State of Washington v. Jose Angel Lopez, Jr.

Sep 1, 2026
40353-0

MURPHY, J. — In 2011, Jose Angel Lopez Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of assault in the first degree (with a firearm enhancement) and two counts of assault in the second degree. He committed these crimes when he was 17 years old. The trial court found a factual basis to support Lopez‘s guilty plea and imposed a sentence consistent with the plea agreement and the State‘s recommendation. Lopez now appeals from his judgment and sentence, alleging he is entitled to resentencing pursuant to State v. Houston-Sconiers1 as the trial court failed to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth.

Because Lopez entered a joint plea agreement, we affirm under State v. Harris, 4 Wn.3d 108, 559 P.3d 499 (2024).

FACTS

Lopez, then 17 years old, was identified as a suspect in a drive-by shooting. He was charged as an adult with five counts of assault in the first degree (each with a firearm enhancement), two counts of assault in the second degree (each with a firearm enhancement and one with an additional deadly weapon enhancement and a domestic violence enhancement), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. These charges and enhancements carried a potential sentence of 124 years.

In 2011, Lopez appeared before the court for a change of plea and sentencing. A plea agreement, signed by Lopez, was presented to the court. The agreement detailed that Lopez would plead guilty to one count of assault in the first degree with a firearm enhancement and two counts of assault in the second degree. In exchange, the State would dismiss the five other charged crimes and recommend a concurrent sentence of 180 months on the three base offenses, plus a consecutive 60-month confinement for the firearm enhancement, for a total of 240 months.

At the hearing, defense counsel presented the terms of the plea agreement and confirmed the agreed recommendation of 240 months of confinement. The sentencing court engaged Lopez in a colloquy and verified Lopez understood the court was not bound by the recommendation. Lopez acknowledged that he had read the plea agreement, had any questions answered by his attorney, signed the agreement, and was voluntarily pleading guilty to the agreed charges. There was no discussion about Lopez‘s age at the time of the offenses, nor was there any presentation of information related to mitigating qualities of youth. The court accepted the joint recommendation and imposed the 240-month sentence.

This court determined Lopez did not waive his appeal rights. Lopez now appeals.

ANALYSIS

Lopez argues he is entitled to resentencing because the sentencing court did not consider mitigating qualities of youth for both the sentencing range and mandatory firearm enhancement terms. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21 (holding sentencing courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth and have “absolute discretion” to depart downward when sentencing juveniles as adults). Citing to Harris, Lopez argues that the plea agreement bound the prosecution to a certain recommendation but did not bind him. He contends that although he joined the State‘s recommendation, there was no explicit term in the plea agreement prohibiting him from arguing for a lower term of confinement. He argues (1) resentencing is warranted because, under Houston-Sconiers, children are different and (2) “a judge imposing sentence for a person on a crime committed as a juvenile must meaningfully consider the mitigating qualities of youth and must have discretion to make a downward departure from otherwise mandatory sentencing guidelines.” 188 Wn.2d at 21.

The State responds that Lopez received the bargained-for sentence and, pursuant to Harris, resentencing is not required.

We review questions of constitutional law de novo. State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 433, 387 P.3d 650 (2017). We review a sentencing court‘s decision for an abuse of discretion, reversing “only if we find ‘a clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.‘” State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 116, 456 P.3d 806 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Porter, 133 Wn.2d 177, 181, 942 P.2d 974 (1997)).

Houston-Sconiers was decided years after Lopez was sentenced. In that case, our Supreme Court established that trial courts “must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW,] range and/or sentence enhancements.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21. The sentencing court must consider a “juvenile‘s ‘immaturity, impetuosity, . . . failure to appreciate risks and consequences,‘” vulnerability to negative influences, and greater capacity for rehabilitation. Id. at 23 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)). As a direct appeal, Houston-Sconiers applies to Lopez‘s sentence. Harris, 4 Wn.3d at 117.

“‘Plea agreements are contracts.‘” State v. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d 828, 838, 947 P.2d 1199 (1997) (quoting State v. Mollichi, 132 Wn.2d 80, 90, 936 P.2d 408 (1997)). “Due process requires the prosecutor to act in good faith and prohibits undercutting the terms or by conduct evidencing an intent to circumvent the terms of a plea agreement.” Harris, 4 Wn.3d at 117. “Judges play no role in plea negotiations.” Id. at 118. “Courts do, however, play a critically important role when accepting or rejecting a plea agreement: determining whether an agreement is consistent with the interests of justice and with prosecuting standards.” Id. (citing RCW 9.94A.431(1)). While a sentencing judge is not bound by any recommendation contained in an agreement, “once the agreement is accepted by the trial court it becomes a binding agreement between the defendant and the State.” Id. (citing RCW 9.94A.431(2)).

The Houston-Sconiers court did not consider plea agreements. Id. at 120. Our Supreme Court, in Harris, addressed the issue of juvenile plea agreements in the context of defendants sentenced as adults for crimes committed when they were juveniles. In Harris, it was argued that Houston-Sconiers requires judges to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and that the presentation of such evidence must be allowed regardless of a plea bargain or agreed upon sentence recommendation. 4 Wn.3d at 121. The court disagreed, holding “that when parties negotiate a plea agreement requiring neither party to advocate for a lesser sentence, a trial court is not required to sua sponte ask the parties to provide mitigating evidence of youthful qualities if the court accepts the agreed recommendation.” Id. at 122. “Conversely, if the parties have not reached an agreed recommendation or if a court does not accept a plea and agreed recommendation, a trial court must meaningfully consider mitigating evidence related to the qualities of youth as required by Houston-Sconiers.” Id. This rule preserves the bargained-for nature of the plea. Id. at 123. In circumstances of negotiated plea agreements, allowing a defendant to counter the agreed upon terms without characterizing this as a breach of the plea agreement would undermine the State‘s concessions, such as the dismissal of other charged offenses.

This case falls squarely within Harris. The parties, however, present opposite conclusions under Harris on whether Lopez was bound by the plea agreement. Lopez contends the plea agreement did not explicitly prohibit him from arguing for a downward departure, which he claims creates ambiguity. In reviewing the record, including the plea agreement and hearing transcript, the parties entered and presented a joint commitment to a specific arrangement of the plea agreement and what would be recommended to the sentencing court. The plea agreement was signed by Lopez with his affirmation at sentencing that he understood and agreed to the terms of the plea agreement, inclusive of the State‘s sentencing recommendation. Lopez received substantial benefits from the plea agreement he entered with the dismissal of multiple serious charges and a significantly lower term of confinement than what he may have otherwise received. Based on the ruling in Harris and the presented circumstances at this sentencing hearing, the court was not required to sua sponte ask the parties about mitigating qualities of youth. As the court accepted the agreed recommendation, Lopez cannot now successfully claim an entitlement to resentencing without showing a breach or invalidity of the bargained-for agreement.

This plea was presented to the sentencing court as a joint agreement with a joint recommendation for 240 months. Defense counsel and Lopez explicitly joined the recommendation at sentencing. The sentencing court accepted the joint recommendation without deviation. Under these circumstances, the sentencing court had no duty to independently inquire into or consider mitigating qualities of youth. Harris, 4 Wn.3d at 122. To hold otherwise would disrupt the finality of negotiated pleas. Lopez is not entitled to resentencing.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

Murphy, J.

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, J.

Hill, J.

Notes