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State of West Virginia v. Ronald Goins
748 S.E.2d 813
W. Va.
2013
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*1 simply type- the will is unsigned result that second MeCausland’s second will was document with no indication of testa- written void.

mentary intent. Additionally, although necessary not to the IV. CONCLUSION ease, resolution of this we note that Court’s judgment of the Circuit Court of Ma- statutory requirement that two witnesses County, Virginia, son West is affirmed. will, presence subscribe and attest the Affirmed. presence and in the testator of each

other, Although is not met in this case. Chief Justice disqualified. BENJAMIN

signatures appear of two witnesses on the will, nothing face of the in the record indi- WILFONG, Judge by sitting temporary they signed cates document either assignment. presence of Mr. or in the McCausland presence of each other. See Brammer v.

Taylor, 175 730 n. (“the 215 n. witnesses’ acknowl- edgement signatures pres- of their ... in the (and, Virginia, ence of the testator West other) presence of each is tantamount to ‘signing’ and will be deemed a or ‘subscrib- ing’ presence persons.”); in the of those Ste- 748 S.E.2d 813 vens, 508 S.E.2d at 613 Virginia, Respondent STATE West (“In ease, parties signed this none of the or acknowledged signatures pres- their in the other.”).7 Further, ence of each noted as GOINS, Ronald Petitioner. earlier, clearly the witnesses did not witness No. 12-0256. will, affixing signature of a to the either

by by Mr. McCausland or someone at his Supreme Appeals Court of direction, signature because there was no on Virginia. West the document. Sept. Submitted 2013.

This Court cannot find substantial compliance statutory requirement with the Sept. Decided 2013. testator, signed “by by that a will be presence by

some other in his direction,” 41-1-3, Virginia West Code in a situation where there was no compliance whatsoever. To hold otherwise would re

quire us not to construe the statute but to it; do,

disregard this we cannot “[t]he as right dispose property gener will is and,

ally regarded statutory right, as a with limitations, subject constitutional it is complete Legislature.” control of the Black, 254-55, 46 S.E.2d at 808

(internal omitted). Accordingly, citation we judgment affirm the of the circuit court that (1943) (parol evidence as to the-fact affidavits of Ms. Robinson and Ms. Greer testator’s declarations of intention not admissible they state that which dates on saw Mr. will). to control the of a construction McCausland "execute" will were Decem- his last 14, 2010, respective- ber December reads, 7. The attestation clause in the second will ly than seven months after Mr. McCaus- —more entirety: previous in its "Witness to the as dictat- death. land’s by Bright following ed McCausland on the Further, April dates—10 & 11 2010.” the after- *2 Jeopardy violate the Double

Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. He also asserts that the evidence was insuffi- cient to sustain the convictions. After a briefs, careful review of the the record sub- appeal on listening mitted argu- to the *3 affirm, parties, ments of the part, we reverse, part and pro- remand for further ceedings consistent opinion. with this

I. AND

FACTUAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY wife, Mr. Goins with lived his Goins, Cynthia twenty-two in their home on Rock, acres of rural land in Virginia.2 West July On began Mr. Goins drinking got while at argument home and into an with argument his wife. The caused Mrs. Goins family to take the van and drive to her However, mother’s home. the vehicle broke down before she could reach her mother’s residence. Mrs. Goins called her husband to get come and agreed her. Mr. Goins and left the home with his father.3 Mrs. Goins was get able to the van started before her hus- band arrived. While Mrs. driving Goins was home, the van back toward her she saw Mr. Goins and stopped his father. Both vehicles intersection, got and Mr. Goins into the van with Mrs. Goins. After Mrs. Goins start- Smith, Corpora- David C. Public Defender van, driving couple began arguing. ed Princeton, tion, WV, for Petitioner. stopped Mrs. Goins the vehicle. Mr. Goins’ General; Morrisey, Attorney Patrick Ben- pulled up father behind the van and told Mr. III, jamin Yancey, Attorney F. Assistant get Goins to into his ear. Mr. Goins re- General, Charleston, WV, Respondent. they mained in his father’s car until arrived

at a local store. After Mr. Goins made a DAVIS, Justice: store, purchase got from the he back into the wife, van with couple and the drove home. appeal by This is a criminal filed Ronald (hereinafter Goins”) home, couple Goins “Mr. from an or- When arrived Mr. Goins County began der of the Circuit Court of Mercer drinking again. Mrs. Goins became convicting him of five counts of upset misdemeanor and told her husband that she was brandishing. The going circuit court sentenced to tell her mother to come over and year Mr. to five pick up. angry Goins consecutive one terms her Mr. Goins became and appeal, pulled phone of incarceration.1 this Mr. Goins cord out of the wall. Mr. eventually contends that his sentences for five counts of Goins went to bed. After Mr. originally suspended, couple 1.The sentences were and 2. The is now divorced. However, placed probation. Mr. Goins was on proba- as a result of a violation of the terms of actually 3. Mr. Goins' father him drove to meet tion, modified, Mr. Goins’ sentence was and he his wife. jail year, was sentenced to for one to be followed years probation. fours serving year jail year, that after the one took the sleep, Mrs. Goins went to Goins sentence, remaining children and left sentences would be two infant couple’s walked with the children placed Mrs. Goins would be on suspended, house. and Mr. Goins away. Thereafter, a mile neighbor about years. home of this probation to the for four home, Mrs. Goins neighbor’s at the While appeal timely filed. Tiller, brother, told Joseph her called get her.4 come and him to II. vehicle, with his wife got Tiller into his children, drove to the and their three OF STANDARD REVIEW would be Goins said she where Mrs. area the area Mr. Tiller reached waiting. After jeopardy that double Mr. Goins contends be, he told him she would where Mrs. Goins being him sen- principles prevented from *4 decided to find her. Mr. Tiller could not brandishing, tenced for five counts of hopes of Mrs. Goins’ home drive toward convict the evidence was insufficient to way. Tiller along the Mr. finding her has held that a “double him. This Court yards from vehicle about 150 stopped his Syl. reviewed de novo." jeopardy [is] claim Goins, had home. Mr. who Mrs. Goins’ Sears, pt. part, State v. 196 W.Va. awakened, sitting outside the home and was (1996). 1, Chrys- Syl. pt. 468 S.E.2d 324 See at Mr. van. Mr. Tiller stared inside his A.L., 194 W.Va. tal R.M. v. Charlie Mr. Goins minutes before Goins for several (1995) (“Where the issue on an left the the van. When Mr. Goins got out of clearly the circuit court is appeal from van, pistol in the direction of he aimed involving interpretation question of law or fired numerous times— Tillers’ vehicle and statute, of apply we a de novo standard of a landed several feet of the the bullets within review.”). respect claim of insuffi- to a With and called Mr. Tiller fled the scene vehicle. evidence, ciency we have held the follow- of police. ing: February grand jury indicted appellate when The function of an court battery, on one count of domestic Mr. Goins sufficiency evidence to reviewing the assault, and five counts one count of domestic support a criminal conviction is to examine endangerment.5 juryA trial was wanton determine evidence admitted at trial to jury acquitted in December 2011. The held evidence, believed, if is suffi- whether such endangerment the wanton Mr. Goins of a reasonable cient to convince him of five counts charges6 but found beyond guilt a reasonable the defendant’s brandishing.7 included offense of of the lesser Thus, inquiry the relevant doubt. 18, 2012, January circuit court sen- On whether, viewing the evidence in the after Goins to five consecutive terms tenced Mr. light prosecution, favorable to the most year jail but ordered the sentences be one any rational trier of fact could have found placed proba- Mr. Goins on suspended and proved of the crime the essential elements years. April On tion for five beyond a doubt. reasonable probation Mr. after de- court revoked Goins’ Guthrie, Syl. pt. 194 W.Va. controlled sub- termining that he had used a these standards 461 S.E.2d 163 With probation. while on The court or- stance presented. place we will address the issues jail confined in for one dered Mr. Goins be Bell, mother, Syl. pt. State v. her but her 7. See 4. Mrs. Goins also called (2002) ("The mother was out of town. offense of Virginia § Code 61-7-11 is a as defined West alleged the do- Mrs. Goins was the victim of 5. the definition of lesser included offense within battery charges. Mr. Tiller mestic and assault Virginia endangerment Code under West wanton family alleged victims of the and his were 61-7-12.”). charges. endangerment wanton acquitted jury Mr. of the domes- 6.The also Goins battery charge. prosecution dismissed tic charge prior to trial. the domestic assault prosecution

III. ond for the same offense after protects conviction. And it against multi- DISCUSSION ple punishments for the same offense. Court, appeal On to this Mr. Goins raises Similarly, Syllabus point 1 of Conner v. (1) assignments of error: two Griffith, 160 W.Va. 238 S.E.2d 529 sentences for a incident of following we held the regarding dou- jeopardy principles violates double jeopardy ble under the state constitution: the evidence insufficient to sustain his Jeopardy The Double Clause in Article conviction. will address each issue indi- We III, Virginia Section 5 of the West Consti vidually. tution, provides immunity from further Jeopardy A. Double Claim prosecution having jurisdic where a court argues merely Mr. Goins because acquitted tion has protects the accused. It people present five were when he fired his against prosecution a second for the same pistol not mean that inci did five offense after prohibits conviction. It also occurred.8 In other dents multiple punishments for the same off words, assuming the evidence was sufficient ense.®9 support brandishing, a conviction for (Footnote added). argues Goins that he could be sentenced for brandishing, proceeding, this one incident of not five Mr. Goins invokes the *5 i.e., third brandishing. jeopardy prohibition, double instances of Mr. Goins con multi- ple punishments jeopardy principles pre tends that double for the same offense. multiple punishments single clude for a of Green, 530, In State v. 207 W.Va. fense. (2000), 534 395 explained, this Court begin analysis by observing We our hold, analysis and we so that the of “whether Gill, Syllabus point that 1 of State v. 187 may a criminal defendant separately be con 136, (1992), W.Va. 416 S.E.2d 253 this Court punished victed and for multiple violations of following regarding jeopardy held the double single statutory provision upon turns under the federal constitution: legislatively-intended prosecution.” unit of Green, 537, Jeopardy The Double Clause of the 207 W.Va. at 534 S.E.2d at 402.10 Thus, Fifth Amendment to the United applicable penal States we must look to the separate Constitution consists of three con- legislatively-intend statute to determine the protections. protects against stitutional It prosecution brandishing. ed unit of for The prosecution a second for the same determination of the prose offense allowable unit of acquittal. protects against after It statutory a sec- cution is a task of construction. points aggregate 8. Mr. Goins also out that the evidence at intention to sentences for related trial established that two of the children in the legislative crimes. discerned, If no such clear intent can be asleep Tillers’ vehicle were when the shots were analyze then the court should the stat- fired. Blockburger utes under the test set forth in v. States, 299, 180, United 284 U.S. 52 S.Ct. 76 Leverette, 9. In Adkins v. 239 (1932), L.Ed. 306 to determine whether each which involved constitutional requires proof offense an element of the other issues, "[wjhile jeopardy double this Court stated proof does not. different, If there is an element of that is interpret it is true that a state not its consti- presumption legisla- then the is that the guarantee tutional which is identical to a federal offenses.”). separate ture intended to create level, guarantee constitutional nothing prevents below the federal terms, Blockburger analysis, by appli- its own is equaling a state court from or cable to the issue of whether "the same act Adkins, exceeding the federal standard.” 161 19-20, or transaction constitutes a of two dis- violation W.Va. at 239 S.E.2d at 499. statutory provisions.” Blockburger, tinct 284 jeopardy 10. When a claim of double involves a U.S. at 52 S.Ct. at L.Ed. 306. prosecution employ under two statutes we obviously pro- Therefore "the same-elements test Gill, Blockburger Syl. pt. test. See v. State guidance vides no where the issue concerns the ("In 416 S.E.2d 253 ascertain- prosecution allowable unit of under a stat- intent, ing legislative initially a court should look Green, .utoiy provision.” and, language at the necessary, of the involved statutes if S.E.2d at 401. legislative history to determine if legislature expression has made a clear of its the offense the inducement of statutory provi- vamen of is “[a] has held that This Court Kelsoe, unambiguous fear in another.” 308 S.E.2d at 104. is clear sion which will legislative intent in Kelsoe was the plainly expresses The determinative factor by but will be interpreted the courts a “victim” in placing not be statute’s reference to Syl. pt. court, therefore, State given full force and effect.” fear. The concluded Epperly, frightened v. “when the defendant the three (1951). Moreover, explicit [leg- by pointing weapon, “[a]bsent he committed men his unit of that ‘the allowable islative] statement which] three crimes ... [for such-and-such,’ the best prosecution shall be impose trial court was authorized to regarding the legislative intent Kelsoe, indicator of punishments[.]” S.E.2d at 104. gravamen or focus prosecution is unit of State, Similarly, Tuggle 733 P.2d 610 State, Harris S.W.3d of the offense.” (Wyo.1987), Wyoming Supreme Court of (Tex.Crim.App.2011). jeopardy brought by rejected a double claim lan- proceeding, the relevant In the instant a defendant who received consecutive sen- pro- brandishing statute guage under our aggravated tences for two counts of assault vides as follows: battery involving two victims. The de- any person It shall be unlawful drawing gun pled guilty fendant had deadly other armed with a firearm or and, upon being victim confront- on first carry the weapon, whether licensed to victim, pointed it at the ed the second not, carry, brandish or use such same or Tuggle second victim. The statute issue “ cause, way weapon in a or manner to pertinent person provided part, ‘[a] threaten, peace.[11] a breach of the aggravated battery if assault and (1994) (Repl.Vol.2010) deadly § 61-7-11 W. Va.Code he ... to use a drawn [threatens ” (footnote added). prose relevant unit of Tuggle, P.2d at weapon on another-’ requires § 61-7-11 cution under W. Va.Code 610 n. 1. The court found that the use brandish, deadly “carry, or use a referring to the victim of word “another” *6 to cause or threaten a weapon in a manner legislature’s the crime indicated that the in- Bell, 211 peace.” the State v. individual, breach of protect since tent was to each (2002).12 430, 308, 313, 435 565 S.E.2d W.Va. singu- is “a “another” as used the statute prosecution properly evaluate the unit of To time ‘another’ lar term and thus means each statute, two cases the we will examine under crime, separate a is affected said it is jurisdictions. In Kelsoe v. Com from other Tuggle, See offense.” 733 P.2d at 612. State 197, monwealth, S.E.2d 104 226 Va. 308 238, Myers, 122 v. 229 728 S.E.2d Virginia found Supreme Court of the (2012) argument (rejecting jeopardy double multiple punishments the defendant’s robbery for a affirming and three sentences brandishing weapon persons at three a victims). single three incident that involved jeopardy principles. did not violate double Tuggle The courts in Kelsoe and The statute involved in Kelsoe made it unlaw “ that, jeopardy Court for double any firearm ... instruct this point ful ‘to or brandish analysis, prosecution prohib reasonably when the unit of induce fear such a manner as to ” Kelsoe, specifically against a “victim” or 308 its conduct the mind of the victim.’ “another,” single prohibited a incident court found that of S.E.2d at 104. The Kelsoe punished conduct be as a of legislature “clearly proscribed offense present.13 In the in against gra- fense for each person,” “[t]he and that tending provoke 11.Although or excite others to break our cases refer to this statute as the statute, brandishing peace it is clear that the statute alarm. or cause consternation or Co., 548, sets out additional offenses. Ry. 81 W.Va. Marcuchi v. & W. Norfolk 7, 553, 979, (1918). Syl. pt. 94 S.E. Accord phrase peace” has a wide 12.The "breach of the 669, (1921). Long, v. 88 W.Va. 108 S.E. 279 State general meaning application and and com- prehends public peace disturbances of the vio- McGilton, 13.See State decorum; decency lative of order signifies or it (2012) (where prosecution unit of public tranquili- disquieting upon victim and there- was focused an individual inciting ty by any act to violence or or conduct however, proceeding prose- the unit of appeal stant defendant raised on was that expressly jeopardy not refer to a victim. principles precluded cution does double prosecution upon unit focuses conviction and sentence for three counts of any peace” regard spe- brandishing “breach of without only because one incident of persons brandishing cific number of affected. To the had occurred. This Court prosecution may agreed extent that the unit of be with the defendant as follows: ambiguous, lenity considered the rule of re- case, present [I]n the State’s evidence quires ambiguity that we are to resolve that only indicated one act of brandishing a Stone, in favor of the defendant. See State v. weapon. Despite presence multiple 271, 278, 229 W.Va. 728 S.E.2d witnesses, one act of brandishing should (2012) (“If prosecution the unit of is not produce a conviction for one count of indicated, clearly lenity the rule of must be brandishing. There appear did not to be (internal applied.” quotations and citation any evidence acts of brandish- omitted)). All this means is “that when the ing specific against instances of threats Legislature fails to indicate the allowable separate individuals. prosecution clarity, unit of with sentence Kendall, 639 S.E.2d at 788. legislative doubt as to intent should be re- Turner, See State v. 137W.Va. 70 S.E.2d lenity solved in favor of for the accused.” (1952) (affirming single sentence for Sears, deadly a weapon in front of sev- Sotelo, People See also victims.) F., eral See also In re Peter 360 Ill.Dec. N.E.2d (Ill.App. 52, 55, Cal.Rptr.3d 132 Cal.App.4th Ct.2012) (“Where ambiguous a statute is as (2005) (“Thus, single act can prosecution, to the allowable unit of the court only support a single conviction of a count adopt must a construction that favors the ... many no matter how people witness the (internal quotations defendant.” and citation Indeed, act. the victim of the crime of omitted)). Thus, conclude, we must and so brandishing need not even be aware the de- hold, prosecution that the focus of the unit of possesses weapon.”). fendant statute, under the W. Va.Code argues The State that Kendall is distin- (Repl.Vol.2010), 61-7-11 is not de guishable because the sentences in Kendall pendent upon present the number of victims upon were based the number of victims in deadly weapon when a is used to breach the the room. The State now contends that the Therefore, peace. incident of brand sentences in the case were not based instant ishing may punished multiple not be as of upon present the number of victims when the merely fenses because there are two or more *7 Instead, brandishing occurred. the State ar- present thereby. sup victims or affected gues “every that time [Mr. fired his Goins] port argument reaching of his this conclu pistol in the direction of the Tiller’s [sic] sion, Mr. upon Goins relies this Court’s deci vehicle a separate constituted act of brand- Kendall, sion 219 W.Va. 639 ishing, as each shot awas breach of (2006). peace, the which he could be convicted Kendall, officer, police without a war- disagree and sentenced.” We with the State rant, pistol entered a home with his drawn. First, jury for two reasons. the did not looking The officer was suspect. for a DUI brandishing upon convict Mr. Goins of based home, suspect The was not in the but three the number of shots he fired. In our review persons present.14 other police instructions, were jury of the it is clear that the subsequently officer was indicted for three jury was to instructed find Mr. Goins counts of wanton endangerment, burglary upon of based the number of is, charges. jury persons and other A present. jury convicted the That the in- was burglary defendant of and three counts of structed to determine whether Mr. Goins brandishing, as the lesser included weapon offenses presence brandished a the of each endangerment. Second, of wanton One of the jury issues of the victims. even if the was multiple punishment home, fore person for a transaction 14. A fourth inwas but he was jeopardy principles). asleep. did not violate double

624 LaRock, 294, 304, v. 470 S.E.2d convict Mr. Goins of that it could instructed fired, upon “Finally, jury each shot he verdict brandishing based only would be erroneous. instruction aside when the record such an should be set evidence, stat Nothing regardless in the text of our contains no of how it is upon suggests it is violated based ute weighed, jury guilt could find from which weapon.15 of shots fired from a Guthrie, the number beyond a reasonable doubt.” interpretation accept the State’s of To 669-70, 461 S.E.2d at 175-76. W.Va. if a fired a would mean that statute during the trial. He Mr. Goins testified presence weapon three times shooting getting admitted out of his van and brandishing offenses oc person, three one However, pistol. Mr. Goins testified interpretation of This is an absurd curred. anyone present at the he did not know was Napier v. Board statute. See of Educ. of began shooting. time he Mr. Goins’ version Mingo, Cnty. W.Va. testimony of events was contradicted (2003) (“It duty ... wife. Mr. Tiller testi- of Mr. Tiller and his disregard a construction ... of the a court to fied as follows: statute, in a when such construction words Q. Okay. point you And at what did injustice absurdity.” (quot lead to would you looking realize that were at Ronald Click, Syl. pt. part, Click v. ing W.Va. Goins? (1925))). 419, 127 S.E. 194 got A. he out of the van and When upon foregoing, we find that the Based turned to where I could see-could see that sentencing Mr. committed error in trial court it was him. brandishing, for five counts of when Goins was, Q. Okay. From where he could he peace only single incident of breach of you? Stone, see established. See State was (finding 728 S.E.2d A. Yes. jeopardy prohibited multiple sen- double people killed in an tences for the number Q. you please indicate to the Could auto accident where the defendant failed wife, your your jury you, shot at who scene); State ex rel. stop and remain at the day? children that Recht, Porter A. Ronald Goins. (2002) (holding prosecution that unit of swearing did not for the offense of false in an affi-

include each false statement found you Q. Okay. How close were able to davit). coming you? hear the bullets Sufficiency B. of the Evidence me, they they like A. To sounded 15-10,15 of me. foot Goins next contends that the evi dence in this case was insufficient to sustain a conviction under the statute. Q. you you when How did it make feel that “a criminal This Court has observed you you calm? heard this? Were Were sufficiency challenging defendant afraid? *8 support evidence to a conviction takes on a It me. After about the A. terrified Guthrie, heavy burden.” State v. they put I or fifth shot were so close fourth 657, 669, “Thus, 461 S.E.2d my gear sped That’s when car in and out. a suf

when a criminal defendant undertakes my I went and I called mom. evidence, ficiency challenge, all the direct jury provided Tiller the with the follow- Mrs. circumstantial, from the must be viewed testimony: ing prosecutor’s coign vantage, and the viewer that, you Q. Okay. looking it In at did see accept must reasonable inferences from all day? anything that that are the verdict.” State consistent with fact, brandishing re- viction. 15. statute does not quire weapon discharged to sustain a con- a be charge. Williams, [Goins] A. I seen Ronald the drivers on that See State v. van, (1983) side of the looked like he was [sic] trying key (“When to beat switch out of it. there is no error in a criminal ease

other than judgment imposing sentence, judgment should be reversed and re- Q. Sure. entry proper manded for of a sentence van, gets A. He out of the and he looks court.”). trial right up parked, there to where we’re walking he starts towards the front of the Affirmed, Reversed, part; part; van. He raises his arm and starts shoot- Remanded. ing. they’re hitting It sounds like

guardrail.

Justices WORKMAN and LOUGHRY concur and right reserve the to file Q. you How did that make feel? Were concurring opinions. calm, afraid, you or— No, I trying A. was terrified. I was LOUGHRY, Justice, concurring: get him [Mr. Tiller] to leave. I agree majority’s with the conclusion finding guilty Mr. violating Goins W. petitioner’s multiple that convictions of 61-7-11, § it Va.Code is obvious that brandishing may upheld not be on the basis

jury rejected Mr. Goins’assertion that he did present number of victims when he anyone repeatedly not see when he fired his Moreover, discharged weapon. I agree pistol in the direction of the Tillers’ vehicle. operable that prosecution” “unit of un- jury’s The decision to believe the Tillers’ Virginia § der West facts, Goins, Code 61-7-11 version of the over that of Mr. a peace” “breach of the credibility occasioned when involved determinations. have We “carr[ies], emphasized brandish[es], “[c]redibility defendant determinations or use[s]” jury appellate are for a and not an deadly weapon. court.” firearm or other And Guthrie, at S.E.2d at 175. I while do not believe that the evidence Therefore, we conclude the record clear- petitioner’s adduced trial was suffi- ly presented shows that the State sufficient justify cient multiple convictions of jury evidence for a to find Mr. Goins of brandishing, disagree strongly I with the violating § beyond Va.Code W. 61-7-11 conclusion, dicta, majority’s albeit that mul- reasonable doubt. tiple violations of the statute

cannot occur when a defendant fires multi- ple IV. majority shots from a firearm. The dis- missively position characterizes this as “ab- CONCLUSION surd,” analysis without so much as a hint of above, For the reasons set out this Court supporting case law. finds that imposed upon the five sentences majority proper analysis undertakes a Goins for the offense of prior gives of our eases which direction as to § under W. Va.Code 61-7-11 violate double determining prosecution” the “unit of and,

jeopardy principles, accordingly, we re- concludes, Jeopardy Double purposes and judgment verse the of the Circuit Court of properly, that the number of victims is irrele- County However, ground. Mercer on that vant to the number of offenses which be we find that there was sufficient evidence to charged under the support statute —a Mr. Goins’ conviction for a 61-7-11, and, already conclusion this count of Court had reached in W. Va.Code there- *9 fore, Kendall, 686, regard we affirm in v. this and remand State 639 S.E.2d (2006).1 this case resentencing to the trial court for doing, gives In so it short shrift recently 1. This Court multiple reached a similar conclu- the scene of an accident where there are Stone, charged sion only 728 S.E.2d can be victims for one violation of (2012), Stone, holding § that a defendant who leaves W. Va.Code 17C-4-1. In the Court argument rewarding that a defendant who chooses to com- compelling more to the State’s acts, upheld “limit[ing] be petitioner’s conviction should mit additional rather than fired and merely number of shots activity” “encourages on the basis of the or her criminal remarkably thereby a similar case activity.” Rejecting overlooks a additional criminal Id. by which recently Justice Workman authored argument multiple in the context of similar analy- thorough and well-reasoned presents assaults, a Appeals of Vir- sexual the Court of precisely this issue. sis of ginia found that a defendant should not be rape” rape permitted a “free where each McGilton, 229 W.Va. State divisible!,]” “readily and the defendant sim- defendant stabbed his ply repeat to his crime on the same “cho[se] during argument times wife numerous period time.” Carter victim within a short of home, resulting in his conviction of their Commonwealth, Va.App. ap- assault. On multiple counts of malicious end, S.E.2d that same we To that conviction of peal, McGilton asserted concluded McGilton that: malicious assault for three three counts of during inflicted the same course stab wounds reading [mali- it is not a reasonable of this Jeopardy. violated Double of conduct cious statute to conclude that a assault] issue, quickly the Court iso- addressing this perpetrator only charged can be with one necessary analysis highlighted the lated and simply he or she malicious assault because determining multiple, if discrete acts that managed multiple a victim to stab times may during period a short of time occur very or not quickly regardless of whether — multiple sustain convictions: the elements of the crime were committed have this Court make He would distinctly, contemporane- [McGilton] separately, and ruling that as a matter of law an ironclad ously stabbing. with each multiple anytime a is stabbed 566, 729 at 888. We times, person, the same within short therefore held that time, perpetrator of the period of that the multiple defendant be convicted of [a] only be of one malicious crime can under offenses of malicious assault West Moreover, petitioner asks this assault. 61-2-9(a) (2004) against Virginia Code regardless to make such a conclusion Court victim when the offenses the same even crime specific circumstances of of part of conduct. were a of the same course perpetrator irrespective whether a violate the double Such convictions do not actually requisite intent each formed jeopardy provisions contained in either the every he or she committed time United States Constitution or the West separate a victim. malicious assault of long Virginia Constitution as as the facts (emphasis add- Id. at 729 S.E.2d at 883 separate distinct viola- demonstrate ed). prior decisions dem- We noted that our the statute. tions of appro- “multiple that convictions onstrate are added). Syl. (emphasis Pt. id. priate performs where a defendant provides Our statute that support “[i]t acts that would violations of different any person armed with 729 S.E.2d at shall be unlawful for the same statute.” Id. at added). (emphasis unavailing deadly weapon, found a firearm or whether We other not, carry, systemat- cany or perpetrator the notion that a could licensed to the same way weapon or in a or ically disfigure maim a victim with succes- brandish use such or cause, threaten, forming requisite manner to a breach sive actions “each time intent,” peace.” (emphasis § 61-7-11 yet charge than one W. Va.Code elude more added). Like our malicious assault statute malicious assault. Id. at 729 S.E.2d McGilton, language similarly addressed in there is no 888. Other courts have found language in accord particular of the statute Court further found such construction focused on the Stone, "any person requires render aid majority jurisdictions. which injured one to with a of other Id. accident,” concluding "any” however, [an] whether did not address the issue of Legislative prosecute intent to successive, connoted discrete violations of the statute regardless one of the statute violation support multiple would convictions. at 162. The victims. Id. at

627 (D.C.1991) brandishing pre- (holding in our statute that would that as to separate three dwelling, shots into a charge brandishing each shot clude a second when a constituted a offense); separate People Harris, actually brandishing occurs within a second 114, 957, 447, Ill.2d 230 Ill.Dec. 695 N.E.2d time, period complete requi- short with the (1998) (finding as to two consecutive See, separately e.g., site formed intent. Ken- shots into a vehicle each shot constituted a dall, 696, 219 W.Va. at 639 S.E.2d at 788. act”); physical Morrow, “discrete State v. (“There appear any did not to be evidence of 387, 888 S.W.2d 392-93 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) multiple specific acts in- (“The proscribed complete conduct is on one against separate stances of threats individu- shot, subsequent shot. A whether moments added)). (emphasis als.” Both the conduct— later, or a substantial amount of time creates carry, “to brandish or use” a firearm or danger the same which the statute in deadly weapon the result of the con- —and prevent.”).2 tended to peace phrased duct —a breach of the —are said, however, That agree, I under the terms, singular evidencing legislative “a in- presented case, evidence underlying punish tent to each violation of the statute that such Quite a conviction cannot stand. McGilton, 566, separately.” simply, the did proof beyond State not offer Certainly, firing 729 S.E.2d at 888. of a petitioner reasonable doubt that the breach- may shot constitute an unlawful “use” peace ed the separate shots, with five each of a which firearm results a breach of the forming time requisite required intent peace. quite simply why There is no reason Moreover, under the statute. additional complete shots —all of which are instructions, neither the jury indictment nor singular and discrete acts which likewise phrased which were all in terms of individual separate cause and distinct breaches of the victims, permits this Court to conclude other- peace not constitute additional viola- —should wise. It dangerously is a overreaching con- jury tions of the statute where a finds a clusion, however, to insist that because the separately formed intent. evidence adduced particular below in this convictions, multiple case did not sustain question, Without the notion that support statute would not such convic- may from a complete shots firearm constitute adduced; satisfactory tions were evidence widely recognized, distinct offenses is to certainly, McGilton instructs otherwise. Re- requisite the extent intent was gardless, precisely it is this conclusion that each time. As articulated in Ste formed reaches, majority summarily without un- Commonwealth, phens 141, Va.App. dertaking the prosecution” same “unit of firing S.E.2d act “[e]aeh analysis to which it dedicates the remainder weapon separate, constituted a distinct opinion of its to form the partial basis of its act, notwithstanding closely how the second reversal. shot followed the required first. Each shot Notwithstanding foregoing and for the pull conscious decision the trigger.” [] herein, respectfully reasons stated I concur Rambert, See also State v. 341 N.C. in the majority’s holding and decision to re- (1995)(“[Djefendant’s actions verse four counts of and remand and, therefore, separate were three distinct resentencing. I am authorized to state required events. Each shot ... that defen joins that Justice Workman in this concur- employ thought processes dant each time rence. Miranda, weapon.”); he fired the (Ariz.Ct. 198 Ariz. 10 P.3d

App.2000) (holding that three successive supported convictions); separate

shots three States, Gray v. United 585 A.2d " States, Blockburger 2. See also concept: impulse v. United single, U.S. '[W]hen is but one lies, 52 S.Ct. long 76 L.Ed. 306 Al- indictment no matter how the action McGilton, though, explained as the Blockber- impulses sepa- continue. If successive are ger analysis inapplicable multiple rately given, though swelling convic- even all unite statute, action, Blockburger tions under the same 'common stream of indictments ” Court nevertheless reiterated the above-described lie.’ Id. at 52 S.Ct. at 181.

Case Details

Case Name: State of West Virginia v. Ronald Goins
Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 12, 2013
Citation: 748 S.E.2d 813
Docket Number: 12-0256
Court Abbreviation: W. Va.
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