Until his death in 1997, the defendant was a prisoner of the Department of Corrections. The State Treasurer sued for reimbursement of the cost of incarceration, and obtained an order requiring that the bulk of the defendant’s prison account and pension income be paid to the state. The Court of Appeals reduced the award, but we reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.
i
In January. 1990, defendant James Gardner began serving a prison sentence for criminal sexual conduct. In prison, he continued to receive monthly payments of approximately $370. The source of these payments is described in the record as a long-term disability pension. In addition, the defendant had accumulated approximately $2,200 in his prison account.
In December 1991, the State Treasurer filed a complaint in circuit court, seeking reimbursement for the expense of the defendant’s incarceration. 1 The suit was filed under the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act. 2 MCL 800.401 et seq.; MSA 28.1701 et seq.
*3 At a March 1992 hearing, an assistant attorney general asked the court for an award of ninety percent of the defendant’s prison account (which was said to have grown to about $4,000). She also sought ninety percent of the defendant’s accrued and future pension benefits. 3 The circuit court agreed, and entered such an order. 4
On appeal, the defendant raised several objections that the Court of Appeals rejected, including a claim that MCL 600.6023; MSA 27A.6023, which exempts property from levy and sale, precludes execution on his pension. However, a majority of the panel agreed with him that the garnishment subchapter of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limited the amount that the state could take. 15 USC 1671 et seq.
The Court of Appeals majority thus remanded the case for modification of the reimbursement order, to provide that the State Treasurer would be entitled only to sixty percent of the defendant’s accrued and future disability pension benefits.
The State Treasurer has applied to this Court for leave to appeal. 6
*4 n
Analyzing the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act,
7
the Court of Appeals majority noted the broadly
*5
worded definitions of “garnishment”
8
and “earnings.”
9
The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the reimbursement order constituted an order that garnished earnings for the support of a person. Accordingly, it applied the sixty-percent limit set forth in 15 USC 1673(b)(2)(B).
Dissenting from the imposition of the sixty-percent limit, Judge M. Richard Knoblock would have found the federal statute inapplicable on the ground that Congress enacted the statute to protect a different class of persons.
m
As noted by Judge Knoblock, the purpose of the federal statute is set forth in 15 USC 1671:
(a) . . . The Congress finds:
(1) The unrestrictive garnishment of compensation due for personal services encourages the making of predatory *6 extensions of credit. Such extensions of credit divert money into excessive credit payments and thereby hinder the production and flow of goods in interstate commerce.
(2) The application of garnishment as a creditor’s remedy frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of employment, production, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
(3) The great disparities among the laws of the several States relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country.
(b) ... On the basis of the findings stated in subsection (a) of this section, the Congress determines that the provisions of this subchapter are necessary and proper for the purpose of canying into execution the powers of the Congress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.
The United States Supreme Court examined the federal statute in
Kokoszka v Belford,
There is every indication that Congress, in an effort to avoid the necessity of bankruptcy, sought to regulate garnishment in its usual sense as a levy on periodic payments of compensation needed to support the wage earner and his family on a week-to-week, month-to-month basis. [417 US 651 .]
It is thus apparent that the statute reflects Congress’ intention that “predatory extensions of credit” and similar commercial practices not drive debtors into bankruptcy. By limiting the amount that can be *7 garnished from a person’s earnings, Congress sought to allow a debtor the means to avoid falling further behind.
The present case, by contrast, involves a prisoner who is properly required to compensate the citizenry for the cost of incarceration. He is not the victim of a debtor-creditor relationship gone bad. Rather, he is simply paying a portion of his current living expenses.
This point was made in
State Treasurer v Schuster,
Research has produced no case in which a federal court 11 or a state court has invoked the federal statute to limit the public right to recover the current cost of providing room, board, supervision, and care to a *8 prisoner. We are satisfied that this case is governed by the state statute alone.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
Notes
Besides Mr. Gardner, the complaint also named two other defendants — the insurer that was paying the pension and the imincarcerated individual who actually was receiving the checks.
The State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act was originally enacted as
Not more than 90% of the value of the assets of the prisoner may be used for purposes of securing costs and reimbursement under this act. [MCL 800.403(3); MSA 28.1703(3).]
The circuit court later denied reconsideration.
Reh den May 8, 1997 (Court of Appeals Docket No. 167791).
The defendant died in June 1997. On his behalf, Prison Legal Services of Michigan has filed a motion to dismiss, citing
People v Peters,
The key section reads:
(a) . . . Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in [15 USC 1675], the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by [29 USC 206(a)(1)] in effect at the time the earnings are payable,
whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2).
(b) . . . (1) The restrictions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply in the case of
(A) any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or in accordance with an administrative procedure, which is established by State law, which affords substantial due process, and which is subject to judicial review.
(B) any order of any court of the United States having jurisdiction over cases under [11 USC 1301 et seq.].
(C) any debt due for any State or Federal tax.
(2) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not exceed—
(A) where such individual is supporting his spouse or dependent child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support such order is used), 50 per centum of such individual’s disposable earnings for that week; and
(B) where such individual is not supporting such a spouse or dependent child described in clause (A), 60 per centum of such individual’s disposable earnings for that week;
except that, with respect to the disposable earnings of any individual for any workweek, the 50 per centum specified in clause (A) shall be deemed to be 55 per centum and the 60 per centum specified in clause (B) shall be deemed to be 65 per centum, if and to the extent that such earnings are subject to garnishment to enforce a support order with respect to a period which is prior to the twelve-week period which ends with the beginning of such workweek.
*5 (c) . . . No court of the United States or any State, and no State (or officer or agency thereof), may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation of this section. [15 USC 1673.]
The term “garnishment” means any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt. [15 USC 1672(c).]
The term “earnings” means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program. [15 USC 1672(a).]
15 USC 1673(b)(2).
In
United States v Porter,