delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State Roads Commission has appealed from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court for Cecil Cоunty pursuant to an inquisition of a jury in a condemnation case. The only questions presented involve the action of the trial court in refusing to grant the appellant’s motion to strike the testimony оf one of the defendants’ witnesses.
*93 The appellant’s brief fails to set forth with clarity the manner in whiсh its contentions were presented in the lower court and reserved for determination here. A reading of both the appellant’s and appellees’ briefs and the record extract indicates that a Mr. Joesting was called as a witness by appellees and testified, at some length, concerning his estimate of the injury suffered by the appellees to the remainder of thеir property as a result of the taking of a portion thereof by the appellant. Included in his estimate was a somewhat involved item of damages for the increased flowage of wаter upon the appellees’ land because of a larger amount of impervious surfаce as a result of widening a road and the installation of an enlarged culvert conducting surfаce water onto their land. He gave, inter alia, his estimate of increased surface water flowage, the damage to particular portions of the property by reason thereof, аnd the cost of ditches to carry off the increased amount of water, both on direct and cross-examination. When partially through cross-examination, the appellant’s counsel moved “to strike the testimony of this witness concerning water damage, because it is based on conjecture and not facts.”
The appellees claim the motion was too broad to bе effective; and, even if it were not too broad, the court’s ruling thereon was harmless, because the same witness later gave the same testimony which was included in the motion to strike, without objection being made thereto. As pointed out above, the appellant, in its brief, does not attempt to argue how the ruling on its motion to strike was reserved, but, in oral argument, it contends the motion was not too broad, and that if evidence be objected to once, it is unnecessary tо repeat the objection if the testimony be reoffered. We think the appellees are clearly right in both of their contentions. The motion is obviously too broad and general in requesting the court to strike the testimony of the witness “concerning water damage,” when, at least, a portion thereof was admissible (and we so hold), even though another portion may be objectionable. Waltz
inger v. Birsner,
Judgment affirmed, with costs.