STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CASE NO. C25-0127-JCC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
February 6, 2025
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR
ORDER
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiff States’ motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 63) and the Individual Plaintiffs’ supplemental motion for the same (Dkt. No. 74). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, and having heard the parties’ oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS the motions for preliminary injunction (Dkt. Nos. 63, 74) for the reasons explained herein.1
On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order (“Order“) entitled “Protecting the Meaning and Valuе of American Citizenship.” (Dkt. No. 12-1.) In it, the President stated that “the privilege of United States citizenship does not automatically extend to persons born in the United States.” (Id. at 3.) Instead, the President explained that birthright citizenship does not apply to two categories of newborns depending on the status of their parents: (1) those born to a mother who is “unlawfully present” in the United States and whose father is not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident (“LPR“) at the time of birth, and (2) those born to a mother whose presence in the United States is “lawful but temporary” and whose father is not a United States citizen or LPR at the time of birth. (Id.) The Order then declares it the policy of the United States not to “issue documents recognizing citizenship, or accept documents issued by State, local, or other governments or authorities purporting to recognize United States citizenship” to the aforementioned categories of persons. (Id.) This policy is effective February 19, 2025. (See id. at 4.) Nevertheless, the Order further directs the “heads of all executive departments and agencies” to “issue public guidance within 30 days of the date of this order regarding this order‘s implementation with respect to their operations and activities.” (Id.)
On January 21, 2025, the states of Washington, Arizona, Illinois, and Oregon (“Plaintiff States“) filed a complaint against the Government seeking declaratory and injunctive reliеf. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) In it, they argued that the Order violates the Citizenship Clause of the
II. DISCUSSION
A. Threshold Matters
Before reaching the criteria for a preliminary injunction, the Government raises two threshold challenges. First, the Government argues that the Plaintiff States’ lack standing to bring this lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 84 at 20-26.) Second, the Government contends that both sets of Plaintiffs have failed to assert valid causes of action. (Id. at 28-30.) The Court takes each challenge in turn.
1. Standing
Though the Court has already concluded that the Plaintiff States have standing, (see Dkt. No. 43 at 2), it reaffirms that conclusion here. To establish Article III
Here, the Order subjects the Plaintiff States to direct and immediate economic and administrative harms. (Dkt. No. 63 at 12.) That is, the Order would force the Plaintiff States to disqualify many individuals it currently deems citizens, and such disqualification would result in the States’ significant loss of federal funds for which they are otherwise eligible. (See id. at 13.) It would also impose “significant operational disruptions and administrative burdens within state agencies and state-run-healthcare facilities as they try to navigate the chaos and uncertainty the [Order] creates.” (Id. at 14; see also Dkt. Nos. 14 at 12; 15 at 9; 25 at 5; 26 at 4, 6) (documenting burdens on state agencies). This is more than sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. See Biden v. Nebraska, --- U.S. ---, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2365-66 (2023) (Missouri had standing to sue the federal government where federal action cancelling student loans would cost Missouri millions “in fees that it otherwise would have earned under its contract with the Department of Education“); see also City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 944 F.3d 773, 787-88 (9th Cir. 2019) (states had standing to challеnge federal government where federal action would have encouraged aliens to disenroll from public benefits, which would have resulted in a reduction in Medicaid reimbursement payments to the States of about $1.01 billion and increased administrative costs).3
2. Cause of Action
The Government argues that the Plaintiffs lack a valid cause of action. (Dkt. No. 84 at 26-30.) But the Plaintiffs maintain a valid cause of action by nature of the equitable relief they seek in response to the statutory and constitutional violations they allege. Federal courts are courts of equity that are tasked with upholding the rule of law. Cf. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326 (2015). Indeed, “[t]he ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.” Id. at 327. “[I]n a proper case, relief may be given in a сourt of equity ... to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.” Id. (quoting Carrol v. Safford, 3 How. 441, 463 (1845)). As such, a party may seek to enjoin acts of a public officer that run counter to statute. See Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 696 (9th Cir. 2019). Similarly, because a public officer‘s unconstitutional acts are particularly injurious, a court may provide equitable relief under that principle alone. See id. at 694. Different standards apply to suits for damages, of course. See DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 292 (2024). But the Plaintiffs here do not
B. Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and is never available as a matter of right. Winter v. Nat‘l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008). Therefore, the burden is on the moving party to establish that (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) irreparable harm is likely to occur absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in the movant‘s fаvor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. Moreover, in the Ninth Circuit, a preliminary injunction may be appropriate where the moving party establishes “`serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff ... so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable harm and that the injunction is in the public interest.” All for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
1. Success on the Merits
The Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Order violаtes the Citizenship Clause of the
The Government, for its part, rеlies on the provision of the Citizenship Clause that conditions citizenship upon being “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. (Dkt. No. 84 at 31-36.) That is, the Government argues that “children born in the United States of illegal aliens or temporary visitors” are not “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and therefore cannot be considered birthright citizens. (Id. at 31.) Its logic proceeds as follows. First, the Government contends that a person is “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States if that person is born “`in the allegiance and under the protection of the country.‘” (Id. at 33) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898)). It then explains that such allegiance and protection exist for a person “only if [they] are not subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign power, and the `nation’ has `consent[ed]’ to [that person] becoming part of its own `jurisdiction.‘” (Id.) (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1884)). The Government further explains that a person owes “allegiance” to the country in which they аre “domiciled,” and because a child‘s domicile “`follow[s] the independent domicile of [their] parent,‘” so, too, must a child‘s “allegiance.” (Id. at 37) (quoting cases). In turn, the Government reasons that because
In interpreting the text of the Constitution, courts are “guided by the principle that `[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.‘” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). Here, the Government interprets the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction” beyond its normаl and ordinary meaning. For one, the Government insinuates that “subject to the jurisdiction” conditions citizenship upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (See Dkt. No. 84 at 33) (stating that allegiance exists only if a person is not subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign power). But the text of the phrase requires no such exclusivity; it requires only that the person born in the United States be subject to it. See Michael D. Ramsey, Originalism and Birthright Citizenship, 109 Geo. L.J. 405, 446 (2020).
The Government also contends that whether a person born in the territorial United States is “subject to its jurisdiction” ultimately turns on the legal status of the person‘s parents and their allegiance to and domicile in this country. But the words “allegiance” and “domicile” do not appear in the Citizenship Clause, or anywhere in the
The Government‘s interpretation also cоntravenes longstanding precedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the seminal case Wong Kim Ark. See generally 169 U.S. at 649-705. There, the Supreme Court concluded that a child born in California to Chinese nationals, nevertheless acquired United States citizenship at birth under the
in the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” the Suрreme Court explicitly clarified that “aliens” were “exempt” from the qualifications because:
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, . . . , it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe tempоrary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.
Id. at 685-86. In other words, “aliens” and other individuals who avail themselves of this country for non-diplomatic purposes—whether lawfully or not—are necessarily “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. So, too, are children born of said “aliens” on United States territory. To construe the phrase otherwise would be “dangerous to society” and delegitimize this сountry‘s jurisdiction over the persons who inhabit it. See id. (citing The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 136). And thus, according to the Court in Wong Kim Ark, so long as a child is born in the territorial United States and does not fall under one of the narrowly tailored exceptions covered by the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” that child receives citizenship by birth under the
To the Government‘s credit, allegiance has at least some importance to citizenship. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged
Finally, this Court briefly considers the Government‘s argument regarding consent. The Government intimates that the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” requires that the United States “consent” to a person becoming subject to its jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 84 at 33.) That is, “`[n]o one can become a citizen of a nation without its consent.‘” (Id. at 16) (quoting Elk, 112 U.S. at 102). And because the United States has not “consented” to the entry of undocumented immigrants, it must follow that the United States has not “consented to making citizens of that person‘s children.” (Id.) Once again, the Government seems most preoccupied with the legal status of the parents—so much so that it conflates the position of the child with that of their parents. The fact of the matter is that the United States has consented to the citizenship of children born on its territory, through the ratification of the
Ultimately, the Government‘s position is unavailing and untenable. It does not have the text or precedent to support its interpretation of the Citizenship Clause. And it rehashes losing arguments from over a century ago. See, e.g., Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705-32 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, subsequent precedents have affirmed the exceptionally American grant of citizenship as birthright. See also Regan v. King, 49 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1942), aff‘d, 134 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 753 (1943); see also Gee v. United States, 49 F. 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1892). We need not till thе same ground more than a century later.
The Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.
2. Irreparable Harm
The Plaintiff States have also shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable economic harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Economic harm “is irreparable here because the states will not be able to recover money damages.” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 581 (9th Cir. 2018). The Order will directly impact the Plaintiff States, immediately increasing unrecoverable costs for providing essential medical carе and social services to the States’ residents and creating substantial administrative costs for state agencies that are forced to comply with the Order. (See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 14 at 12; 15 at 9; 25 at 5; 26 at 4, 6) (cf. Ledbetter v. Baldwin, 479 U.S. 1309, 1310 (1986) (“the State will suffer irreparable harm . . . [and] will bear the administrative costs of changing its system to comply with the District Court‘s order“)).
Likewise, the Individual Plaintiffs have made the requisite showing of irreparable harm. “An alleged constitutional infringement will often alone constitute irreparable harm.” Goldie‘s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2948
Therefore, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm.
3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
Finally, the Court finds that the balance of equities and the public interest strongly weigh in favor of entering a preliminary injunction. These two factors merge when the federal government is a party. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). First, constitutional violations weigh heavily in favor of an injunction. Betschart v. Oregon, 103 F.4th 607, 625 (9th Cir. 2024). Second, the Government has no legitimate interest in enforcing an Order that is likely unconstitutional and beyond its authority. See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Third, the rule of law is secured by a strong public interest that the laws “enacted by their representatives arе not imperiled by executive fiat.” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 9 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
The balance of equities and the public interest both support the relief sought.
C. Scope of Injunction
The Plaintiff States ask the Court to enjoin the Order‘s implementation and enforcement on a nationwide basis.9 (See Dkt. No. 63 at 29.) They contend anything less cannot provide complete relief, given the Order‘s “extraordinary nature,” its resulting financial burdens, and the likely “operational chaos” the Order will trigger. (Dkt. Nos. 63 at 29, 105 at 23.) It is axiomatic that injunctive relief must be narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, this “is `dependent as much on the equities . . . as the substance of the legal issues,’ and courts must tailor the scope `to meet th[ose] exigencies.‘” Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Azar, 911 F.3d at 584).
The extreme nature of the equities, see supra Part II.B.3., alone warrants nationwide relief. Moreover, the Court cannot ignore the Supreme Court‘s discussion regarding President Biden‘s student loan debt program, as implemented by the Secretary of Education, where according to the Court, the Executive branch “arrogat[ed] to itself power belonging to another [branch].” Biden, 143 S. Ct. at 2373. Given the nature of that harm and the scope of that conduct, nationwide relief was warranted. See id. at 2376 (reversing the District Court‘s refusal to issue a nationwide preliminary injunction). The Court fails to see a distinction with the actions at issue here.
In addition, as the Plaintiff States note, a geographically limited injunction would be ineffective, as it would not completely relievе them of the Order‘s financial burden(s). (See Dkt. No. 63 at 29.) For example, babies born in other states would travel to the Plaintiff States. Once they do, those persons would be eligible for services
For all these reasons, the Court finds that relief must be nationwide. Anything less is ineffectual.
III. CONCLUSION
Citizenship by birth is an unequivocal Constitutional right. It is one of the precious principles that makes the United States the great nation that it is. The President cannot change, limit, or qualify this Constitutional right via an executive order. The Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs’ motions for a nationwide preliminary injunction (Dkt. Nos. 63, 74) and ENJOINS enforcement or implementation of the Order on a nationwide basis.
DATED this 6th day of February 2025.
John C. Coughenour
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE