State of Washington, Respondent v. James Patrick Coleman, Appellant

Sep 1, 2026

60683-6

LEE, J. — James P. Coleman appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (UPCS) with intent to deliver, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his GR 37 objection and allowing the prosecutor‘s peremptory challenge to a Black juror. In a statement of additional grounds (SAG),¹ Coleman raises additional challenges to his convictions. We affirm.

FACTS

On May 22, 2023, the State charged Coleman with UPCS with intent to deliver.² The case proceeded to a jury trial.

During voir dire of the jury panel, the State asked prospective jurors about their reaction to hearing a case that involved a drug charge:

So, what came into everybody‘s head when they heard the charge? Did anybody, when they heard the charge here, had [sic] specific thoughts about it when they heard about a drug charge? No. 27?

JUROR [27]: Just made me think about some of the black sheep I have in my family. They got, you know, drug charges, sales and use—

[STATE]: Okay—

JUROR [27]: —both.

[STATE]: And just kind of following on that. If you‘re hearing the evidence today, based on your experience with your family members, or maybe other people that you know, would that—would—do you feel that you‘d be able to fairly and impartially hear the evidence? Or are you going to be kind of leaning one way or another?

JUROR [27]: Not really sure. Not sure we have an answer for that.

7 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 3044. In addition to Juror 27, several other jurors identified some kind of experience or association with drugs:

JUROR [52]: I just feel like it hits home personally for me, because I‘m going through—I‘m not personally going through it, but my daughter‘s going through it with her boyfriend right now. So, I don‘t think it‘ll make me not be able to do the job, it just . . .

[STATE]: So, it just sounds like, without getting—prying too much in there, it just sounds like at least some aspect of your life has been affected by drugs?

JUROR [52]: (no audible response.)

[STATE]: Okay. No. 51?

JUROR [51]: I just don‘t feel comfortable sharing it right now.

[STATE]: Okay. No. 48?

JUROR [48]: It just made me think about my own experiences. I‘ve been sober from meth for about 11-and-a-half years?

[STATE]: Okay. And kind of following up, kind of similar questions, I hear, based on your past experience, is this a situation if you—well, actually, let me take a step back on there. If this is a situation where you‘re hearing evidence about methamphetamine use, or just methamphetamine itself, is this something that might trigger some feelings or memories for you that might be painful, or to where you don‘t feel like you can sit?

JUROR [48]: No, not at all.

[STATE]: Okay. And if you‘re just—sorry, a follow-up question on it. If you are sitting through this and you‘re hearing evidence, do you feel you can be fair and impartial to both sides?

JUROR [48]: Absolutely.

[STATE]: Okay. No. 5?

JUROR [5]: My uncle, he was addicted to meth and heroin for as long as I‘ve known him. I don‘t think it‘ll affect my ability to be impartial because we weren‘t very close, but that‘s just what came to my head.

[STATE]: Okay. And do you mind passing it to your neighbors?

JUROR [number unclear]: My initial thought was that I wasn‘t surprised. It‘s a big problem in the area, and I know a lot of people who have been affected by it, have used, and so . . .

[STATE]: And do you feel, if you hear evidence that—in regard[] to that, obviously hear the possession with intent, do you feel that you can be fair and impartial to both sides?

[JUROR]: I can.

[STATE]: Okay. Did I miss anybody that wanted to speak on that?

. . . .

JUROR [38]: I am a recovering addict for, like, 20 years; but, I would be impartial about everything. I feel both sides pretty good.

7 VRP at 3044-46.

The State also asked all the jurors about any prior jury service:

By a raise—raising of hands, who has sat on a jury before? Now, those that have their hands up, keep your hand raised if it was a criminal trial? Okay. Now, of those, let‘s see, how I can phrase this here: if you were not able to reach a verdict, can you please—please keep your hand up? So, everybody was able to reach a verdict? Okay. All right. Number 27, were you—

JUROR [27]: You said reach a verdict?

[STATE]: Yes, if you sat on a criminal trial, were you able to reach a verdict?

JUROR [27]: No.

7 VRP at 3043.

After the State completed its voir dire, the State challenged Juror 27 for cause, claiming it was unclear whether Juror 27 would be willing “to come to a conclusion” after hearing the evidence or whether Juror 27 would take “more like a wait and see type response“. 7 VRP at 3064. Coleman‘s counsel argued that Juror 27‘s answers did not support a for cause challenge at that time and explained that he intended to question Juror 27 further during the defense‘s voir dire of the jury venire. The trial court agreed with Coleman‘s counsel and stated that the court would revisit a for cause challenge after Coleman had completed voir dire.

During the defense‘s voir dire of prospective jurors, Coleman asked follow-up questions of Juror 27:

Let‘s see. I made a note with regard to Juror No. 27. So, you‘d indicated when [the State] was up here asking questions, you indicated that because you were reflecting on some of the things, things that family members had gone through, you weren‘t really entirely sure whether you could be fair and impartial. Is that correct?

JUROR [27]: Yes.

[COLEMAN]: Are you still kind of wrestling with that?

JUROR [27]: Due to my mother‘s side of the family, I got a lot of close family that was on that side that had a lot of situations with law enforcement, and in particular me actually seeing this from being a kid, seeing warrants being served to my grandmother‘s house, police running through the house, destroying the home, looking for a specific person that is a family member, trying to help family members, you know, kick the habit. And its’ just a never ending cycle, going right back to it again, you know, getting going in and out of prison. Just a lot.

[COLEMAN]: It is a lot. So, are you continuing to wrestle with this, but ultimately you‘re not leaning one way or the other?

JUROR [27]: I just—I don‘t know. I don‘t have —t —I don‘t really have an answer. I wish I did.

7 VRP at 3073-74.

After Coleman finished voir dire, the State renewed its challenge of Juror 27 for cause. The trial court denied the State‘s for cause challenge because Juror 27 had not stated definitively that they could not be fair and impartial.

After the trial court denied the State‘s for cause challenge of Juror 27, the State indicated it would use a peremptory strike on Juror 27. The State explained its reason was not related to Juror 27‘s past experiences with law enforcement, but instead related to Juror 27‘s equivocality with regard to the impact of their family members’ experiences with drugs on their ability to be fair and impartial:

My doing so is still [Juror 27‘s] hesitancy based on some of [the] responses in regard[] to the past and family members being involved with drugs. And I don‘t think we really got into specifics out of all that. Whether they were—it sounded like some of them had been involved with use, based on [their] statements. But there could have been other circumstances, as well.

It is still a concern in the State‘s mind that once [Juror 27] has that, without [a] definitive answer, if [Juror 27 is] presented with those facts, [Juror 27] may indeed be affected by them once [they are] in the jury room. And by then it‘s too late.

7 VRP at 3080.

Coleman objected to the State‘s use of the peremptory challenge against Juror 27 under GR 37 because Juror 27 was Black. Although Coleman did not believe there was any purposeful discrimination, Coleman argued that an objective observer could view race as a factor in the State‘s preemptory challenge. Coleman broadly contended that Juror 27‘s “equivocation comes from experiences that he has had that would be definitely touching on a couple of the reasons that are presumed to be invalid.” 7 VRP at 3081.

The State reiterated that its challenge was based on Juror 27‘s inability to give a clear answer about whether the family experience with drugs affected their impartiality:

Like I just indicated before, the concern here is what could potentially happen in the jury room when we don‘t have a definitive answer. A lot of the times we‘re having jurors say that, no, I can be fair and impartial, and other jurors saying that they can‘t be fair—fair and impartial. We weren‘t really able to get an answer either way.

And while that might not meet the cause—for cause challenge, that‘s what still causes the State concern. And if it had just been experiences that could be viewed as poorly on law enforcement, that would not be a situation where the State would make a strike. It‘s purely based on the drugs, and [their] experience with family members that have been involved with drugs and how it may affect [them].

7 VRP at 3081-82. The trial court overruled Coleman‘s GR 37 objection to the State‘s preemptory challenge to Juror 27.

Following trial, the jury found Coleman guilty of UPCS with intent to deliver. The trial court imposed a standard range sentence of 50 months of confinement.

Coleman appeals.

ANALYSIS

A. GR 37 Challenge to Striking Juror 27

In his appellate briefing, Coleman argues that the State‘s given “‘reason [for exercising a peremptory challenge on Juror 27] might be disproportionately associated with race or ethnicity.‘” Br. of Appellant at 22 (quoting GR 37(g)(iv)). Specifically, Coleman contends that association with law enforcement has been given as a reason for discriminatorily using peremptory challenges against people of color to remove them from jury panels in our state. Coleman cited GR 37(h)(i) for this statement.

For the first time in this case, at oral argument, Coleman argued that the State‘s purported reason for exercising its peremptory challenge (that Juror 27 had been unsure about his ability to be fair and impartial) should actually be considered a presumptively invalid reason under GR 37(h)(iii). Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., State v. Coleman, No. 60683-6-II (June 18, 2026), at 1 min., 11 sec. to 1 min., 41 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State‘s Public Affairs Network, https://www.tvw.org. In light of our Supreme Court‘s recent decision in State v. Hogan, ___ Wn.3d ___, 591 P.3d 335, 345-48 (2026), we address both arguments.

1. Legal Principles

We review the trial court‘s decision on a GR 37 objection de novo. Hogan, 591 P.3d at 344-45.³ GR 37 was established “to eliminate the unfair exclusion of potential jurors based on race or ethnicity.” GR 37(a). GR 37(c) provides that “[a] party may object to the use of a peremptory challenge to raise the issue of improper bias.” Once a GR 37 objection has been made, the party making the peremptory challenge shall articulate its reasons for the peremptory challenge. GR 37(d).

“If the court determines that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the peremptory challenge shall be denied.” GR 37(e). For the purposes of GR 37, “an objective observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.” GR 37(f).

GR 37(g) provides a non-exclusive list of factors for a court to consider when making a determination on a peremptory challenge:

(i) the number and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, which may include consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the prospective juror about the alleged concern or the types of questions asked about it;

(ii) whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked significantly more questions or different questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in contrast to other jurors;

(iii) whether other prospective jurors provided similar answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party;

(iv) whether a reason might be disproportionately associated with a race or ethnicity; and

(v) whether the party has used peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race or ethnicity, in the present case or in past cases.

We review the record as a whole and consider the totality of the circumstances when reviewing a challenge to a trial court‘s GR 37 decision. State v. Bell, 5 Wn.3d 54, 65, 67, 571 P.3d 272 (2025).

2. No GR 37 Violation

In reviewing the non-exclusive list of factors in GR 37(g), we first consider the number and types of questions posed to Juror 27. GR 37 (g)(i). The record shows that during jury voir dire, the State asked similar number and types of questions of Juror 27 as to the entire jury venire. Therefore, this factor does not indicate that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge.

Second, we consider whether the State asked significantly more or different questions of Juror 27. GR 37(g)(ii). The record does not show that the State asked significantly more or different questions of Juror 27. Therefore, this factor does not indicate that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge to Juror 27.

Third, we consider whether other prospective jurors provided similar answers to Juror 27 but were not subject to a peremptory challenge by the State. GR 37(g)(iii). Coleman emphasizes this factor, pointing out that multiple other jurors answered that they had some personal or family history with drugs but were not the subject of peremptory challenges by the State.

However, the record shows that Juror 27‘s personal or family history with drugs was not the reason for the State‘s peremptory challenge. Rather, the State‘s peremptory challenge was based on Juror 27‘s equivocal responses when asked if personal or family history with drugs would affect impartiality.⁴ In contrast to Juror 27‘s responses, all except one of the other jurors who indicated that they had a personal or family history with drugs definitively stated that they would be impartial.⁵ The only juror who indicated a hesitation about discussing the specifics of a history with drugs, Juror 51, was excused by the court for hardship. Because Juror 27 was the only prospective juror who expressed equivocation about the ability to be impartial based on a family history with drugs, Juror 27 did not provide similar answers to other jurors.⁶ Therefore, this third factor does not indicate that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge to Juror 27.

Fourth, we consider whether the State‘s reason for the peremptory challenge might be disproportionately associated with a race or ethnicity. GR 37(g)(iv). Coleman asserts that the State relied on a presumptively invalid reason for its peremptory challenge. In his brief, Coleman references GR 37(h)(i) which provides that “having prior contact with law enforcement officers” is a presumptively invalid reason.

The record shows that Juror 27 stated he had seen law enforcement officers serving a warrant at his grandmother‘s house, but there is no indication in the record that Juror 27 had direct contact with law enforcement or that the incident had anything to do with Juror 27. Further, Juror 27 did not express any negative opinion or distrust toward law enforcement based on that experience. Also, during the discussions of the GR 37 challenge, the State recognized that contact with law enforcement was a presumptively invalid reason and stated that it was not relying on that reason for its peremptory challenge. Instead, the State repeatedly stated that the reason for its peremptory challenge was Juror 27‘s equivocal answers to questions as to whether Juror 27 could be fair and impartial in light of past family experiences with drugs and law enforcement. Here, the fourth factor based on Coleman‘s reliance of prior contacts with law enforcement officers would not indicate to an objective observer that race or ethnicity was a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge.

In oral argument, Coleman also argued that the State‘s asserted reason for the peremptory challenge—how Juror 27‘s family‘s history with drugs impacted his ability to be fair and impartial—was presumptively invalid under GR 37(h)(iii). Wash. Ct. of App. oral arg., supra, at 1 min., 11 sec. to 1 min., 41 sec.

GR 37(h)(iii) states that “having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime” is a presumptively invalid reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. Although Juror 27 did not state that any of his family had been stopped, arrested, or convicted of crimes related to their history with drugs, we acknowledge that it is a reasonable inference from Juror 27‘s answers that at least some of his family members may have had some criminal consequences related to their drug history, which could implicate this presumptively invalid reason. However, Juror 27‘s undisputed inability to definitively state whether they could be fair and impartial distinguishes this case.

Generally, when a party exercises a peremptory challenge, the juror has stated that they can be fair and impartial but there remains some identified reason or reasons that the party exercising the peremptory challenge relies on to move to strike the juror. See, e.g., Hogan, 591 P.3d at 341, 349-50 (juror responded that they would keep an open mind about the case and consider the evidence; State exercised its peremptory, in part, because juror seemed to have trouble articulating a position in front of a group); State v. Thompson, ___ Wn. App. 2d ___, 590 P.3d 732, 738-40 (2026) (juror stated he thought he could participate and follow the rules and thought his role as juror was to listen to the evidence presented and apply the law; State argued that it did not think the juror could be fair and impartial based on his bias against the criminal justice system as a whole).

Here, in contrast, Juror 27 could not definitively state that they could be fair and impartial. 7 VRP at 3044 (Juror 27 was “[n]ot really sure” if they would be able to be fair and impartial or if they would be leaning one way or the other.); 7 VRP at 3074 (When asked if ultimately they were leaning one way or another, Juror 27 answered, “I just—I don‘t know. I don‘t have—t —I don‘t really have an answer. I wish I did.“). In a case such as this, where the challenged juror was unable to state whether they can be fair and impartial, there remains a valid reason for the peremptory challenge that is independent and distinct from any other reason. Therefore, we do not consider the reason for the State‘s peremptory challenge as a presumptively invalid reason of close relationships with people who have been stopped, arrested, or convicted of a crime.⁷ Exercising a peremptory challenge because a juror cannot definitively state they can be fair and impartial is not related to a race or ethnicity. Therefore, the fourth factor does not indicate that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge.

Fifth, we consider whether the State used its peremptory challenges disproportionately against a given race or ethnicity. GR 37(g)(v). Coleman asserts that this factor weighs in support of determining that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge because the State used its peremptory challenge to remove the only Black prospective juror from the jury venire. Despite the fact that the racial or ethnic composition of the jury venire and the selected jury panel is not clear in our record, it does appear that the State exercised its peremptory challenge disproportionately against the only juror identified as Black.⁸ Therefore, this fifth factor might indicate that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge.

Although we recognize that the State‘s peremptory challenges may have been used against the only Black juror in the jury venire, this factor must be balanced against the other factors which do not indicate that race or ethnicity was a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge of Juror 27.

As explained above, the State‘s reason for exercising the peremptory challenge against Juror 27 was based on Juror 27‘s equivocation when repeatedly asked if they could be fair and impartial. Juror 27 was simply unable to state that they could be fair and impartial in this case. This reason is supported by the record. And Juror 27, while allegedly was the only Black prospective juror, was also the only prospective juror who was uncertain about their ability to be fair and impartial, and fairness and impartiality are the foundation of jury selection. See State v. Bell, 26 Wn. App. 2d 821, 829, 529 P.3d 448, review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1035 (2023) (“Voir dire, the part of jury selection wherein the parties ask questions and engage in discussion with potential jurors to draw out potential bias, is central to securing the right to an impartial jury.“).

Considering all the GR 37(g) factors and the totality of the circumstances in the record as a whole, we conclude that an objective observer could not view race or ethnicity as a factor in the State‘s peremptory challenge. Given the record before us, to hold otherwise would create a per se rule that GR 37 prohibits use of a peremptory challenge against the only member of a particular race or ethnicity, regardless of the reason for doing so. We decline to adopt such a rule. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s decision overruling Coleman‘s GR 37 objection to the State‘s peremptory challenge to Juror 27.

B. SAG

In his SAG, Coleman also raises several challenges to his conviction.

First, Coleman claims that one of the jurors was the ex-sister-in-law of the person who drove them to and from court and, as a result, was biased against Coleman. However, there are no facts in the record on appeal establishing a relationship between the juror and whomever drove Coleman to court. We will not consider matters outside the record on direct appeal. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Therefore, we decline to consider Coleman‘s first SAG claim.

Second, Coleman claims that the State misled the jury by showing them a picture of money seized during the arrest as evidence because Coleman claims the money was returned upon release. Again, whether the money was returned to Coleman is not in the record before this court. Accordingly, we also decline to consider this claim. See id.

Third, Coleman claims defense counsel helped the prosecutor mislead the jury because defense counsel asked Coleman to testify about bank records that showed a withdrawal of money on May 2, when Coleman claims no money could have been withdrawn on May 2 because Coleman had been arrested. At trial, Coleman testified that they had methamphetamine in their possession on May 1, but it was only for personal use and that they were not intending to sell it or give it to anyone else. Coleman also testified that when they get their social security check at the beginning of the month, they withdraw it from the bank, pay bills, and will usually buy a bag of methamphetamine. And Coleman‘s defense counsel introduced Coleman‘s bank records which Coleman testified showed a $914 deposit on May 1. Coleman explained this deposit was their social security money. Coleman then testified that the bank record showed three $300 withdrawals on May 2. Finally, Coleman testified that they believed the bank record was incorrect because the money was withdrawn on May 1. And Coleman testified they could not have withdrawn the money on May 2 because they were in jail.

Reviewing the record, Coleman‘s defense counsel elicited testimony that allowed Coleman to explain their version of events, consistent with the version of events as relayed in the SAG. Nothing in the record supports Coleman‘s assertion that defense counsel misled the jury. Accordingly, Coleman‘s final SAG claim fails.

We affirm Coleman‘s conviction for UPCS with intent to deliver.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Lee, J.

We concur:

Veljacic, C.J.

Maxa, J.

Notes

RAP 10.10.

The information also included a charge for violation of ignition interlock. The ignition interlock charge was dismissed prior to trial.

To the extent that Coleman argues that the trial court also erred by misunderstanding GR 37, we note that under de novo review, we do not review the reasons for the trial court‘s decision. Because our Supreme Court has clarified that the standard of review for GR 37 decisions is de novo, we decline to review the trial court‘s reasons for denying Coleman‘s GR 37 objection and limit our review to whether an objective observer could view race as a factor in the State‘s exercise of peremptory challenge to strike Juror 27. .

In response to the State‘s inquiry as to whether Juror 27 could fairly and impartially hear the evidence or lean toward one side or another, Juror 27 responded, “Not really sure. Not sure we have an answer for that.” 7 VRP at 3044. And in response to Coleman asking whether Juror 27 was leaning one way or another, Juror 27 responded, “I just—I don‘t know. I don‘t have —t —I don‘t really have an answer. I wish I did.” 7 VRP at 3074.

Juror 52 (“I don‘t think it‘ll make me not be able to do the job.“), Juror 48 (“No. not at all,” and “Absolutely.“), Juror 5 (“I don‘t think it will affect my ability to be impartial.“), Unidentified Juror (“I can [be fair and impartial to both sides].“), Juror 38 (“I would be impartial about everything.“). 7 VRP at 3044-46.

In addition to generally referencing other jurors who had a past experience with drugs, Coleman also asserts that “Juror number 56 expressly said he did not think he could be fair on a drug case but was not removed.” Br. of Appellant at 21-22. We note that Juror 56‘s statement of bias was related to past juror service on a similar drug case, not a past personal or family experience with drug use. Further, the record demonstrates that Juror 56 was excused for cause by agreement of the parties. Accordingly, Juror 56 is not relevant to the analysis of GR 37(g)(iii).

This is an important distinction because both the State and the defendant have the right to an impartial jury. ; , review denied, . It would be an affront to this right to prevent a party from removing a juror who is unable to determine whether they can be fair and impartial and instead require them to wait until the juror is in deliberations to find out whether the juror can be fair and impartial, when it is too late to take any action to protect the right to an impartial jury.

Juror 27 was the only juror who was identified as Black in the record. However, there is no record documenting the racial or ethnic makeup of either the jury venire or the seated jury panel.