State of Washington v. Joseph Raymond Sallinger

Sep 1, 2026

40701-2

MURPHY, J. — Joseph Sallinger appeals the trial court‘s order revoking his special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) and imposing the suspended sentence with all previously ordered conditions. He contends the revocation rested on violations of unconstitutional internet and social media restrictions. The challenged restrictions were not imposed by the trial court. Rather, they were imposed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) and Sallinger‘s treatment provider. Sallinger did not appeal from his judgment and sentence. He did not pursue administrative review available under RCW 9.94A.704 to challenge his social media agreement with the DOC. He did not challenge the treatment provider‘s rules restricting internet and social media use, nor did he challenge the termination decision by the treatment provider before or at the revocation hearing.

In this appeal, Sallinger attempts to bootstrap his unpreserved claims about internet and social media restrictions into an argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his SSOSA. Sallinger stipulated in writing to his termination from the required sex offender treatment, the central violation that formed the basis for the SSOSA revocation. We affirm the revocation.

Sallinger also contends that the record does not support the imposition of a geographic boundary restriction. We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

Sallinger pleaded guilty to two counts of child molestation in the second degree and one count of assault in the third degree. On February 6, 2023, the trial court imposed a SSOSA under RCW 9.94A.670: 48 months for each child molestation conviction and 12 months for the assault conviction, all concurrent, with all but 12 months suspended. Among other conditions, the judgment and sentence required Sallinger obtain a psychosexual evaluation and comply with all recommended treatment, register as a sex offender, submit to polygraph testing as required by his community custody officer (CCO) or therapist, remain within geographic boundaries as set forth in writing by his CCO, and abide by any other condition imposed by the court, the DOC, or his CCO. The sentencing court did not impose any internet or social media restrictions. Sallinger did not timely appeal from the judgment and sentence.

Sallinger started the community custody portion of his sentence on his release from confinement. He enrolled in sexual deviancy treatment and signed a sex offender treatment contract. Among other conditions required by his treatment provider, Sallinger acknowledged that he was “prohibited from downloading any social media and/or unauthorized internet account to include: TikTok, Facebook, YouTube, Myspace, Tumbler, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram, Xbox, WhatsApp, chatrooms, and all other virtual messenger apps/websites, without permission.” Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 71. Also required by the treatment provider, Sallinger agreed that all electronic devices permitted for use by his CCO would “be monitored by accountability software designed to filter all internet searches on computers.” CP at 72. Sallinger was informed that the monitoring results were “subject to scrutiny by [his] CCO and will demonstrate fidelity to treatment and legal initiatives.” CP at 72. Essentially, it will “reflect [his] level of honesty.” CP at 72.

With the DOC, Sallinger signed a “social media and electronic device monitoring agreement.” CP at 103 (capitalization omitted). Among other provisions, Sallinger agreed he was prohibited from using or accessing any electronic, communication device, or service not specifically approved of by the DOC. He agreed he would not use or own any device that allowed internet access other than those devices authorized by the DOC. Further, he agreed he would not “view, subscribe to, download, or transmit any sexually explicit material in any medium.” CP at 104. Sallinger agreed he would not prevent the recording, nor would he destroy any recording monitoring his use of any electronic device without approval from the DOC.

Sallinger violated several DOC requirements. DOC filed a notice of violations and stipulated agreement with the trial court. In writing, Sallinger admitted that he

willingly violated the requirements of the Court or Department of Corrections by committing the following violations:

1. Failing to comply with sex offender treatment contract by accessing social media, TikTok.com on or about 12/4/23.
2. Failing to comply with sex offender treatment contract by accessing social media, X/twitter.com on or about 12/5/23.
3. Failing to comply with sex offender treatment contract by deleting web browsing history from his cell phone on or about 12/20/23.

CP at 69. For the violation, the DOC and Sallinger agreed he would complete a “thinking report” that he would submit to his sex offender treatment provider and CCO. CP at 69. He signed that he understood that if the trial court was not satisfied with the sanction, then the court “may schedule a hearing and impose sanctions.” CP at 69.

At the end of January 2024, the DOC submitted a special report to the court on the status of Sallinger‘s community custody supervision. The report documented that Sallinger was deceptive in his answers during a polygraph in early December that led to further inquiry. A search of Sallinger‘s cell phone showed he accessed social media and YouTube to view “Sexy Goddess Alexa Bliss takes off shirt,” as well as Pornhub.com to view “Attention– only for people with strong psyche-Extreme inflation Outdoors.” CP at 73. Another search of his cell phone at the end of December showed he had again accessed Pornhub.com. Sallinger‘s treatment provider expressly told Sallinger that any further violation would result in immediate termination from the treatment program and referral back to court.

In July 2024, the DOC filed a second notice of violations and stipulated agreement with the trial court. Sallinger admitted he

willingly violated the requirements of the Court or Department of Corrections by committing the following violations:

1. Failing to comply with the DOC Social Medial and Electronic Device Monitoring agreement by using an internet capable LG cell phone without a monitoring program on more than 2 occasions on or about 7/10/24.
2. Failing to comply with the DOC Social Medical and Electronic Device Monitoring Agreement by using an internet capable chrome book laptop without a monitoring program on more the 5 occasions since on or about 6/12/24.

CP at 108. The DOC required Sallinger to complete work crew hours and a “thinking report” that he would provide to his sex offender treatment provider and CCO. CP at 108.

Before Sallinger started these sanctions, the DOC submitted a third notice of violation to the prosecutor and recommended SSOSA revocation after learning Sallinger was terminated from treatment. The notice included Sallinger‘s CCO‘s documentation that he received a report of termination as of July 26, 2024, from Sallinger‘s sex offender treatment counselor, stating Sallinger was terminated from the program “due to lack of trust and ongoing pattern of deception.” CP at 124. The counselor stated, “‘Despite multiple chances being given to [Sallinger to] amend his ways, he continues to present himself dishonestly.‘” CP at 124 (quoting CP at 127). Sallinger‘s CCO noted that Sallinger‘s “overall progress on supervision has been poor” and “whenever he commits a violation, he tends to make excuses, blame others, and minimize his own mistakes.” CP at 124. The CCO concluded, “It is obvious that Mr. Sallinger has not considered supervision seriously and shows absolutely no interest in complying with conditions of supervision.” CP at 125.

The State moved to revoke Sallinger‘s SSOSA. The revocation hearing proceeded on September 4, 2024. The State filed an order of violation, arguing Sallinger “stipulates to the violations alleged in the State‘s motion to revoke SSOSA filed on July 31, 2024. Namely, that he violated his SSOSA conditions by being terminated from sex offender treatment due to noncompliance.” CP at 149.

After hearing from the prosecutor, counsel for Sallinger, the mother of the child Sallinger molested, and Sallinger, the trial court stated that receiving a SSOSA was a “privilege.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Sep. 4, 2024) at 56. The court noted that in Sallinger‘s own words from a written statement he submitted as a sanction to an earlier violation, Sallinger said he understood what “a big deal” the SSOSA was and “the importance of following the rules and completing treatment.” VRP (Sep. 4, 2024) at 58. In the approximate 10 months Sallinger had been working with his treatment provider, his provider reported Sallinger had been “dishonest,” engaged in “dishonest behaviors,” and was assessed to be at high risk “due to blatant disregard for rules[] and an ongoing pattern of deception.” VRP (Sep. 4, 2024) at 59. Because of this, Sallinger was “no longer eligible to continue because of [a] lack of trust, and also the increase in risk to community.” VRP (Sep. 4, 2024) at 60. The court revoked Sallinger‘s SSOSA.

In the written order revoking the SSOSA and imposing the suspended sentence, the court stated that it “finds that the evidence presented has established that [Sallinger] committed the violations as outlined in the State‘s Petition; however, the court is reasonably satisfied that revocation is appropriate for any one of these violations.” CP at 144.

The trial court imposed “all other conditions that were imposed at the time of [his] felony Judgment and Sentence as part of this, as well, including registration requirements, treatment requirements, and all of the Appendix H requirements, as well.” VRP (Sep. 4, 2024) at 64.

Sallinger appeals.

ANALYSIS

1. Preservation of issue on appeal

We review a trial court‘s revocation of a SSOSA for abuse of discretion. State v. Ramirez, 140 Wn. App. 278, 290, 165 P.3d 61 (2007). A court abuses its discretion when its “‘decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.‘” State v. Gunderson, 181 Wn.2d 916, 922, 337 P.3d 1090 (2014) (quoting State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 572, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). Issues not raised in the trial court are generally not considered on appeal unless they constitute manifest constitutional error causing actual prejudice. RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 934-35, 155 P.3d 125 (2007).

Sallinger does not contest that he violated the conditions of his SSOSA. In fact, he stipulated in writing that he violated his SSOSA because he was terminated from treatment. Sallinger instead argues that the trial court improperly revoked his SSOSA because the predicate violation was premised on a violation of an unconstitutional restriction of his First Amendment right under the United States Constitution. He argues that the internet restriction is unconstitutionally vague because “an ordinary person cannot determine the proscribed conduct.” Appellant‘s Opening Br. at 20-21 (emphasis omitted). Further, he argues the conditions are not crime related because his conviction did not involve the internet or social media. Sallinger concludes that this court must order a new revocation hearing because the record does not reveal if the trial court, the State, or the DOC would have moved forward without the unconstitutional conditions.

Conditions and rules of a SSOSA come from three distinct sources. Each carry its own procedural mechanisms for challenge. Under RCW 9.94A.703 and RCW 9.94A.670, court-imposed conditions may be challenged at sentencing by a motion to amend the judgment and sentence or on direct appeal. Under RCW 9.94A.704, DOC-imposed conditions are subject to the DOC‘s internal administrative review and grievance processes before a defendant may seek judicial relief. Treatment provider requirements are part of the court-ordered treatment program. A defendant may raise an issue with a rule or requirement directly with the provider, request a change of provider through the DOC, motion to the court, or present evidence at a revocation hearing that the termination itself was arbitrary or unfounded.

Here, the trial court did not impose social media or internet restrictions on Sallinger as part of the SSOSA. Such restrictions originated with the DOC and with Sallinger‘s treatment provider. Sallinger signed both the DOC monitoring agreement and the treatment provider‘s contract without objection. He did not file a DOC grievance or request administrative review of the social media or device monitoring rule, nor did he ask the CCO or the court to modify those conditions. Similarly, he did not directly raise an issue about the rules his treatment provider set, nor did he request a change of treatment provider before termination with the DOC or the court. He sought a different treatment provider only after the treatment provider terminated him from the program. At the time of the revocation hearing, Sallinger stipulated that termination occurred; he offered no argument or evidence that the underlying treatment rules were vague or unfair or that the provider‘s termination decision was arbitrary.

Because Sallinger failed to use any of the distinct procedural avenues to challenge the court‘s conditions, the DOC‘s conditions, or the rules of the treatment provider, he did not preserve his claim that the SSOSA revocation was based on unconstitutional, vague, or unfair restrictions. The trial court was entitled to accept his stipulation at the revocation hearing and, therefore, was entitled to accept his termination from treatment at face value. Sallinger cannot bootstrap these unpreserved challenges into an argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his SSOSA.

2. Revocation of the SSOSA

The trial court‘s decision to revoke the SSOSA is supported by independent preserved grounds. Sallinger stipulated in writing that he was terminated from treatment. Termination from a court-ordered sex offender treatment program is a direct violation of the SSOSA. RCW 9.94A.670(11); State v. McCormick, 166 Wn.2d 689, 698, 213 P.3d 32 (2009). The record establishes a documented pattern of deception, repeated use of unmonitored internet-capable devices on multiple occasions, and prior stipulated violations. The trial court‘s oral ruling at the revocation hearing and its written order expressly relied on the totality of the circumstances: approximately 10 months of dishonest behavior in treatment, a high-risk assessment due to blatant disregard for the rules, an ongoing pattern of deception, and an increased risk to the community. The court found that Sallinger had been given ample opportunity to comply but failed to do so.

We reject Sallinger‘s argument that the trial court improperly relied on violations of unconstitutional restrictions. The revocation order is supported by the stipulated termination from treatment alone.

3. Geographic boundary restriction

Sallinger challenges the geographic boundary restrictions as unconstitutionally vague. The court-imposed condition reads: “Remain within geographic boundary, as set forth in writing by the Community Corrections Officer.” CP at 59. This geographic boundary condition was originally imposed in the February 6, 2023, judgment and sentence. Sallinger did not timely appeal that judgment with respect to this condition. The subject of this appeal, the September 4, 2024, order, revoked the SSOSA and imposed the suspended sentence subject to all previously ordered conditions, including the geographic boundary. Because that order is on appeal, the geographic boundary condition is properly before us.

Our Supreme Court stated that “[w]hile the right to travel is recognized as a fundamental right of citizenship, this right is affected by a criminal conviction.” In re Pers. Restraint of Winton, 196 Wn.2d 270, 274, 474 P.3d 532 (2020). Infringement on an offender‘s right to travel is authorized while the offender is serving community custody. Id. at 275.

Recently, in State v. Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. 2d 977, 572 P.3d 1243 (2025), Division One upheld an identical condition, holding it was not unconstitutionally vague because statutes authorize the trial court to order an offender to remain within, or outside of, a specified geographical boundary, and authorize DOC to set geographic boundaries. The Lundstrom court noted that the CCO‘s authority to impose conditions is limited and must be “‘reasonably related to . . . [t]he crime of conviction, the offender‘s risk of reoffending, or the safety of the community.‘” Id. at 981 (quoting RCW 9.94A.704(7)(b)). If an offender believes a geographic restriction is not related to one of these categories, then the offender has the right to pursue administrative review. Id.

We follow the reasoning in Lundstrom. The condition mandating that Sallinger stay within a geographic boundary proscribed by his CCO is not unconstitutionally vague because the statutes authorize the DOC to set geographic boundaries and because such restrictions are limited in application and subject to review.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

Sallinger submitted a statement of additional grounds for review claiming he was honest with his CCO with whom he did not have a good relationship. This claim does not alter our analysis. The trial court‘s decision rested on the written record of stipulated violations, the treatment provider‘s termination report citing lack of trust and ongoing deception, and the CCO‘s documentation of poor progress and minimization.

CONCLUSION

Sallinger did not preserve his challenges to the DOC and the treatment provider‘s conditions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the SSOSA based on Sallinger‘s stipulated termination from required sex offender treatment. The geographic boundary condition was lawfully imposed.

We affirm.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

Murphy, J.

WE CONCUR:

Staab, C.J.

Cooney, J.