79 N.C. 660 | N.C. | 1878
In the second section of the act incorporating the Wilmington Steam Fire Engine Company (Private Laws 1868-'69, ch. 55) it is provided that the members of it "shall during membership be exempt from all jury and militia duty," and by a subsequent act (Private Laws 1869-'70) it is provided "that the members of all organized fire companies in the city of Wilmington be and they are hereby exempt from serving as jurors on any coroner's inquest, or in the Special or Superior Court."
The defendant was summoned as a tales juror in the Superior Court, and refusing to answer was fined by the Court, nisi; and in answer to a notice to show cause why the judgment should not be made absolute he exhibited to the Court his certificate of membership in the Wilmington Steam Fire Engine Company, and by virtue of it claimed exemption from jury duty under the acts which have been (661) recited. It was conceded that he was admitted as a member because of having subscribed to the organization of the company, and that it was understood that he and others so subscribing should not be called upon for active duty, and that in fact he was not required to attend the meetings of the company. His Honor being of opinion that defendant was not exempt from duty as tales juror, ordered that the judgment be made absolute, and the defendant appealed. It is not material to inquire whether the defendant was such a fireman as the acts contemplated to be excused; for admitting that he was a regular member in *492 all respects, we are of opinion that he was not exempt from service as a tales juror.
There have been three decisions bearing upon the case in our State:
The first was the S. v. Hogg,
The next was the S. v. Williams,
The last case is S. v. Whitford,
The reason why these acts are held not to extend to tales jurors, is assigned to be, that these exemptions are not intended as privileges or compensations to the party, unless so expressed in the act. So far as serving on a jury does not interfere with their public avocations they are still liable to be called on for that service. "And it is because a talesman must be taken from the bystanders at the Court that he may be summoned, as his being a bystander proves that he was not there on official or professional duties which required his attention." Relying upon these authorities and the reasonableness of the proposition they maintain, we think the defendant was not excused as a tales juror.
Affirmed.
Cited: S. v. Cantwell,
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