10 S.E. 312 | N.C. | 1889
The defendants were found guilty by a jury, and on motion of their counsel the judgment was arrested on the ground that the usual concluding words, "against the peace and dignity of the State," were omitted from the indictment. The State appealed. The conclusion, "against the peace and dignity of the King," was held in England to be necessary in all indictments. No reason was assigned for it except that it had been customary. It furnished no light to the defendant, and its employment was not required by any statute. As every criminal offense is, in its nature, "against the *630 peace," its use is tautology, and doubtless originated in the rhetorical flourish of some ancient and forgotten pleader.
In our Constitution of 1776 it was provided that indictments should conclude, "against the peace and dignity of the State," but this requirement is in the same clause which regulates the form in which commissions, grants and writs shall run, and was evidently intended (912) merely to place in the organic law a provision that in all legal proceedings and documents thereafter the word "State" should be substituted for "King" in all places where the latter had till then been customarily used. The Constitution of 1868 omits this requirement.
Ever since 1784 "it has been the evident tendency," as is said by Ashe,J., in S. v. Parker,
The omission in the present Constitution of the requirement that indictments shall conclude "against the peace and dignity of the State," was not made without a purpose, and is in accord with the manifest tendency to simplify criminal as well as civil proceedings, and to try all causes upon their merits, stripped of useless refinements and (913) technicalities, which never aid and often hinder the due administration of justice. This tendency is shown in many decisions of this Court, which hold to be sufficient indictments concluding "against the act of Assembly," "against the statute," "against the form of the statute," etc. S. v. Tribatt,
In S. v. Parker,
In S. v. Moses, above cited, the elder Ruffin, than whom a greater lawyer never sat on this bench, refers to the fact that "many sages of the law had called nice objections of this sort a disease of the law and a reproach to the bench." He expresses the opinion that by the act of 1811 (now Code, sec. 1183) "the Legislature meant to disallow the whole of them and only require the substance, that is, a direct averment of those facts and circumstances which constitute the crime to be set forth."
We are not unaware that a contrary opinion to ours has been held in S.v. Joyner,
Indeed, it may be noted that even in England, where the words "against the peace of the King" are held material, it is considered that their omission is not ground for a motion in arrest of judgment, but the objection must be taken at an earlier stage. Archbold Criminal Pleading, p. 58. Our statute makes the bill "sufficient in form for all intents and purposes if it express the charge against the (914) defendant in a plain, intelligible and explicit manner," and if that is done forbids that the bill should either be "quashed or judgment arrested" by reason of any informality or refinement.
The judgment in arrest must be set aside and the case remanded to the Superior Court that it may proceed to pass judgment in conformity with this opinion.
Per curiam. Error.
Cited: S. v. Harris,