dr. Blinder‘s opinion, Abion was not under the influence of methamphetamines at the time of the offense, but “rather was suffering from its permanent or long-term effects.”
Although the circuit court instructed the jury on the
Hence, Dr. Blinder would have presented “competent evidence” on an “essential factual issue” regarding “a defense sanctioned by law . . . to excuse [Abion‘s] criminal conduct.” Horn, 58 Haw. at 255, 566 P.2d at 1380. Thus, the circuit court “reject[ed] evidence which, if admitted, would [have] present[ed] an essential factual issue for the trier of fact” and violated Abion‘s due process right to present a complete defense by precluding Dr. Blinder from testifying at trial. Id.
Dr. Blinder‘s testimony would have aided the jury in determining whether Abion suffered from a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect that caused him to lack the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offense under
V. Conclusion
We therefore vacate the ICA‘s April 14, 2020 judgment on appeal, which affirmed the circuit court‘s June 13, 2018 judgment of conviction and sentence and July 26, 2018 stipulation and order to amend judgment of conviction, and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Benjamin E. Lowenthal, for Abion
Gerald K. Enriques, for the State
/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
/s/ Paula A. Nakayama
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
/s/ Jeannette H. Castagnetti
Lack of penal responsibility is not merely a statutory affirmative defense; it reflects a precept that is fundamental to due process under the Hawaiʻi Constitution: “A defendant who, due to mental illness, lacks sufficient mental capacity to be held morally responsible for his actions cannot be found guilty of a crime.” Kahler v. Kansas, --- U.S. ----, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1039, 206 L.Ed.2d 312 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we prospectively hold that once the court receives notice. . . that a defendant‘s penal responsibility is an issue in the case, the circuit court must advise a defendant of the penal-responsibility defense and obtain a knowing waiver of the defense. Cf. Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawaiʻi 226, 236, 900 P.2d 1293, 1303 (1995).
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