8 N.C. 6 | N.C. | 1820
Lead Opinion
The only methods of proving the handwriting of a person sanctioned by law are:
1. By a witness who saw him sign the very paper in dispute.
2. By one who has seen him write and has thereby (8) fixed a standard in his own mind by which he ascertains the genuineness of any other writing imputed to him.
3. By a witness who has received letters from the supposed writer of such a nature as renders it probable that they were written by the person from whom they purport to come. Such evidence is only admissible where there is good reason to believe that the letters from which the witness has derived his knowledge were really written by the supposed writer of the paper in question.
4. When a witness has become acquainted with his manner of signing his name by inspecting other ancient writings bearing the same signature, and which have been regarded and preserved as authentic documents. This mode of proof is confined to ancient writings, and is admitted as being the best the nature of the case will allow.
Other modes of proving handwriting not yet sanctioned by adjudged cases may possibly come within the reason of the cases enumerated, but I think they ought to appear clearly to do so *5 before they are admitted. The court ought to be well satisfied that the person who proves the signatures on a bank bill, without having seen the signers write or having been engaged in a correspondence with them, were from their situation and pursuits likely to acquire a correct knowledge on the subject; and, particularly, that they must have known of the return of those bills they believed to be genuine if they had been spurious. The first witnesses in this case only knew that they had received bills in the course of business which purported to be signed by the president and cashier of the Augusta bank; that they passed them away, andif they were genuine the note in question was counterfeit. What was the occupation of the witnesses, whether they were likely to receive many bills and to acquire an accurate knowledge of the signatures are facts to which no evidence is directed. They may have received counterfeit (9) bills which may yet return, for it is not said when they received and passed them away. Such evidence, I think, inadmissible, especially as it requires much experience and a more than ordinary skill to detect counterfeit signatures to bank-notes. The fraudulent ingenuity of men has brought this crime to such perfection that even the signers themselves have sometimes been imposed upon. Hence, before witnesses are allowed to give evidence to the jury, the court ought to be satisfied that they are skilled in the knowledge of bank-notes. The evidence of Erwin approaches very nearly to my conceptions of what is proper on such a question, and if I were certain that the verdict was founded on his evidence and not on that of the other witnesses I should hesitate in agreeing to a new trial; but, as some improper testimony has been admitted, a new trial must be awarded.
Addendum
The law requires that he who deposes to a fact should have the means of knowing it. Grounds of conjecture and opinions are not sufficient. A knowledge, therefore, of the handwriting of a person should be founded on specimens of writing known to be his. Having seen him write is the most certain. But it is said to satisfy the rule if the specimens be obtained in the course of a correspondence in which pertinent answers have been received or if they be ancient authentic documents. I am not disposed to go further, for there is nothing more dangerous than a relaxation of the rules of evidence. Their object is more to prevent imposition by falsehood than even to get at the truth; my meaning is, that the law prefers that many truths should be omitted than that one falsehood should be imposed on the court. The rules, therefore, guard more against *6
the introduction of falsehood than against the suppression of the truth. In this case it is more than probable that the bank-notes which the witnesses had seen and from which they had (10) drawn their knowledge of the handwriting of the president and cashier of the bank were genuine, and therefore that the note passed by the prisoner was counterfeit. But this rests on bare probabilities, for it might well have happened that most or all of the notes from which they derived their knowledge were spurious. We cautiously refrain from giving any opinion upon the doctrines laid down inU.S. v. Holtsclaw,
New trial.
HALL, J., concurred.
Cited: S. v. Harris,
(11)
