123 S.E. 303 | N.C. | 1924
STACY, J., dissenting. *73
Defendants were convicted, and from judgment of the court on the verdict appealed, assigning errors.
Defendants excepted, first, that they were ruled to a trial of the cause at the same term the bill of indictment was found and so soon after the alleged theft that they were, in effect, denied the right to obtain necessary evidence; but our decisions are to the effect that this is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and not the basis of a valid exception, unless there has been manifest abuse, and, on the facts presented, we are of opinion that no such abuse has been made to appear. S.v. Burnett,
Defendants excepted further for the refusal of the court to allow their motion to nonsuit, made in apt time at the close of the evidence for the State, renewed at the close of the entire evidence. There were facts in evidence on the part of the State tending to show that the automobile in question, the property of B. H. Mitchell, an Essex coach, was stolen from one of the streets of Greensboro on "Saturday, 3 December, 1923," and was recovered on 13 December. Saturday seems to have been 1 December, and to that extent the evidence is confused; in any event it was found in possession and control of the defendants on Monday, 10 December, and both their conduct and their declarations concerning it tended to show their guilt. It was not seriously contended that there was a sufficient failure of proof to sustain a nonsuit as to defendant Riley, but it was very earnestly urged that the motion should have been allowed as to defendant Steelman, who was not examined nor shown at any time to have been in control of the car, but we do not so interpret the record. On the contrary, the witnesses who testified as to the possession on several occasions spoke of its being in possession of both defendants. Among other evidence admitted as against Riley and Steelman, it was shown that the two had the stolen car at the home of Riley's father, who lived near Pleasant Garden in said county, on Monday, 9th, or Tuesday, 10 December, 1923, and that defendant Steelman had there falsely introduced himself as a Mr. Brown of High Point. This testimony being from the police officer, S. J. Current, and John T. Carter, an agent, who testified that Steelman, having denied knowing anything about the stolen car, at *74
the request of Mr. J. H. Riley, the latter was taken to the jail to see if he knew Steelman and could identify him as being the man who was with his son, had the car at the home of the witness, and on the meeting Mr. Riley, the father, said: "Yes, sir; you are the man that was at my house and introduced yourself as Brown from High Point." True, this was declaration of Riley, but being made in the presence of Steelman, who made no denial, it became a fact in evidence relevant to the issue. S. v. Jackson,
Again it is objected that there was error in his Honor's charge in leaving to the jury the question whether certain confessions or inculpating statements made by defendants were voluntary. The question of the competency of these inculpating admissions was raised when they were first offered, and counsel for defendants was allowed to cross-question the witness concerning them. On the preliminary inquiry the statements were ruled competent and admitted, and later in the progress of the trial, and after testimony for defense had been admitted tending to show that there had been improper inducements offered, the court left the question of whether or not they were voluntarily made to the jury with the direction that if found by them to have been made by reason of disqualifying threats and promises they should be disregarded. There is much authority for the course pursued by his Honor in this matter. S. v. Wells,
On careful consideration of the entire record, we are of opinion that no reversible error has been shown, and the judgment below must be affirmed.
No error.
STACY, J., dissenting. *76