130 Iowa 365 | Iowa | 1906
In the year 1888 Kate L. Smith obtained title to the lot in question by devise from her father, and in January of the year 1902 conveyed the same to plain-' tiff by warranty deed; the consideration being $8,500. In August of the year 1897 Katy and Mary Dolan obtained judgment before a justice of the peace against Mrs. G. ,B. Smith for the sum of about $90. This judgment was transcripted to the district court of Harrison county. Neither this judgment nor the index thereof refers to Kate L. Smith, nor do either show that Mrs. G. B. Smith was the wife of any particular Smith, save as the name itself serves to distinguish the'individual. November 11, 1903, execution issued upon this judgment, which was levied upon the. property, and pursuant to proper notice the same was sold to the plaintiff in
The testimony shows that Kate L. Smith is the daughter of one Willard Bump, from whom she obtained title to the property, and that she is the widow of one G. B. Smith. Plaintiff’s attorney and one of its stockholders knew, when negotiating for the property, that Mrs. G. B. Smith was the wife of G. B. Smith, who was then alive, and that her correct name was Kate L. Smith. He also said that there was another G. B. Smtih in Missouri Valley at this time and another Mrs. G. B. Smith, and that he knew the judgment above referred to was against Mrs. G. B. Smith, and- presumed it was intended to be against “ Mrs. G. B. Smith here referred to.”
Counsel’s argument is based upon the proposition that as between the parties thereto the judgment never became a lien upon Kate L. Smith’s property, and that, no matter what plaintiff’s knowledge, it purchased the property free from any claim or lien of the judgment creditor. This position is fallacious. A judgment may be a lien as between the parties, although not properly indexed. Jenny v. Zehnder, 101 Pa. 296.
It is argued that the sheriff should have looked for other property belonging to the judgment defendant before levying upon the valuable property he did take. There is no
As plaintiff had actual notice of the judgment, and constructive, if not actual, notice of the sale, it should have attended the same and protected its interests. Bailing in this, it may still protect itself by redeeming from the sale, unless by its own laches it has waived or forfeited its right to do so. And, while the sheriff might in his discretion have adjourned the sale because the amount offered was grossly inadequate, there is no reason here for setting it aside for failure on the part of the sheriff to exercise his discretion. The sale was for a judgment creditor, and he was not hound to bid more than enough to satisfy his claim. And, if the rule we have announced does not apply, a judgment creditor for a small amount might not be able to collect his judgment because of inability to raise enough money to bid on the property. The cases relied upon by appellant are not in point. We shall not review them, for none seem to involve-the exact question now before us.
There is no reason for disturbing the sale, and the decree must be, and is, affirmed.