12 N.C. 508 | N.C. | 1828
Lead Opinion
On the trial the only witness who directly proved the assault was one Mary Rittenhouse, whose general moral character was seriously impeached; but there was no evidence of her character for truth when upon oath. Mr. Holmes, a (509) gentleman of the bar, was called to impeach her, which was effected by his proving a material variance between her evidence on the trial of this indictment and that given upon a former trial of the prisoner for the same offense. S. v. Jim,ante, 142.
His Honor, Judge Norwood, instructed the jury that a general character such as had been given of the witness Rittenhouse "was a circumstance against her credibility, and should be taken into consideration by them, and might, if accompanied by other circumstances against her credit, be thought by them sufficient to induce them to disregard her testimony; but that such general character was not entitled to as much weight as a general character bad in respect to truth when speaking on oath; and on either case, as their duty was to ascertain the truth, they might, exercising a sound discretion, reject part of a witness's testimony which they did not believe and act on such part as they did believe."
The prisoner being convicted, motions were made, on several grounds, for a new trial and in arrest of judgment; which being overruled, and judgment of death awarded, the prisoner appealed. I understand the judge as distinctly informing the jury when discussing the want of credit in a witness arising from corruption or immorality, that although they should discredit a witness in part, because that in such part they thought the witness both false and corrupt, yet they were at liberty, if they thought proper, to believe him in other parts of his testimony. I have always understood the law to be otherwise; for although it is true that if the jury should ascertain that a witness is incorrect in his testimony as to one or more facts, yet if he is not corruptly so, but is merely mistaken in judgment, or by reason of a failure in memory, the witness is not discredited further than would arise from the want of reliance on the correctness of his conception or from a distrust in his powers of memory; and if the jury think proper they may believe him as to other parts of his testimony. But when once *344 they are satisfied of the witness's corruption, they are bound, in obedience to the law, to disregard all that he swore to. For the law does not act upon a jury's bare belief, their bare opinion of the fact; their belief must be founded on that which is regarded in law as testimony. Hence the jury are not permitted to hear a witness who is not sworn, although they might possibly believe him. So also they might believe persons convicted of an infamous crime — perjury, for instance; but such persons are not allowed to be heard before a jury. I can see no difference in principle, and if so, there should be none in practice, between a person heretofore convicted and one who stands convicted before a jury, in the case they are trying. Hence the maxim, falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus. Were it otherwise, the law would be untrue to itself. It is not every conjecture which floats in a juror's mind that should guide him in the formation of his verdict. His will is not the law. He (511) is bound to pronounce his solemn convictions after weighing the evidence, and if he cannot arrive at this state of mind he should find against that party who holds the affirmative, that is, against him whose duty it is to produce satisfactory evidence to a jury. Nothing is more difficult than to prescribe rules of faith; perhaps every man has one peculiar to himself. But in some cases the law has prescribed the rule, and I think this is one of them; and it is the duty of the jury to yield to the law, and not to set themselves above it. Whether any of the witnesses were placed in the situation above mentioned before the jury I have not the right to say; it belonged exclusively to them. But they should be satisfied that such was the fact before they acted under it. There should be such evidence of falsehood and corruption that they, as jurors, would convict the witness were he on trial before them; if they doubt upon the subject, the law does not forbid them to believe the witness. As the jury may have been misled by the charge, I think that there should be a new trial.
Addendum
There are many exceptions taken in this case which I think it is unnecessary to notice, for I suppose they would not be seriously insisted on. The prisoner being without counsel, I have felt it to be a duty to examine the record attentively, to ascertain whether there are any points which ought to have been ruled differently.
The only direct evidence of the assault was that of Mary Rittenhouse, whose credibility was assailed on the ground of her immoral character; and Mr. Holmes has pointed out some *345 important variations in her testimony since the time she gave evidence on the first trial. All the rest of the evidence on the part of the State is supplemental, and intended to be confirmatory of hers. Whether she was entitled to belief was a question altogether for the determination of the jury, and whether they have decided right or wrong, this Court cannot (512) interfere with their verdict. But the prisoner was entitled to the full benefit of that advice from the court to the jury which should enable them to weigh the evidence according to the principles which the law has established. Now, the court instructed the jury that "a general character such as that of Mary Rittenhouse was a circumstance against her credibility, and should be taken into consideration by the jury, and might, if accompanied with other circumstances against the credit of the witness, be thought by the jury to be sufficient to induce them to disregard her testimony. But that such general character was not entitled to as much weight as a general character bad in respect of truth when speaking on oath." The correctness of this direction it is not my purpose to inquire into; it is cited to show that the jury was thereby prepared to have their confidence in the credibility of the witness weakened on the score of her corruption or immorality of character. The court then proceeds to state, "that in either case, as their duty was to ascertain the truth, they might, exercising a sound discretion, reject part of a witness's testimony which they did not believe, and act on such part as they did believe." And it is in this respect I think the prisoner has not received the full benefit of such legal advice as the judge ought to have given to the jury.
I believe that all the writers on the law of evidence lay down the rule that a witness who gives false testimony as to one particular cannot be credited as to any, the maxim being "falsumin uno, falsum in omnibus." And it is very reasonable that it should be so, for the general presumption that a witness will tell the truth is overthrown when it is shown that he is capable of perjury. Our faith (says an accurate writer on evidence) cannot be partial, or fractional; where any material fact rests on the testimony of a witness, the degree of credit due to him must be ascertained, and according to the result his (513) testimony is to be credited or rejected. A witness whose misinterpretation results from mistake or infirmity, and not from design, is of course not within the operation of the principle; his integrity remains unimpeached, though his character for ability may be impaired. On this ground, therefore, and especially in a case affecting the life of a prisoner, I feel bound *346 to give my opinion in favor of a new trial. As I give no opinion upon the other objections, it will, of course, be considered that I do not regard any of them as tenable.
PER CURIAM. Judgment reversed, and a rule for a new trial made absolute.
Overruled: S. v. Williams,
Cited: S. v. Peace,