29 N.C. 147 | N.C. | 1846
The prisoner was indicted for stealing a negro woman named Harriet, the property of one Allen Bost. The indictment contains three counts. It is unnecessary to advert further to the second and third, as upon them the prisoner was acquitted. The first count is as follows: (148)
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA — CABARRUS COUNTY.
Superior Court of Law, February Term, 1846.
The jurors for the State, upon their oath present, that James Gallimore, late of said county, laborer, not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil, on 10 January, 1845, with force and arms, in the said county of Cabarrus, a certain female slave named Harriet, of the value of 50 shillings, and the property of Allen Bost of the said county of Cabarrus, feloniously did steal, take and carry away, contrary to the act of Assembly in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.
Upon this count the prisoner was convicted by the jury, and through his counsel moved for a new trial "because the jury had found him guilty without sufficient testimony." It is unnecessary here to state the *110
testimony given on the trial. We have no authority, as the case appears before us, to look into it. The question raised by the motion has been repeatedly decided in this Court. The Supreme Court is a court for the correction of errors in law committed by the court trying the cause, and not for the correction of those committed by the jury. If there is error here, it is of the latter kind, the only remedy for which rests in the sound discretion of the judge before whom the cause was tried, by granting a new trial. We cannot interfere, although in our opinion it might appear that injustice had been done. Long v. Gantly,
The prisoner's case has, in our opinion, in no manner been prejudiced by the omission. We have looked carefully into the testimony, and think that there was evidence to go to the jury, and that the court could not have told them there was not any; and the jury, after a most careful and clear charge from the presiding judge upon this point, returned their verdict of guilty against the prisoner. If in this they erred, it is an error which could have been cured only by the granting of a new trial, which was within the peculiar discretion of the court, with the exercise of which, as we have before said, we cannot interfere.
The prisoner moved further in arrest of judgment, and assigned as error, that the indictment did not set forth or charge "that the slave was in the possession of the owner, and that the prisoner took and carried her away from his possession." The indictment in this particular conforms to the precedents to be found in the books. We have looked through Archbold, and find that the words "shall take and carry away" are the operative words used by him. Nor do we anywhere find it stated to be necessary that the indictment should charge that the property stolen was in the possession of the owner, or that the prisoner stole it from his possession. Possession in the owner at the time of the larceny is a part of the essence of the crime; but it is a matter of evidence, and is not usually stated in the indictment, and is not (151) necessary to its validity. The indictment, in S. v. May,
After a careful examination of the case, we are unable to discover any *112 good reason why there should be a venire facias de novo, or why the judgment should be arrested.
PER CURIAM. No error.
Cited: S. v. Tribett,