256 Md. 605 | Md. | 1970
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On 5 July 1968 the appellant (Commission) filed a petition seeking the acquisition in fee simple of 0.60 acres of land of the appellee (Laurel) in connection with the improvement of Maryland Route 197 in Prince George’s County. The Commission deposited with the clerk of the circuit court $3,810 which it believed represented “the fair value of the property to be acquired.” Since an agreement “as to the fair value of the property” could not be reached the case was referred to the Board of Property Review for a determination. On 20 March 1969 the board awarded Laurel $8,801. Attached to the award was a certification that on the same day copies thereof had been filed with the clerk of the circuit court and that “addi
The Commission submits rather odd arguments. If, it says, the award had been filed on the date of the certification, 20 March, and the copy thereof had not been received by the Commission until 7 April, it would have had but 12 days to file its notice of dissatisfaction which, it complains, is “an unfair burden.” The Commission has certainly misread the rule, the language of which is as follows:
“Within thirty days after the filing of the award of the board with the clerk of the court, any party dissatisfied therewith may file written notice of his dissatisfaction with the clerk of the court. A copy of the notice shall be served on a party pursuant to Rule 306 (Service of Pleadings and Other Papers).” (Emphasis added.)
There can be no doubt that the 30 days does not begin to-run until the award is filed with the clerk of the court. Obviously, in these circumstances, the Commission had not 12 days but at least 26 days in which to file the notice
Neither are we persuaded by the argument that the filing of the “revised notice” rescues the Commission from its plight. Not only was there no revision; the avowed and single purpose for which it was filed was to extend the 30 day period for an extra 11 days. If it is proper to do this once, it is proper to do it twice. Indeed the board, by this means, could continue indefinitely to frustrate the obvious purpose of the rule. In our judgment it does not have that power. Roselle Park Trust Co. v. Ward Baking Corp., 177 Md. 212, 221 (1939). The action of the trial judge will not be disturbed.
Affirmed with costs.