25 N.C. 570 | N.C. | 1843
The act of 1836, Rev. Stat., ch. 34, sec. 1, introduced for the first time, the term "storehouse" into the statute book, and accompanies it with two explanatory words to show precisely to what particular building the Legislature meant to apply it. Having, previously, no legal signification, as a term of art, it must, of course, be understood in its general sense, given to it as a word in our language in approved dictionaries. In that way we find it to be defined, "a building for keeping grain or goods of any kind; a repository; a warehouse"; which signification clearly covers the place in this case, and, indeed, much more, and even more, perhaps, than was actually in the mind of the writer of the act. For we believe, the word is vulgarly used in different senses, and, perhaps, not exactly alike in different parts of the country. A common use of it is to designate a building, in which domestic supplies are kept at a place of residence. It is also applied to places of business, and is there vulgarly used as synonymous with "shop" in one of its proper senses, meaning a building in which goods are offered openly for sale. It is probable the Legislature had in view a (574) building of the latter character, since one of the former kind *382 would probably in most cases be protected as "part of the dwelling-house" mentioned in the previous part of the sentence. If such was the intention, it is to be regretted that the term "shop" had not been adopted, as having an established legal meaning. But as another term was chosen, it is the duty of the Court to execute the act accordingly, and it cannot be doubted that "storehouse," both in its proper sense and according to a common acceptation of it, embraces the building here burnt.
The determination of the preceding point goes far in deciding also that the ownership was properly laid to be in Cowan. It was certainly not a part of McKeller's house, in legal contemplation. There was no communication between this and the other parts of the building, and they were severed by being employed for different purposes, and occupied by different persons, as their own for the time. The several portions thereby became distinct properties and houses, for the purposes of constituting the crimes of burglary or arson, as much so as if they had not been under the same roof. 1 Hawk. P. C., ch. 38, sec. 34; East. P. C., 504.
The next objection is nothing at all, being no more than a question whether burning is burning. It is stated in the case that the floor of the building was charred to the depth of half an inch. The definition of "char" is to reduce wood to a coal or burning. Therefore the crime was complete here, for although to constitute arson there must be a burning of the house, and not merely something that is in it, yet the least burning of the building is sufficient. The opinion of the Court therefore is that the conviction was right.
But the Court is likewise of opinion that there cannot be judgment on this indictment, because it concludes "against the form of the statutes," while the offense depends on but a single statute. We think it settled that when the offense depends on more than one statute, the conclusion contra formam statuti, is bad, and in like manner, that a (575) conclusion contra formam statutorum is bad, when there is but one statute. The former proposition is not susceptible of dispute, but all seem agreed in it. Broughton v. Moore, Cro. Jac., 144; 2 Hale, 173; S. v. Jim,
PER CURIAM. Judgment arrested.
Cited: S. v. Abernathy,
(578)